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Abstract
A multi-path automatic ground collision avoidance system (Auto-GCAS) for perfor-
mance limited aircraft was further developed and improved to prevent controlled flight
into terrain. This research includes flight test results from the United States Test Pilot
School’s Test Management Project (TMP) titled Have Multi-Path Escape Decisions
Using Sophisticated Algorithms (MEDUSA). Currently, the bomber and mobility air-
craft communities lack an Auto-GCAS. The F-16 Auto-GCAS was proven successful
for fighter-type aircraft with seven aircraft and eight lives saved from 2014 to 2018.
The newly developed and tested Rapidly Selectable Escape Trajectory (RSET) sys-
tem included a 5-path implementation which continuously updated at a rate of up to
12.5 Hz. The research employed Level 1 Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) to
identify the offending terrain and an augmented 6 Degree-of-Freedom (DoF) Stitched
aerodynamic model to create terrain avoidance paths based on the aircraft’s current
state and location. The system then triggered when all paths predicted collision with
the DTED and automatically activated the path which had the longest time until
impact. A terrain safety buffer (TSB) of 200 ft added to the DTED to allowed for
the time needed to process and execute the maneuver. The RSET system was flight
tested against DTED using the Calspan Learjet 25D Variable Stability System (VSS).
Path prediction error (PPE) did not meet the specified criteria and was larger than
expected for the 30-second path predictions; however, at the maximum refresh rate
of 12.5 Hz, the RSET system ensured terrain clearance in all cases tested. The RSET
system was able to achieve and maintain target load factor and flight path angle with
momentary overshoots. The system showed no tendency for nuisance. The RSET
hand-back was favorable and can be used as a baseline for future Auto-GCASs.
iv
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This work is dedicated to the men and women who, in the line of service to our great
country, lost their lives to CFIT. Let their sacrifice not be in vain when we now
have the tools and the knowledge to prevent these tragedies in the future.
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MULTI-PATH AUTOMATIC GROUND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM
FOR PERFORMANCE LIMITED AIRCRAFT
WITH FLIGHT TESTS:
PROJECT HAVE MEDUSA
I. Introduction
Despite advances in technology and training, as of this writing Controlled Flight
into Terrain (CFIT) remains a significant cause of fatal aircraft accidents [1]. Substan-
tial progress has been made in developing and fielding Automatic Ground Collision
Avoidance Systems (Auto-GCASs) for fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), but there has been limited work done for performance limited (Class III)
aircraft. Class III aircraft, as defined in MIL-STD-1797B, are generally less maneu-
verable and have low power-to-weight ratios, and thus, recovery trajectories must
be developed which take into account these performance limitations [2]. This work
presents the research, design, and testing efforts to develop an Auto-GCAS for per-
formance limited aircraft. The Auto-GCAS discussed herein, known as the Rapidly
Selectable Escape Trajectory (RSET) system, leveraged previous Air Force Institute
of Technology (AFIT) and Test Pilot School (TPS) research efforts and sought to
significantly advance Auto-GCAS technology.
1.1 Background
As of 2019, CFIT was a primary reason for aircraft total losses and fatalities [3].
In fact it was only in 2014 that Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I) overtook CFIT as
the leading cause of fatal accidents in air transportation [4]. Figure 1.1 presents a
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ten-year look at CFIT accident rates in commercial aviation [4]. According to the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “CFIT occurs when an airworthy aircraft
is flown, under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain, water, or obstacles with
inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impeding collision” [5]. The issues
that arise which lead to CFIT then are directly related to the pilot and crew. These
issues are both external (weather/visibility, air traffic control (ATC) error, aid to
navigation (ATON) malfunction, etc.)and internal (poor crew resource management
(CRM), failure to adhere to standard operating procedures (SOPs), poor cross-check,
etc.) [6]. Over the years, manual warning systems have been put into service to notify
crew of impending terrain impact, yet CFIT still occurs.
To date, the majority of Auto-GCAS research has focused on fighter type aircraft
and UAVs. The successful F-16 Fighting Falcon Auto-GCAS program can be traced
back to the 1980s [7]. What ultimately catalyzed the program was a 2003 memo-
randum by then Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld challenging military
leaders to reduce preventable accidents by 50% [8]. This prompted a Defense Safety
Oversight Council (DSOC) business case analysis (BCA) which identified that CFIT
was in fact the #1 cause of fighter pilot fatalities [9]. In 2007 SecDef Robert Gates
pushed for a reduction in preventable accidents of 75% [10]. The F-16 Auto-GCAS
system was fielded in 2014 and has since saved eight pilots and seven aircraft [11–13].
UAVs provide a cost-effective and ideal platform for researchers to develop and
test Auto-GCAS technologies. Many effective approaches and solutions to prevent
UAV ground collisions have been developed, but those solutions are not necessarily
applicable to transport aircraft. This research continued the foundational works by
Suplisson and Trombetta that have been the primary direct efforts towards making
multi-path Auto-GCAS a reality [14, 15].
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Figure 1.1. Top Commercial Aviation Fatal Accident Categories 2008-2017 [4]
1.2 Research Problem Motivation and Description
Although a thorough BCA had not been performed as of 2018, data existing sup-
ports the need for Auto-GCAS on performance limited aircraft. Col Peter Mapes,
author of the 2006 Fighter/Attack BCA, stated “the reaction timing of the human
beings in the cockpits sometimes fell below the reaction timing required to avoid colli-
sion with the ground...” [16]. Clearly reaction time and human error is not a problem
just for fighter aircraft, but all aircraft. 2011 data from C-130 Hercules builder Lock-
heed Martin identified 30 CFIT accidents for that aircraft over its life resulting in
433 deaths not including the HAZE 01 mishap described next in Section 1.2.1 which
brings the total to 31 CFITs and 438 deaths for C-130s alone [17]. Furthermore in
2017 a group of students from the U.S. Air Force Academy, under the supervision of
Col Angela Suplisson, performed an initial business study and found that at least five
USAF C-130 CFITs could have been prevented by Auto-GCAS. Those five CFITs
alone account for 34 lives lost and $385M worth of aircraft destroyed [18].
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To highlight the need for Auto-GCAS on performance aircraft, two tragic but
preventable mishaps are presented below.
1.2.1 Case Studies: HAVOC 58 and HAZE 01.
This section discusses two CFIT incidents where an Auto-GCAS system would
have likely prevented impact with terrain.
HAVOC 58.
The information for the following case study was provided in an article by the
Flight Safety Foundation [19].
HAVOC 58, a United States Air Force (USAF) Lockheed C-130H Hercules, took
off from Jackson Hole Airport in Jackson, Wyoming at 2247L on 17 August 1996.
Three minutes and 20 seconds later the aircraft impacted Sheep Mountain east of
Jackson at an altitude of 10,392 feet mean sea level (MSL). The USAF Accident
Investigation Board (AIB) determined that the crew
“failed to avoid the mountainous terrain ahead. They were complacent
and not situationally aware of their proximity to that terrain. Visual cues
were limited by a dark, moonless night. Radar information, which would
have been showing on the navigators radar scope, was not correctly in-
terpreted. Arrival/departure charts were not studied by the pilot/copilot
and were incorrectly interpreted by the navigator”[20].
The combination of errors led to the deaths of the eight crew members and one pas-
senger. At the time of impact the estimated aircraft states were a magnetic heading
(ψ) of 77 degrees, 173 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and climbing flight with a
pitch angle (θ) of seven to eight degrees. HAVOC 58 struck the mountain 500 ft be-
low the ridge. Beginning 30 seconds from the time of impact, had the pilot increased
their pitch angle by just 3.3o they would have avoided the ridge-line. The presence
of a functioning Auto-GCAS system on HAVOC 58 could have alerted the crew of a
4
Figure 1.2. HAVOC 58 Flight Path
potentially dangerous aircraft state and, if needed, executed an escape maneuver to
avoid terrain.
HAZE 01.
The information for the following case study was provided by a report produced
by the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority [21].
HAZE 01, a Norwegian Air Force (NAF) Lockheed-Martin C-130J Super Hercules,
took off from Harstad/Narvik Airport in Norway at 1340Z with a flight planned
route to Kiruna Airport in Sweden. Following takeoff the crew climbed to flight level
(hundreds of feet above MSL) (FL) 130 and established a holding pattern 45 nautical
miles (NM) south of the departure airport. The crew established a holding pattern
for one hour, then headed east towards the destination airport. At 1454Z HAZE
01 was cleared from FL 130 to FL 100. One minute later upon contacting Kiruna
Airport HAZE 01 was cleared to descend to FL 70, which it reached at 1457Z. 29
seconds later, the aircraft impacted Kebnekaise mountain 150 ft below the ridge-line,
as shown in Figure 1.4. Similar to HAVOC 58, had the pilot adjusted the aircraft
5
Figure 1.3. HAZE 01 Flight Path [21]: (CTA = “control area”, TMA = “terminal
control area”)
flight path by 1o 30 seconds earlier, the aircraft would have avoided the mountain. A
functioning Auto-GCAS could have easily avoided the terrain and saved the 4 crew
members and 1 passenger on board.
It is worth noting that although the crew members of HAZE 01 were not U.S.
military they were all seasoned aircrew who were trained and certified in the United
States. This accident could have just as likely happened to a proficient U.S. crew.
1.2.2 Mishap Causal Factors.
In the two cases just presented, as well as all CFIT incidents, a number of con-
tributing factors are involved. For HAVOC 58 it was mostly crew error that led to the
CFIT occuring. For HAZE 01 it was a combination of misunderstanding, miscommu-
nication, and technological shortfalls. First, the crew of HAZE 01 believed they were
under the control of Kiruna Approach and within Kiruna’s radar coverage, which
they were not. Second the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) installed on
the C-130J lacked terrain data above 60o N latitude where the crew was transiting,
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Figure 1.4. HAZE 01 Point of Impact [21]
(CVR = “cockpit voice recorder”)
as shown in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.6 shows a summary of all CFIT contributing factors for commercial
aircraft according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). An asterisk,
“ * ”, is used to indicate causal factors that this research identified could either be
prevented by or would not negatively affect a well-designed and functioning Auto-
GCAS. With sufficient motivation given, the following sections describe the goals and
limitations of this research.
1.3 Objectives and Scope
The purpose of this research was to further develop, improve, and flight test an
Auto-GCAS system for performance limited aircraft. As with all USAF ground colli-
sion avoidance systems, this system was designed based on the principal requirements
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(a) TAWS Void Above 60o N
(? indicates HAZE 01 crash
site)
(b) TAWS display.
Voids appear in magenta.
Figure 1.5. TAWS Terrain Void [21]
Figure 1.6. Worldwide CFIT Contributing Factors (* denotes Auto-GCAS unaffected
by) [4]
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of [22]:
1. Do No Harm
2. Do Not Impede Mission Performance
3. Avoid Ground Collision
These requirements, which are listed in priority order, were key to creating a
system which would be acceptable to the operational aviation community.
1.3.1 Research Objectives.
This research continued the works of Suplisson, Trombetta, and Sorokowski et
al. Suplisson’s research addressed how to determine the optimal ground collision
avoidance path. Trombetta conducted the first USAF flight test of a heavy aircraft
ground collision avoidance algorithm. Sorokowski et al. leveraged the success of the
F-16 Auto-GCAS program to develop and flight test Auto-GCAS on a small UAV.
As such, this research adopted several of their recommendations as objectives. These
objectives are listed briefly below and are described in detail in later chapters. Each
objective, where applicable, includes the reference from which it was motivated.
1. Apply 6-degree of freedom (DoF) equations of motion for aircraft path predic-
tion [14]
2. Allow for a variable aircraft initial state [15]
3. Determine necessary number of RSETs [15, 23]
4. Integrate auto-throttle for maneuver execution [14]
5. Perform continuous path analysis, even during maneuver [15]
6. Achieve ≥ 6 Hz operation with MATLAB implementation [14]
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7. Include wind and density altitude effects [15, 23]
Additionally the author, through careful review of existing literature, has identi-
fied other important objectives that have yet to be explored.
8. Use of identical control laws for both path prediction and maneuver execution
9. Identify multi-path Auto-GCAS nuisance criteria
10. Determine maneuver termination criteria
Ultimately this research aimed to not only demonstrate the feasibility of Auto-
GCAS for performance limited aircraft but to also provide an RSET flight-tested
solution that could be adapted to multiple platforms.
1.3.2 Flight Test Objectives.
The overall test objective was to demonstrate the utility of the RSET system as
a multi-path automatic ground collision avoidance system for performance limited
aircraft. The specific test objectives were to:
1. Demonstrate the path prediction accuracy of the RSET system.
2. Demonstrate the impact of changing the refresh rate on the RSET system’s
ability to calculate an achievable escape path
3. Observe the RSET system tendency to nuisance activation
4. Observe the control hand-back of the RSET system after maneuver termination
The rationale behind the choice of flight test objectives is covered in Section 3.7.
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1.4 Constraints
Due to available resources, the Calspan Learjet 25D (LJ-25D) Variable Stability
System (VSS) was used as a surrogate for performance limited aircraft. As is discussed
throughout this document the maneuver performance of the LJ-25D was restricted
to simulate the capabilities of the objective military aircraft. Additionally all testing
was conducted as part of a USAF TPS test management project (TMP). TMPs are
limited to a fixed number of test flights within a two week testing window and have
several safety limitations. Operational testing of an Auto-GCAS would ultimately
requires more test flights and higher risk test points than those presented here.
The auto-throttle in the LJ-25D VSS was not capable of setting consistent throttle
settings and, as such, was not used. Because of this, when an escape maneuver was
commanded, the evaluation pilot (EP) had to manually advance the throttles to the
required setting. This added some variability to the model path prediction and actual
path performance. This was accepted since it was already understood that the engine
model was low fidelity and would induce error even with an auto-throttle. The engine
model is discussed further in Section 3.2.2.
Many of the design choices made with respect to algorithm structure, propaga-
tion length, and integration step size were made due to computational performance
limitations. With increased computing power more robust or sophisticated solutions
may become viable.
Navigation errors and Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) accuracy were not
evaluated in this project. As such, any reference to the distance between the aircraft
and terrain refers to the distance between the aircraft’s navigation solution and the
DTED loaded in the research laptop. This was different than the actual distance
between the aircraft and real terrain features since DTED elevations and navigation
solutions are known to have error.
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1.5 Limitations
The primary limitation identified is that this research relied upon existing mod-
els available and it was beyond the scope of this work to develop a custom model.
Recommendations regarding application specific model tailoring are presented later.
1.6 Assumptions
This research sought to be as rigorous and portable to multiple aircraft as possi-
ble. Nevertheless, assumptions were necessary given the time and resources available.
First, it is assumed that the Calspan Learjet 25D VSS can serve as a surrogate for an
actual performance limited aircraft as defined in Section 2.9. Second it is understood
that the algorithm presented herein, though designed for use on a performance lim-
ited aircraft, may not necessarily be applicable to all such aircraft. Each aircraft has
its own unique flight characteristics and careful consideration and testing is needed
to tailor an Auto-GCAS solution to aircraft performance. Lastly, it is assumed that
the design choices and navigation/DTED accuracy discussed in Section 1.4 do not
invalidate the results presented herein.
1.7 Expected Contributions
The results of this research will ultimately increase the growing body of knowl-
edge for ground collision avoidance systems. It is the author’s hope that the efforts
described herein will be a significant leap forward towards developing and fielding
an effective and life-saving Auto-GCAS for performance limited aircraft. Through
extensive simulator testing and flight testing at USAF TPS the system presented
here should prove to be both a valid and feasible solution for CFIT prevention in
bomber/transport aircraft.
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1.8 Chapter Summary and Document Outline
This chapter serves as a starting point for presenting the research efforts and
results of developing a multi-path Auto-GCAS. From the tragic CFIT accidents de-
scribed and the data presented herein, the case for Auto-GCAS was made. Chapter
II presents a review of literature from academia and industry regarding GCASs and
is the body of knowledge upon which this research effort expands. Chapter III out-
lines the methodology used and Chapter IV presents the results of real-world manned
flight test. Lastly, Chapter V presents the conclusions, recommendations, and lessons
learned which will be beneficial for subsequent work supporting this important re-
search. Additionally there are a number of appendices which provide amplifying
information and are referenced throughout this document: Appendix A: Support-
ing Figures, Appendix B: Daily Flight Reports (from flight test), Appendix C: Data
Analysis Procedures, Appendix D: Test Points, Appendix E: Path Prediction Error
(explained in Chapter III), Appendix F: Virtual Terrain Activation Results (explained
in Chapter III), Appendix G: Software Configuration Tracker, Appendix H: 412th Test
Wing Objective Rating Criteria, Appendix I: Digital Appendix, Appendix J: Control
Hand-back in-flight survey, and Appendix K: Aircrew Comments.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
Chapter II provides the background for this research. First a common vernacular
when discussing and categorizing Ground Collision Avoidance Systems is established.
Next, several existing GCASs both operational and still in Research and Development
(R&D) are presented. Then the computer model on which this research is built, the
Learjet 25D Stitched Model, is introduced. Lastly, various classification criteria as
well as the test framework planned for this research are presented to set the stage for
the methodology described in Chapter III.
2.2 Conflict Detection and Resolution
With the increasing ubiquity of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, ex-
tensive research has been done on Conflict Detection and Resolution (CDR) systems
for applications on land, sea, and air. While significant work has been accomplished
in recent years with regard to aircraft CFIT avoidance, the majority of CDR meth-
ods focus on air-to-air collision avoidance solutions [14]. Following the structure of
Suplisson and Trombetta, this chapter will discuss CDR as it relates to Auto-GCAS
in five of the six key design factors identified by Kuchar and Yang [14, 15, 24]. The
sixth design factor that Kuchar and Yang discuss is “Multiple Conflicts”, but that is
only applicable to Automatic Air Collision Avoidance Systems (Auto-ACASs). The
Kuchar and Yang design factors presented here are:
• State Propagation
• State Dimensions
• Conflict Detection Threshold
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• Conflict Resolution
• Resolution Maneuvers.
This research has also identified other key implementation areas that distinguish
Auto-GCAS approaches, which are:
• Model Fidelity
• Trajectory Limitation
• Digital Elevation Model (DEM) Post Capture
• Safety Buffer.
2.2.1 State Propagation.
Kuchar and Yang discussed three approaches to propagating the state of an air-
craft to predict its location at some time in the future [24]. These three methods,
which are depicted in Figure 2.1, are identified as (a) nominal, (b) worst-case, and (c)
probabilistic. Before diving into these scenarios, it is worth noting that Kuchar and
Yang were addressing Auto-ACAS which involves an avoiding “ownship” aircraft and
an avoided “intruder” aircraft, such as instances described by Richardson et al. [25].
In the case of Auto-GCAS the avoiding aircraft is maneuvering to avoid the ground,
which is of course stationary. This is an important distinction to keep in mind when
considering the applicability of each method.
In the nominal case, the path of the aircraft is forecast along one trajectory, such
as using current location, velocity, and heading to predict a future location assuming
no change in velocity or heading. The Auto-GCAS system on the F-16, which is
discussed later in detail in Section 2.3.2.1 relies on a nominal path prediction based
on a roll to wings-level and a 5-g pull-up maneuver [26]. A clear limitation of this
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method is the inability to account for trajectory uncertainty, introduced by such
things as navigational error or atmospherics such as wind.
The worst-case approach assumes “that an aircraft will perform any of a range
of maneuvers. If any one of these maneuvers could cause a conflict, then a conflict
is predicted” [24]. It will be shown that this approach is the most relevant for de-
veloping a minimum nuisance Auto-GCAS system for heavy aircraft. In the case of
Auto-GCAS, however, the “worst-case” corollary is “maximum performance” [14, 15].
In other words, the Auto-GCAS implementation of the “worst-case” approach is at
the point where the aircraft is required to use the maximum of some performance
parameter, be it load factor, bank angle, etc., else the aware aircrew would consider
the maneuver a nuisance.
Lastly the probabilistic method is implemented either by applying uncertainty
analysis to a nominal model or a set of possible trajectories are given weights based
on their likelihood of occurring. Sorokowski et al. use a probabilistic approach to
account for trajectory uncertainty in their development of a small UAV Auto-GCAS
system. Their system is discussed in Section 2.3.3.1.
Figure 2.1. Kuchar and Yang State Propagation Methods [24]
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2.2.2 State Dimensions.
Kuchar and Yang described state dimensions as the planes in which the CDR
model operates [24]. This means the horizontal plane, the vertical plane, or both.
Through their exhaustive research, Kuchar and Yang identified that the majority
of CDR models operated in either the horizontal plane or both the horizontal and
vertical plane, with only one, Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), operating
in the vertical plane. Suplisson identified the necessity of 3-Dimensional (3-D) state
information for Auto-GCAS so that terrain in all directions can be avoided [14].
Consequently, among Auto-GCAS, 3-D state information is the most common as is
shown in the survey of ground avoidance systems in Section 2.3.
2.2.3 Conflict Detection.
There are a number of ways in which CDR algorithms can determine if a potential
conflict is present. These methods include, but are not limited to, time until Closest
Point of Approach (CPA), horizontal range to a terrain feature, Height Above Terrain
(HaT), or a combination of these. For instance, Suplisson examined a left-center-right
look-down method wherein the terrain to the left and right as well as beneath the
optimal path is evaluated for collision detection [14]. Typically GCAS algorithms
analyze the terrain directly beneath the predicted path to determine if a conflict
exists and rely on safety buffers, discussed in Section 2.2.9, to account for maneuver
delays or lateral terrain features.
2.2.4 Conflict Resolution.
Of the five conflict resolution methods identified by Kuchar and Yang and dis-
cussed in depth by Suplisson, the prescribed and optimal resolution methods are the
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most relevant to Auto-GCAS applications [14, 24, 27]. Force field1 provides neither
the predictability of a prescribed maneuver nor the nuisance minimization of the op-
timal maneuver. By definition, manual and no resolution approaches are irrelevant
for Auto-GCAS. As such, the force field, manual, and no resolution methods will be
ignored for the discussion herein.
Prescribed solutions can take on a variety of forms. They can be fixed or flexible
and have one or multiple evasion options. GPWS and Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning System (EGPWS) both provide a simple “PULL UP” command when the
conflict is in the warning area [28, 29]. NASA’s Small UAV, by contrast, used an
on-board autopilot to calculate its three recovery trajectories. Though these paths
were still prescribed, the autopilot adapted to changes in the UAV’s flight profile [23].
The optimal conflict resolution sought to find the best possible solution to a given
set of rules and objective. In the case of Auto-GCAS, an objective could be to use
maximum control, or performance, while avoiding ground collision subject to the
limits of the aircraft. A problem of this form was addressed by Suplisson, and will
be discussed in Section 2.3.3.3 [14]. The optimal resolution is by nature adaptive and
unique for each situation.
2.2.5 Resolution Maneuvers.
Resolution maneuvers refer to the myriad of possible escape trajectory options the
model calculates and allows. The escape maneuvers can involve the vertical plane,
horizontal plane, a change in speed, or a combination. Note that this is different
from state dimension, such as how the F-16 Auto-GCAS accounted for terrain in
three dimensions, but only determines a climbing (vertical) escape and not a lateral
escape or speed change.
1The force field method, which is generally used in AACAS scenarios, treats each aircraft as
a charged particle and relies on electrostatic physics equations to determine avoidance and ensure
separation. [24]
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2.2.6 Model Fidelity.
Model fidelity is important as it encompasses the degree to which a model can
accurately predict the future location of the aircraft. A highly accurate model can be
used to make reliable estimates of possible future locations, including during an avoid-
ance maneuver. Increasing fidelity, be it by moving from 3 to 6 DoFs or including
wind and other perturbations, comes at the expense of increased computation require-
ments. There is a balance that must be struck between the fidelity of the model and
the need to operate in real-time. Indeed the majority of systems discussed here rely
upon 3-DoF point mass models for path propagation. As described in Chapter III,
this research utilized a high fidelity 6-DoF model to accurately estimate the aircraft
states continuously throughout the aircraft’s flight and during escape maneuvers, and
in a timely manner.
2.2.7 Trajectory Limitations.
Trajectory limitations describe the driving factor in why one escape profile would
be preferred over another. In all cases, the Auto-GCAS is operating in a manner
so as to avoid nuisances, but not all systems are inherently capable of the same
maneuvers. For instance the F-16 was capable of more than a 5-g pull, yet it was
designed to use less than maximum load factor to account for the fact that the pilot
may have become incapacitated due to g-induced Loss of Consciousness (g-LOC).
Other systems are limited by the structural or performance limit of the aircraft itself.
An Auto-GCAS operates so that these limitations are not exceeded, but take full
advantage of the maximum flight envelope of the aircraft.
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2.2.8 DEM Post Capture.
Common among Auto-GCASs proposed and is use is the use of a Digital Elevation
Model (DEM) to serve as the terrain which is to be avoided. A DEM is “a represen-
tation of a surface in terms of elevation values that change with position” [30]. This
elevation data is usually presented in matrix form with uniformly spaced elevation
values, or “posts”. Among DEMs, Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED), which ref-
ered to terrain data gathered from either the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA) or National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Shuttle Radar To-
pography Mission (SRTM) DTED, is the most common. The manner in which the
projected aircraft position is compared to this terrain to determine if a conflict exists,
however, varies. Table 2.1 shows the various levels of DTED and the corresponding
resolution of the terrain and how far apart the individual height measurements, or
“posts”, were spaced. In all cases the DEM is not continuous, and therefore some
method must be used to resolve the aircraft’s propagated path compared to a set
of discrete DTED posts. The methods found in current research included scanning,
interpolating, or placing a buffer, or “bubble”, around the aircraft. These methods
are depicted in Figure 2.2, and are described next.
Table 2.1. Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Types [14, 31]
DTED
Level
Post Spacing
(arc-sec)
Post Spacing
(horiz. distance)
Cells per
Degree
DTED-0 30 ≈ 900 m 120
DTED-1 3 ≈ 90 m 1,200
DTED-2 1 ≈ 30 m 3,600
DTED-3 1
3
≈ 10 m 10,800
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2.2.8.1 Scan Method.
There are a variety of scan methods but each work essentially by widening the
projected future path so as to ensure one or more DTED posts are captured. Various
scan methods are employed by the F-16, NASA SUAV, and UAV P-GCAS [23, 32].
An advantage of the scan method is that, assuming a wide enough scan pattern is
used, the highest DTED post within a given range bin is used to determine terrain
height for the entire bin, thus being conservative. The inherent disadvantage to this
method is that although within that range bin there may exist a trough through which
it is both safe and desirable to fly, the trough is not identified and would be considered
a nuisance by the aircrew. The scan method also allows for track uncertainty to be
included in the scan pattern, but as will be shown with the NASA SUAV research,
this does not guarantee that the actual flight path will fall within the scan [23].
2.2.8.2 Interpolation Method.
The interpolation approach solves the problem of discontinuous elevation data
by using the projected location of the aircraft and interpolating between the discrete
DEM posts. There are numerous numerical methods to accomplish this interpolation.
Suplisson examined methods that use the nearest DTED post, linear interpolation
(a) Scan [23] (b) Interpolation [33] (c) Bubble [15]
Figure 2.2. DEM Post Capture Methods
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between neighboring posts, as well as cubic and spline interpolations [14]. An advan-
tage of interpolating is that the projected path of the aircraft need not be artificially
widened to ensure post capture. This allows for the projected path and any error
or uncertainty to be analyzed independently. Consequently the DTED posts do not
guarantee that a higher terrain feature doesn’t exist between discrete posts, so inter-
polating could place the aircraft below the actual terrain. This problem also exists
with the scan and bubble methods but to a lesser extent since interpolating does not
inherently add in any safety buffer (discuss in Section 2.2.9).
2.2.8.3 Bubble Method.
The bubble method works by enclosing the aircraft in an ellipsoidal “buffer” that
is sized appropriately to capture the terrain posts. The bubble method was used
by Trombetta for his Have Emergency Safe Calculated Autonomous Predetermined
Exit (ESCAPE) algorithm, discussed further in Section 2.3.3.2 with the modification
of using the sphere to define the dimensions of a quadrilateral rather than using the
sphere directly [15]. The bubble approach has the benefit of allowing track uncertainty
to be evaluated directly while still providing some inherent terrain clearance margin.
The disadvantage is that, as with the scan method, the necessary size of the bubble
could trigger nuisance activations when flying laterally near terrain or attempting to
fly through a saddle.
2.2.9 Safety Buffer.
The design of and inclusion of a safety buffer in a Ground Collision Avoidance
System (GCAS) is prudent and necessary to account for errors in both the path pre-
diction of the aircraft as well as the terrain uncertainty in the DEM. This research has
identified multiple approaches to implementing an intentional safety buffer: adding
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an aircraft clearance buffer (ACB) around the aircraft, adding a Ground Clearance
Buffer (GCB) to the terrain itself at each DEM post, adding a Time-based Buffer
(TBB) to the projected path, or a combination of these three.
2.2.9.1 Aircraft Clearance Buffer (ACB).
As discussed in Section 2.2.8, the bubble method is a potential solution to ensuring
the aircraft path cannot simply fly between terrain posts. In a similar fashion the
ACB can be used to provide an offset from the terrain. Figure 2.3 depicts three 300 ft
(92 m) radius bubbles against DTED-1 terrain with 90 m spacing. If it fact DTED-2
terrain was used, the bubble radius could be made much smaller and still capture the
same number of DTED posts. It might still be desirable, however, to keep the radius
at 300 ft to allow protection for any of the aforementioned sources of error. There are
two downsides to the bubble buffer method; it provides an inconsistent safety buffer
and is not consistent computationally. Referring again to Figure 2.3 from left to right,
the equal red, green, and blue spheres show instances where, versus the same level
terrain, they provide differing terrain clearances. The red sphere which is positioned
directly above a single DTED post provides the maximum buffer of one radius. The
buffer provided by the green sphere which is positioned between two DTED posts is
governed by Equation 2.2. In the scenario given, the green sphere only provides a
buffer of 79.6 m, a reduction of 13%. The blue sphere “rests” on four DTED posts,
and the buffer it provides is given by Equation 2.3. In this scenario with assumed
symmetric post spacing, the buffer provided is 65.7 m, a reduction of 28%. It is clear
that these deviations could lead to a dangerous situation if not accounted for properly.
It is worth noting that the ACB need not be a sphere. Using superquadrics, the ACB
could mimic the shape of the aircraft itself [34].
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B1 = r (2.1)
B2 = r ∗
√
1 − 0.5d1
r
(2.2)
B4 = B2 ∗
√
1 − 0.5d2
B2
(2.3)
where:
r = radius of sphere
d1 = distance between posts in x (or y) direction
d2 = distance between posts in y (or x) direction
2.2.9.2 Ground Clearance Buffer (GCB).
The implementation of a GCB can be a simple as adding a fixed height value to
each terrain post, as in Figure 2.4b. This method is favored by several researchers as
shown in Table 2.4. Benefits of using a GCB are its ease of application and consistency.
As already mentioned, applying a GCB only requires adding a constant value to the
matrix of DEM height values. There are of course numerous ways to adjust these
values such as for various terrain classifications, but a constant value is the most basic
and common usage. The GCB also overcomes the problem with varying safety buffer
provided by the Aircraft Clearance Buffer (ACB). A disadvantage to this approach
is that it does not directly apply an additional lateral safety buffer. This is most
problematic with steeply rising terrain. This shortcoming can be mitigated by the
addition of a TBB.
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(a) Lateral View
(b) 3-D View (c) Overhead View
Figure 2.3. Variation in terrain clearance from ACB due to relation to DEM post
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2.2.9.3 Time-based Buffer (TBB).
The TBB is applied by using a fixed or variable amount of time, δtB, to project
the current aircraft location forward before calculating the escape trajectories. This
is beneficial because it provides lateral terrain separation and accounts for any delays
in algorithm response or aircraft dynamic response, such as pitch rate. The TBB can
be calculated by the current or recent average aircraft velocity and heading and δtB
to estimate a future position. The TBB is highly dependent on the aircraft states
used to predict the future position so care must be taken when applying a TBB to
a highly maneuvering aircraft. The TBB is often used in conjunction with the ACB,
as with Have ESCAPE, or GCB, as with F-16 Auto-GCAS [15, 35]. Trombetta’s use
of an ACB and TBB is shown in Figure 2.4b.
Ultimately, all buffer methods are useful for accounting for the uncertainties in the
propagated aircraft trajectory and DEM posts. For each Auto-GCAS application the
designer will need to identify which method produces the quickest and most accurate
results while providing the desired level of safety.
With the defining characteristics of Auto-GCASs identified, next a brief survery
of existing systems is presented.
(a) ACB and TBB [15] (b) GCB [14]
Figure 2.4. Safety Buffer methods used by Trombetta (a) and Suplisson (b)
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2.3 Survey of Ground Collision Avoidance Systems
Over the years a number of systems, mostly manual, have been developed to assist
in preventing CFIT. Kuchar and Yang, as well as Suplisson, provide an in-depth
survey of many of these systems. For the purposes of this research only systems
whose primary source of terrain information is DTED or another DEM are discussed.
To provide background, a few manual systems will be presented before moving on to
automatic systems.
2.3.1 Fielded Manual Systems.
Herein fielded systems are defined as those that are currently in use in either mili-
tary or commercial applications. Manual systems are those that provide a prediction
of collision but do not automatically control the aircraft to avoid collision.
2.3.1.1 Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS).
The Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System built by Honeywell Interna-
tional Inc. “uses aircraft inputs including geographic position, attitude, altitude,
airspeed, and glideslope deviation. These are used with respect to internal terrain,
obstacle, and airport databases to predict a potential conflict between the aircraft
flight path and terrain or an obstacle. A conflict will result in the EGPWS providing
a visual and audio caution or warning alert” [28, 29]. While EGPWS does predict
terrain collisions and even provides a visual display of surrounding terrain, the extent
of the resolution maneuver is to advise the pilot “OBSTACLE AHEAD, PULL UP”.
An interesting feature of EGPWS is what Honeywell calls “Envelope Modulation”
where, at certain airports, higher resolution terrain data and modified alerting mar-
gins are used to reduce nuisance and missed alerts [28, 29]. Envelope Modulation
is automatic and does not require the flight crew to select this mode. EGPWS is
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currently in use on both the C-17 Globemaster III and C-130J Super Hercules. As
the case study of HAZE 01 in Section 1.2 showed, EGPWS is not adequate by itself
for preventing CFIT.
2.3.1.2 U.S. Navy Terrain Awareness Warning System.
The Navy’s Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) is currently in use on
the F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, AV-8B Harrier, T-45C,
Goshawk, and MH-60 Helicopter [36]. According to Anderson, the U.S. Navy TAWS
“is a safety backup system developed to provide protection against Controlled Flight
Into Terrain. The algorithm predicts 3-dimensional recovery flight paths and com-
pares with DTED to identify terrain intersections. If intersections exist along the
predicted trajectories, an audio and visual directive warning is issued to the aircrew
to affect a recovery away from the imminent CFIT condition” [36]. The Navy TAWS
calculates two trajectories. The first trajectory is a referred to as the Vertical Re-
covery Trajectory (VRT), which is a roll to wings-level followed by a 5-g pull. The
second trajectory, the Oblique Recovery Trajectory (ORT), is used when the aircraft
is turning and is a 5-g pull at the current bank angle. Though the VRT is similar
to the “roll-pull” performed by the F-16 Auto GCAS, it and the ORT are not flown
automatically but are rather directed maneuvers to the pilot. The pilot receives both
an aural direction as well as visual cues on their Heads-Up Display (HUD) with mul-
tiple phases to aid in executing the maneuver [14]. According to the F/A-18 Navy
Flight Manual [37], the computed trajectories assume:
• Pilot Response Time is the time from issuance of a TAWS warning to the time
that the pilot actually initiates recovery. Pilot Response Time is set at 1.3
seconds.
• Roll Recovery Phase is the time necessary to roll the aircraft to near wings-level.
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This assumes at least lateral stick will be used for bank angles less than 70 and
at least 3
4
lateral stick will be used for bank angles ≥ 70.
• G-Onset Phase is the time required to pull to the target recovery g. The target
recovery g is 80% of the instantaneous g available, or 5g, whichever is less. The
g-onset phase assumes that rapid aft stick motion will be used (full deflection
within 3
4
second). In addition, TAWS assumes that the pilot will move the
throttles to MAX if below corner speed and to IDLE if above corner speed.
• Dive Recovery Phase is the remainder of the trajectory until terrain clearance
is achieved. TAWS assumes a terrain clearance of 50 ft.
2.3.1.3 A400M Tactical GCAS.
The Airbus A400M is a multi-role advanced airlifter used by several European and
Middle Eastern militaries. As can be seen in Figure 2.5, the A400M falls between
the C-17 and C-130J in terms of size. It also has similar performance to a C-17.
The A400M has a version of TAWS produced by Cassidian that has been optimized
for low-level flight. “The high update rate Threat Detection and Alert Generator
uses position, hybridized geometric altitude, aircraft attitude, radar altimeter and air
data to determine the caution and warning alerts. The threat detection algorithms
include allowance for military operational specific pilot reaction time based on a
pilot in the loop operation close to ground. Additionally, the lead time is fine tuned
to cover different tactical flight phases and aircraft attitudes. The highly efficient
threat calculation allows a provision of CFIT protection down to 150 ft above ground
level in cruise condition and down to 5 ft above ground level in landing or very
low level extraction. The Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) functionality
terrain clearance margin can be adjusted manually by the flight crew during flight if
needed”[38, 39].
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Figure 2.5. Comparison of A400M to the C-17 and C-130J [40]
The A400M’s Tactical GCAS uses a combination of aircraft performance lookup
tables, including flap setting, cargo door position, anti-icing, etc., and real-time calcu-
lations to allows such close ground clearance. This system provides an aural warning
to the crew as well as visual display on the HUD and a separate Terrain Awareness
Display (TAD). The exact design of Cassidian’s Tactical GCAS algorithm is pro-
prietary, but the use of an adaptable and highly detailed aircraft model as well as
accurate performance modeling and small incremental step size is in the same vein
as this research [39].
2.3.2 Fielded Automatic Systems.
Automatic systems are defined as those that upon determination of the need to
maneuver to avoid terrain do so without input from the pilot. These maneuvers
are flown until a termination criteria is met, be it time based or simply clear of the
offending terrain. This section will discuss automatic systems that are currently in
operational use.
30
2.3.2.1 USAF F-16 Auto-GCAS.
The F-16 Auto-GCAS program has been a resounding success and has paved the
way for Auto-GCAS on other aircraft. The decades long development process is well
documented and this text will only provide a broad overview of the operation of the
system. The F-16 Auto-GCAS works by projecting a single recovery trajectory and
comparing that trajectory to DTED [22]. The recovery trajectory is an automatic roll
to wings-level followed by a 5-g pull. The 5-g pull is held until a termination angle
is reached that ensures the aircraft is clear of the terrain. The operating concept of
the F-16 Auto-GCAS is presented in Figure 2.6.
The F-16 Trajectory Prediction Algorithm (TPA) models the predicted behavior
of the aircraft once the recovery is initiated. The details of the TPA itself are pro-
prietary. The developers of the TPA sought to strike a balance between protection,
nuisance, and reducing model complexity [22]. The TPA was developed by using an
optimization routine along with an augmented 6-DoF simulation. The optimization
routine was used to reduce the Root Mean Squared (RMS) error between the 6-DoF
model and the TPA at various design conditions. Since the TPA uses a reduced fi-
delity model of the F-16, a 0.5 sec delay (TBB) was added to allow for uncertainty
in calculation and maneuver time. Figure 2.7 shows a typical ground avoidance sce-
nario. The inset of Figure 2.7 also shows the various DTED scan patterns that are
used during level, turning, and diving flight.
The F-16 Auto-GCAS development team performed extensive research and flight
testing to evaluate the nuisance potential of the automatic recovery maneuver. Flight
testing revealed that, at least in the case of fighter aircraft, recovery activation with
less than 1.5 sec remaining until ground impact resulted in a low perception of nui-
sance. The flight tests also revealed that the F-16 Auto-GCAS should be effective in
preventing 98% of future CFIT incidents. As evinced by the recorded saves discussed
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Figure 2.6. F-16 Auto-GCAS Block Diagram [26]
Figure 2.7. F-16 Auto-GCAS Phases [35]
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in Section 1.1, so far the system is working exceptionally well.
2.3.2.2 Swedish Gripen Auto GCAS.
The Auto GCAS installed on the Swedish Air Force Saab JAS-39 C/D Gripen
was developed concurrently with the F-16 Auto GCAS [41]. The two systems operate
similarly by using a single roll and pull escape trajectory. Unlike the F-16, the Gripen
provides visual and aural direction to the pilot to initiate the recovery maneuver 1.5-
2.5 seconds prior to automatic recovery [14]. The F-16, on the other hand, gives two
chevrons which appears on the left and right sides of the HUD 5 seconds prior to
automatic activation and meet to form an “X” upon activation. Because the Swedish
Air Force frequently operates the Gripen in a low-level environment, the Swedish
Air Force is continuing to make efforts to reduce the amount of terrain safety buffer
needed for safe and nuisance free operation [41, 42].
2.3.3 Research Level Automatic Systems.
Research level systems are those that have shown promise to the extent they were
tested but are not ready to be implemented on fleet aircraft. In the cases of the NASA
Small UAV Auto GCAS and Have ESCAPE, successful flight tests were accomplished
as part of the research effort [15, 23, 35].
2.3.3.1 NASA Small UAV Auto-GCAS.
The NASA Small UAV (SUAV) was developed in response to a Defense Safety
Oversight Council (DSOC) funded request to design and flight-test Auto GCAS tech-
nologies on different aircraft types while leveraging the work already done on the
F-16 [23]. The SUAV, also known as the Dryden Remotely Operated Integrated
Drone (DROID), is shown in Figure 2.8a in front of an F-16. The DROID was chosen
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for this research because it is significantly different to the F-16 and its flying qualities
mimic that of an MQ-9 Reaper [35]. The comparative performance of the DROID
and MQ-9 is summarized in Table 2.2.
The NASA SUAV trajectory algorithm was developed by flight testing the pro-
posed escape trajectories and using an adjustable TBB and onset rate parameters to
allow for variation in flight condition [23]. The SUAV team determined that a high
fidelity model was not needed due to the simplistic nature of the autopilots employed.
These trajectories are a roll to wings-level followed by a 1000 fpm climb capturing
60 KIAS or a left or right 40 degree bank to capture a 60 KIAS/ 800 fpm climbing
turn. Once again these maneuvers were chosen to represent what could be performed
by a medium-to-large UAV [23]. During flight each trajectory is compared to the
surrounding terrain to determine if a conflict exists. When the last path available
predicts a collision, an on-board Piccolo II autopilot commands the maneuver. The
“last man standing” trajectory selection method used by the SUAV as well as this
research is shown in Figure 2.8b.
The SUAV terrain scan uses a both DTED and National Elevation Dataset (NED)2.
2“The National Elevation Dataset (NED) is a seamless raster product produced by the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS). The NED provides elevation data coverage of the continental United
States, Alaska, Hawaii, and the island territories in a seamless format with a consistent projection,
(a) DROID and F-16 [23] (b) SUAV “Last Man Standing” [23]
Figure 2.8. NASA SUAV Aircraft and Avoidance Maneuvers
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Table 2.2. DROID vs. MQ-9 Specifications [23]
Aircraft
Wing
Span
Weight Power PowerWeight(
hp
lb
) Speed
Rate of
Climb
DROID 9 ft 8 in 58 lb 11 HP 0.19 80 KIAS 1000 ft
min
MQ-9 65 ft 7 in 7000 lb 900 HP 0.13 190 KIAS 1000 ft
min
Using NASA’s advanced compression algorithm, the SUAV is able to carry large
amounts of terrain data while taking up minimal storage. The predicted trajectories
are compared to the terrain using a scan method as described in Section 2.2.8.1. The
SUAV researchers used Equation 2.4 to calculate the appropriate safety buffer to en-
sure safe ground clearance. The TPA term can be used to reduce the need for a high
fidelity model.
Buffer = NAV + (DEM2 + TPA2)
1
2 (2.4)
where:
NAV = buffer due to navigation uncertainty
DEM = buffer due to DEM uncertainty
TPA = buffer due to trajectory uncertainty
and the total represents the required buffer.
The SUAV researchers state in their recommendations that;
“A full six-degrees-of-freedom simulation is not required to model the
trajectory predictions for this module. High-fidelity aerodynamic, thrust,
and flight control models are not required, although a simulation using
those models can provide a very helpful starting point if available. If a
high-fidelity simulation is not available, the necessary parameters can be
determined directly from a few simple flight tests” [23].
While it may not always be necessary to have an extremely detailed aircraft model,
resolution, elevation units, and horizontal and vertical datums” [43]
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it can be seen from Figure 2.9 that a simplified 3-DoF model does not guarantee suf-
ficient path prediction accuracy. It is for this reason that this research seeks to retain
a high fidelity model while still achieving the needed algorithm speed. Additionally,
it was determined that the use of a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) autopilot to exe-
cute the escape maneuvers which were triggered by path predictions that did not have
the same control laws as the COTS autopilot was a potentially large source of error.
This is different from the approach used by this research, wherein internal control
laws are continuously calculating the escape trajectories before cueing an autopilot
which is of identical design to the control laws to fly the maneuver.
The NASA SUAV was the primary inspiration for Trombetta’s Have ESCAPE
research and continues to provide a great deal of direction and lessons learned for the
research presented here.
2.3.3.2 Have ESCAPE.
Have ESCAPE was the predecessor to this research effort. Have ESCAPE was un-
dertaken by Major John “Cowboy” Trombetta as his thesis/TMP for the AFIT/TPS
Master’s program. This foundational work, titled ”Multi-trajectory Automatic Ground
Collision Avoidance System with Flight Tests (Project Have ESCAPE)”, was the first
effort to flight test an Auto-GCAS for heavy aircraft and identified several of the re-
search objectives listed in Section 1.3.2. The ESCAPE in Have ESCAPE stands
for Emergency Safe Calculated Autonomous Preplanned Exit. The philosophy be-
hind his approach is captured in this clever acronym. The following sections discuss
Trombetta’s methods and findings.
The Have ESCAPE algorithm used a 3-DoF point mass model to predict five
escape trajectories. The 3-DoF model was also favored and used by Rahunathan and
Suplisson [14, 44]. Equations 2.5-2.9 were used by Trombetta to predict the aircraft
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Figure 2.9. SUAV Path Inaccuracy [23]
trajectories. These trajectories included a straight-ahead 2-g pull to a 15o flight path
angle limit, a left and right 15o roll followed by a 2-g pull, and a left and right level
60o/2-g turn [15]. Using the “last man standing” concept, when the last path is
predicted to intersect terrain, the escape maneuver is commanded. Have ESCAPE
used fixed Nz and bank angle (φ) commands which were sent to external autopilots
that ultimately commanded the Learjet 25D VSS.
ẋ = V cosγcosχ (2.5)
ẏ = V cosγsinχ (2.6)
ż = V sinγ (2.7)
γ̇ =
Nzcosφ− gcosγ
V
(2.8)
χ̇ =
Nzsinφ
V cosγ
(2.9)
Trombetta’s algorithm relied on a 300 ft “bubble” around the aircraft to capture
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the Level 1 DTED posts as well as provide terrain buffer. Have ESCAPE also used a
0.5 sec TBB to account for g and roll/pitch onset rates that were not captured in the
3-DoF model. Based upon the terrain analysis described in Section 2.8. Trombetta
determined that the appropriate forward projection time was 31 sec. Based on this,
RSET adopted a 30 sec time horizon. Before full implementation, further research is
needed to determine necessary look-ahead for all scenarios (and airframes).
Due to the preplanned nature of Have ESCAPE, the Learjet test aircraft was re-
stricted to straight-and-level flight at 310 KtGS. Any deviation from these conditions
would cause the predicted path to be significantly different from the executed escape
maneuver.
2.3.3.3 Optimal Auto GCAS.
Suplisson’s research, titled Optimal Recovery Trajectories for Automatic Ground
Collision Avoidance Systems (Auto GCAS), is vital for establishing a basis on which to
benchmark Auto-GCAS technologies. In the same manner as Have ESCAPE, Optimal
Auto GCAS modeled the aircraft as a 3-DoF point mass model. Where Optimal
Auto GCAS differed was that for each test case a unique solution was generated that
satisfied the optimal control cost function.
The optimal control problem is predicated on the idea of Aggressive and Timely
avoidance maneuvers. These concepts are key to minimizing nuisances and avoiding
interference with mission execution [14]. Suplisson defines Aggressive as requiring at
least one control be at maximum deflection to execute the maneuver. In reality an
aircraft often reaches some other dynamic limit, be it Nz, flight path angle, stall,
before the actual deflection limit of the control surface. Nevertheless the Aggressive
formulation serves to motivate the approach used herein where escape maneuvers are
flown at either the limit of the control, the dynamic limit, or both. The Timely
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requirement specifies that the escape maneuver be flown at the last possible moment
to prevent intersecting terrain or the terrain buffer, if used. Suplisson concluded that
for Auto-GCAS on military aircraft, ”a last-second aggressive recovery is essential in
order to be nuisance-free and still accomplish the operational mission” [14]. Suplisson
applied a 350 ft GCB as described above to allow for errors in terrain data and path
prediction.
With the Aggressive and Timely criteria defined, Suplisson determined two pri-
mary optimal control formulations that were relevant to Heavy Auto GCAS; Max
Distance with a Timely Trigger or Min Control with an Aggressive Trigger. The Max
Distance formulation seeks to maximize the distance from terrain with the caveat
that the escape maneuver is not performed until the CPA is equal to the GCB of 350
ft. The Min Control formulation, in contrast, seeks to find the least amount of control
required to avoid the offending terrain and the avoidance path is not followed until a
control is at its maximum. These formulations are shown in Figure 2.10. Suplisson
concluded that climb performance limited aircraft are best associated with the Min
Control with an Aggressive Trigger, which inspired the development of the RSET
system.
2.3.3.4 Predictive GCAS for UAVs.
The research on Predictive GCAS for UAV applications performed by Lee et al.
provides some useful insight into handling variation in terrain and reducing nuisance
[32, 45]. The Predictive GCAS algorithm uses the familiar wings-level 5-g pull as
its only escape maneuver, and it is applied to a notional UAV application. The
simulations are run using MATLAB and the X-Plane10 simulator. Lee et al. present
a method of “binning and hulling” the terrain in the scan pattern of the aircraft.
The bins are determine by the maximum terrain height at a given time-distance away
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Figure 2.10. Optimal Auto GCAS Approaches: (a) Max Distance and (b) Min Control
[14]
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from the aircraft. Predictive GCAS differs from the F-16 GCAS binning process by
applying a decreasing weighting factor to terrain that is farthest from the predicted
path. Once the data is binned, those bins are covered by a continous curve, or “hull”
[32]. The hulling process is analogous to the tip of a Computer Numerical Control
(CNC) machine probe, where the probe radius is analogous to the aircraft maximum
decent angle, pull-up radius, and climb angle. The binning and hulling process is
shown in Figure 2.11.
2.3.4 GCAS Survey Summary.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 summarize the various GCAS methods discussed thus far.
As can clearly be seen, there are numerous approaches to solving the problem of
preventing CFIT. This research takes inspiration from each research effort described
here and seeks to advance the state of the art.
2.4 Nuisance Criteria
Of concern to every Auto-GCAS researcher, including the author, is the concept
of “nuisance”. Swihart and Barfield identified early in Auto-GCAS research that “a
ground collision avoidance system is a tradeoff between system safety and nuissance
(a) Data binning (b) Data hulling
Figure 2.11. PGCAS Terrain Data Handling Methods [32, 45]
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Table 2.3. Kuchar and Yang CDR Design Factors Applied to Existing and Proposed
Systems
Model
State*
Prop.
State
Dim.
Detection
Threshold
Conflict
Resolution
Resolution**
Maneuvers
EGPWS# Nominal 3-D time, range Prescribeda V
F-16 Worst-Case 3-D distance Prescribedb C(T/V)
NASA SUAV Worst-Case 3-D xxx Prescribedc C(T/V)
Have ESCAPE Worst-Case 3-D xxx Prescribedd C(T/V)
Optimal Worst-Case 3-D xxx Optimal C(T/V/S)
UAV P-GCAS [32] Probabilistic 3-D distance Prescribedb V
RSETTT Worst-Case 3-D xxx Adaptivee C(T/V/S)
* In the context of Auto-GCAS “worst-case” implies a max-performance maneuver to minimize
nuisance. See Table 2.4 Trajectory Limitations for the determining factor.
** V = Vertical Maneuver, T = Turn, S = Speed Change, C() = Simultaneous
# EGPWS is not an automatic system
TT Proposed herein
a Aural warning and “Pull Up” command.
b Single autopilot based climb trajectory.
c Three autopilot based trajectories (climb, left and right climbing turn).
d Five pre-determined bank angle and g-force commands (climb, left and right climbing turns,
left and right level turns) sent to internal Learjet autopilots.
e Adaptive: Five autopilot based trajectories (climb, left and right climbing turns, left and right
level turns).
Table 2.4. Expanded CDR Design Factors
Model
Model
Fidelity
Trajectory
Limitations
DEM Post
Capture
Safety
Buffer
F-16 Proprietary Pilot scan TBB, GCB
NASA SUAV [23] 3-DoF Structure scan TBB, GCB
Have ESCAPE [15] 3-DoF Structure bubble TBB, ACB
Optimal [14] 3-DoF Structure interpolate TBB, GCB
P-GCAS for UAV [32] 6-DoF Performance scan GCB
RSETTT Augmented 6-DoF Structure interpolate TBB, GCB
TT Proposed herein
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warnings to the pilot which may force the pilot to turn the system off” [41]. In short,
nuisance is any intervention or warning given by the collision avoidance system when it
is not needed or warranted. This could happen in the case of an overly sensitive system
on an aircraft performing a low-level mission. Although nuisance is easy to identify
on a case-by-case basis, it is difficult to generalize for the purpose of algorithm design.
In the words of Swihart et al., “it can also be reasoned that the dividing line between
a valid warning and a nuisance warning is this point where an aware pilot feels an
aggressive recovery must be initiated to avoid collision” [46]. Extensive flight testing
was done during the development of the F-16 Auto GCAS system to determine that
1.5 sec of Available Reaction Time (ART) was the appropriate nuisance threshold.
This means that there is 1.5 sec to initiate the maneuver before it would no longer
avoid collision. As recommended by Suplisson, this research aims to quantify this
threshold for heavy aircraft [14]. The SUAV researchers also identified the difficulty
in evaluating nuisance potential [23]. Sorokowski et al. also recommend that platform-
specific flight testing of operationally relevant mission tasks is necessary to determine
nuisance ART threshold.
2.5 Learjet 25D Stitched Model
Beginning with a series of flight tests in May 2015, the U.S. Army Aviation Devel-
opment Directorate, Textron Aviation, and the USAF Test Pilot School undertook
a collaborative effort to develop a full flight-envelope model of the Learjet 25D [47].
The model developed was referred to as a “stitched model” since it involved nonlin-
ear equations of motion combined with trim data at specific flight conditions [48].
Throughout this document this model will be referred to as the “Stitched Model”.
The core of the Stitched Model is the quasi-Linear Parameter Varying (qLPV)
model. A Linear Parameter Varying (LPV) model is a linearization of a nonlinear
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system, shown in Equations 2.10 and 2.11, where, as opposed to a Linear Time
Invariant (LTI) system, the entries of the state-space matrices are allowed to vary
with time [49]. “If the scheduling parameter vector ρ(t) contains any states of the
system, then the system is quasi-LPV, and is said to be “stitched” in those states”[47].
Ẋ(t) = f
(
X(t),U(t)
)
(2.10)
Y (t) = h
(
X(t),U(t)
)
(2.11)
where:
X,U , and Y are the total states, inputs, and output, respectively, of the system, and
f and h are nonlinear functions.
For a qLPV system, Equations 2.10 and 2.11 become (note that the (t) is dropped
for the sake of brevity) [47]:
X =
Z
W
 (2.12)
 Ż
Ẇ
 =
A11(ρ) A12(ρ)
A21(ρ) A22(ρ)

 Z −Z0(ρ)
W −W0(ρ)
+
B1(ρ)
B2(ρ)
[U −U0(ρ)] (2.13)
Y = C(ρ)
(
X −X0(ρ)
)
+D(ρ)
(
U −U0(ρ)
)
+ Y0(ρ) (2.14)
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where:
Z are states that are stitching parameters, W are states that are not stitching parameters,
A,B,C, and D are linearized state-space matrices, and
ρ is the vector of scheduling parameters.
The derivation of the qLPV model is complex and is only discussed briefly here.
For a more detailed explanation of the rationale behind this formulation see the works
of Berger et al., Tischler, and Tobias [47, 48, 50]. The Learjet 25D Stitched Model
is stitched in the x-body axis velocity state U . What this means is that the aircraft
true airspeed is both a state and a scheduling parameter. Flap deflection, δf , is also a
scheduling parameter but it is not a state, so the model is not stitched in δf . Therefore
the lookup tables of state space matrices and trim values gathered from flight test
are with respect to U and δf [47]. Figure 2.12 along with Table 2.5 graphically depict
the operation of the Stitched Model.
There are three additional features of the Stitched Model which lend to its ro-
bust nature. The first is that flight test data need not be available at all altitudes.
Rather, scaling based on the ratio of actual aircraft density altitude to the flight test
density altitude, in this case 15,000 ft MSL, can be applied to determine trim values
throughout the flight envelope. Second is that only aerodynamic forces and moments
are applied using lookup tables while all other forces and moments are retained in
their full nonlinear form [47]. Lastly is the ability to scale these forces and moments
based upon variation in aircraft mass and Center of Gravity (CG). With the Learjet
25D, which has large wingtip fuel tanks, these variations can be significant.
Given the significance of the Stitched Model to this research, future discussion on
the validation and characteristics of the model are presented throughout Chapter III.
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Figure 2.12. Model Stitching Block Diagram [47] (see Table 2.5 for variable descrip-
tions)
Table 2.5. Model Stitching Block Diagram Variables [47]
Variable Description
U Total longitudinal body axis velocity
Uf Filtered Velocity
∆u Control Perturbations (e.g. deltae)
∆x State Perturbations [e.g., w = (W −W0)]
M Mass and Inertia Matrix
A Dimensional stability derivatives
B Dimensional control derivatives
m Aircraft mass
I Aircraft inertia matrix
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2.6 Theil’s Inequality Coefficient
One of the major efforts of this research is to convert the Stitched Model into a
form which can be used for path prediction with an Auto-GCAS. As such, a metric
is needed to determine the consistency between the converted and original models.
Murray-Smith highlights Theil’s Inequality Coefficient (TIC) as a useful quantita-
tive measure of model performance [51]. Equation 2.15 shows one form of TIC. One
of the benefits of TIC is that all values lie between 0 and 1, with 0 being a perfect fit
and 1 meaning the two data sets are very significantly different. Jategaonkar et al.
used TIC for aerodynamic modeling and system identification, and later Dorobantu
et al. used TIC to successfully validate uncertain aircraft simulation models. Given
the proven utility of Theil’s Inequality Coefficient, the author adopted this metric for
the research herein. Furthermore, Tischler and Remple as well as Jategaonkar et al.
agree that values TIC < 0.25-0.30 correspond to accurate models when comparing
trusted and un-trusted data [50, 52].
TIC =
√
1
N
∑N
i=1[x(i) − x̂(i)]2√
1
N
∑N
i=1[x(i)]
2 +
√
1
N
∑N
i=1[x̂(i)]
2
(2.15)
where:
x = trusted model state (original Stitched Model)
x̂ = un-trusted model state (Converted Model)
N = number of data points (in time horizon)
2.7 Refresh Rate
Computing power is a valuable commodity on most aircraft. As such, Auto-GCAS
algorithms must strike a balance between complexity, accuracy, and “refresh rate”.
Refresh rate dictates the speed at which the predicted paths can be compared to
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the terrain. This becomes increasingly important for fast-moving aircraft and widely
spaced DEM posts. A fast-moving aircraft with a slow Auto-GCAS algorithm could
easily miss a mountain peak if the time step between iterations is too great. Table
2.6 summarizes the refresh rates of existing algorithms.
Table 2.6. GCAS Algorithm Refresh Rates
Model
Model
Fidelity
Number of
Trajectories
Refresh
Rate (Hz)
F-16 [22] Proprietary 1 12
Navy TAWS [36, 37] Simplified 6-DoF 2 10
NASA SUAV [23] 3-DoF 3 5
Have ESCAPE [15] 3-DoF 5 12.5
Optimal [14] 3-DoF Infinite 2
RSET Augmented 6-DoF 5 12.5
2.8 Terrain Classification
Trombetta provides a detailed analysis of terrain classification and the implication
of terrain on path propagation times. Referencing USAF AFI11-202V3 and borrowing
terminology from Dragut, Trombetta provides a common vernacular GCAS terrain
categorization as shown in Table 2.7 [53, 54].
Table 2.7. Terrain Classification Based on Terrain Height Data [15]
Terrain
Class
Terrain Rise vs
Horiz. Distance
Upland ≥ 500 ft per 1/2 nm
Midland ≥ 250 ft & < 500 ft per 1/2 nm
Lowland < 250 ft per 1/2 nm
Trombetta further used the terrain classifications to determine the required propa-
gation time for aircraft operating at different speeds. These times assume the aircraft
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is climbing at a 15o fight path angle and are summarized in Table 2.8.
2.9 Aircraft Classification
MIL-STD-1797B Flying Qualities of Piloted Aircraft groups aircraft based on
weight and maneuverability. A depiction of these groupings can be seen in Figure
2.13. As noted by Trombetta, just because two aircraft are in the same class does
not mean they have similar performance with respect to ground avoidance maneuvers
[15].
The aircraft shown in Table 2.9 are all Class III but clearly have dramatically
different performance with respect to low-level operating speed, turn rate, and turn
radius. The common ground among these aircraft is that, unlike Class IV and some
Class I aircraft, they are unable to perform high-g maneuvers to avoid ground collision.
It is worth noting that although a “one-size-fits-all” solution is not possible among
Class III aircraft the basic architecture and design philosophy for one is applicable
to all. In essence, once the appropriate maneuver criteria is established the aircraft
model need only be changed.
2.10 Aircraft with Auto-throttle
One of the major advances this research attempted was the use of auto-throttle
in trajectory prediction and maneuver execution. Even in the case of the highly
Table 2.8. Avoidance Path Propagation Times [15]
Aircraft Velocity
(KtGS)
Lowland Midland Upland
210 17.25 s 29.19 s 44.54 s
310 17.20 s 21.14 s 30.72 s
540 28.25 s 28.25 s 28.25 s
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Figure 2.13. MIL-STD-1797B Classification of Aircraft [2]
Table 2.9. Military Aircraft Low Level Flight Performance [14, 15]
Aircraft
Airspeed
(KtGS)
Altitude
AGL
Nz
(g)
Bank
Angle
Turn
Radius
Turn
Rate (deg
sec
)
C-130J 210 300-500 ft 2 60 deg 2,254 ft 9.01
C-17 310 300-500 ft 2 60 deg 4,913 ft 6.10
B-52 350 500 ft 2 60 deg 6,262 ft 5.41
B-1 540 500 ft 2 60 deg 14,906 ft 3.50
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successful F-16 Auto-GCAS the throttle is not changed. For aggressive recoveries,
however, it is often necessary to advance or even retard the throttles to achieve the
best climb or turning performance. This is achievable on the research testbed, the
Calspan Learjet 25 In-Flight Simulator (IFS), which has full-authority Fly-by-Wire
(FBW) capability for the ailerons, elevator, rudder, and throttles. It is also possible
on many operational aircraft, such as the B-1, C-17, F-35, and C-130J, all which
have auto-throttle capability. In light of this, the author identified that not only was
auto-throttle a novel approach to Auto-GCAS implementation, but also germane to
the future fielding of a system for heavy aircraft.
2.11 USAF TPS Flight Test
USAF Test Pilot School along with Calspan Corporation has a rich history of flight
test. Futhermore, “Calspan Corporation has been the primary innovator, developer,
and operator of in-flight simulators in the United States as well as the rest of the
world since 1947” [55]. Calspan’s first VSS, the F4U-5 Corsair, had its first flight
in March 1949. Now, almost 70 years later, Calspan operates the Learjet 25 IFS
and F-16/Variable Stability In-Flight Simulator and Test Aircraft (VISTA) IFS. As
is shown throughout this text, the Learjet IFS is an ideal test bed for Auto-GCAS
research. The following sections discuss to key components of the flight test program
at TPS used for this research, the Flying and Handling Qualities simulator and the
Learjet 25D VSS.
2.11.1 Flight Sciences Simulator.
TPS’s Flight Sciences Simulator (FSS), shown in Figure 2.14, was a two-simulator
bay facility which is used for student curriculum and TMPs [56]. The two identical
simulators are capable of mimicking the T-38A Talon, the F-15 Eagle, multiple F-16
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variants including the VISTA, the Blanik Glider, and the Learjet 25D. Furthermore
the F-16 VISTA and Learjet 25D VSS aircraft are able to be remotely piloted from
the FSS if needed or desired for the project. An important feature of the FSS is
the “Hot Bench Lite”. According to Kemper and Cotting, “the Hot Bench Lite is a
software emulation of the VSS system on Calspan’s inflight simulators” [56]. The Hot
Bench Lite accepts the same software and loading configuration as the aircraft and
allows for software checkout prior to actual flight testing. This is extremely valuable
because software can be tested and familiarity with operation can be built without
needing the actual aircraft.
2.11.2 Calspan Learjet 25D VSS.
Calspan’s Learjet 25D VSS IFS, shown in Figure 2.15, is a highly modified twin-
engine business jet. The Learjet VSS is equipped with a FBW control system that
allows the aircraft to be modified to behave like a more or less responsive aircraft [57].
The ability of the flight behavior and controls to be modified, tested in the simulator,
and then used during actual flight test is invaluable to this research.
Recently, as part of 2016 AFIT/TPS TMP titled Have VAPOR, Major Mark
“Zog” Vahle successfully used the Learjet 25 VSS to perform off-nominal aircraft
performance modeling [59]. His research compared 6 DoF nonlinear simulations of
the Learjet 25 with various failures of the ailerons, rudder, elevators, and engines to
flight test data with simulation of the same failures. Access to this level of analysis
is both rare and expensive in research and testing and is a key advantage of this
research. Additional details on the physical description of the LJ-25D and dynamic
models are contained in Vahle’s research.
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Figure 2.14. USAF Test Pilot School Flight Sciences Simulator
Figure 2.15. Calspan Learjet 25D VSS [58]
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2.12 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided an overview of traditional and expanded CDR design fac-
tors for GCAS, a review of GCASs at different stages of development for various
aircraft, and the Learjet Stitched Model which served as the foundation of the RSET
system. Additional consideration was given to Auto-GCAS nuisance, aircraft and ter-
rain classification, and the TPS Flight Test capabilities. Next, Chapter III presents
the methodology used to develop and test the RSET system.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology used to develop the RSET system and
execute the flight test of the Have MEDUSA TMP. Presented are the equations of mo-
tion, the steps taken to convert the Learjet 25D aerodynamic model, and the rationale
and architecture of the RSET system. Lastly, the flight test resources and method-
ology are presented in detail. This chapter sets the foundation for understanding the
results presented in Chapter IV.
3.2 Learjet Model Conversion
As discussed in Section 2.5 the Stitched Learjet Model was a highly sophisticated
and accurate model which was flight test validated. In its original Simulink based
form, however, it was not able to be used in the manner needed for this research.
The main reasons that the original model was not suitable were the original model’s
slow operating speed and the fact that the model would need to be operated in both
real-time and faster-than-real-time simulations simultaneously. In other words, as the
Auto-GCAS read in current state data from the Learjet VSS (in real-time) the escape
paths were calculated and projected into the future (faster-than-real-time). Calspan
utilized a Simulink interface to connect to the Learjet VSS flight controls. Unfortu-
nately, the Simulink environment did not easily allow for dissimilar time environments
(i.e. operating at both real-time and faster-than-real-time).
Correspondence with the developers of the Stitched Model as well as engineers
familiar with programming flight simulators revealed two paths forward for converting
the Simulink model into a usable form [60–62]. The options were to either “auto-
code” the Simulink model into C++ and modify as needed, or to rewrite the Stitched
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Model as one or a series of MATLAB functions which could be called by Simulink. It
was agreed that while “auto-coding” to C++ would ensure no loss of accuracy from
the flight-tested model it would require significant engineering support to execute
and may be premature while other aspects are still be answered. The MATLAB
function option was identified as the more straight-forward route with the caution
that resulting model accuracy was not guaranteed. As can been seen in Table 4.2 and
in Appendix A, the converted MATLAB function produced excellent results. For the
remainder of this thesis the original Simulink based Stitched Learjet Model will be
referred to as the “Stitched Model” and the converted MATLAB function based model
will be called the “Converted Model”. It is important to note that the Converted
Model is still a stitched model in that it uses a combination of flight-test data and
equations of motion. These names were simply adopted for ease of discussion.
The first step in converting the Stitched Model to a MATLAB function was identi-
fying which components of the Stitched Model needed to be kept and which could be
omitted. Figures A.1 and 3.1 show the Stitched Model with an “X” placed over the
subsystems that were omitted during the conversion. Then, starting from the low-
est level and working up by subsystem, each subsystem was individually hand-coded
over to a MATLAB function and tested individually along with the remainder of the
Stitched Model. As each individual subsystem was converted from Simulink blocks
to MATLAB functions the partially converted system was compared to the original
system to ensure accuracy. This systematic process, though tedious, reduced sources
of error and assisted greatly in troubleshooting. Once each individual subsystem was
written and validated they were consolidated into a single MATLAB function. This
MATLAB function contains all of the equations of motion, engine models, actuators,
etc. which comprise the Stitched Model. The complete Converted Model is included
in the Digital Appendix (Appendix I).
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Figure 3.1. Stitched Model Simulink Overview (“X” indicates removed section)[47]
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3.2.1 Equations of Motion.
The final model which included the bare airframe, actuator dynamic, control sur-
faces, and control laws contained 6 degrees-of-freedom (6-DoF). This augmented 6-
DoF model included the traditional aircraft 6 DoF aircraft states (body velocities (U,
V, W) and body rotational rates (P, Q, R)) as well as additional integrators and dy-
namics which were associated with the control surface (elevator, ailerons, rudder, and
horizontal stabilizer) actuators and rate limiters. Equations 3.1 thru 3.4 present the
state-space equations of motion. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present the stability derivative
values which were scheduled with x-body axis velocity U as described in Section 2.5.

u̇
ẇ
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3.2.2 Engine Model.
A known weakness of the overall Learjet aerodynamics model was the engine
model. Since the model was developed using primarily flying qualities flight test
techniques with limited engine performance data the engine model consisted of lookup
tables. The lookup tables provided maximum and idle thrust values at 0 and 40,000
ft., both at 0, 0.25, and 0.8 Mach. For intermediate airspeeds and altitudes, the thrust
values were simply interpolated and scaled linearly based on the percent of throttle
commanded. The impact is that as the aircraft throttle is changed, the response of
the engine and thrust changes are not accurately reflected in the path prediction,
leading to deviation from the actual aircraft response.
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Figure 3.2. Longitudinal Axis Stability and Control Derivatives as a Function of Air-
speed (15,000 ft MSL) [47]
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Figure 3.3. Lateral/Directional Axis Stability and Control Derivatives as a Function of
Airspeed (15,000 ft MSL) [47]
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3.2.3 Terrain Slewing Tool.
The Terrain Slewing Tool was a Simulink based interface designed by Calspan
which could translate, rotate, and elevate or lower current aircraft position to place
it on a collision course with the objective virtual DTED terrain feature. This tool
was used and proven during Trombetta’s Have ESCAPE test flights [15]. The Terrain
Slewing Tool was instrumental in allowing quick progression through test points and
for safely executing the tests against realistic terrain features while safely away from
the actual terrain. At the test conductor (TC) station the TC was able to selection
the terrain feature and, upon initiation of the RSET system, virtually relocate the
aircraft.
3.3 Converted Model Performance
Once the Converted Model was complete it was then necessary to determine if the
desired computational speed had been achieved and how much, if any, accuracy was
lost during the conversion. The following sections present an analysis of the findings.
3.3.1 Research Laptop Computer.
The laptop used for the development of the RSET system was a Hewlett-Packard
EliteBook 8570w. Specifications for this laptop are listed in Table 3.1. The reader
should note that the development laptop was less powerful than the one used during
flight test, as discussed in Section 3.9, and assumed that in the research laptop was
sufficient, the flight test would be sufficient.
3.3.2 Converted Model Computational Speed.
To determine the speed gained by converting the Stitched Model several simula-
tions were run on both the Stitched Model and the Converted Model. Every effort was
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Table 3.1. Research Laptop Specifications
Model Hewlett-Packard EliteBook 8570w
Operating System 64-Bit Windows 7 Pro
MATLAB Version R2015B
RAM 16 GB
Processor Intel Core I7-3720QM, 2.6 GHZ
Graphics NVIDIA Quadro K1000M
Microarchitecture Ivy Bridge
Data width 64 bit
Number of cores 4
Number of threads 8
Level 1 cache size 256 KB
Level 2 cache size 1 MB
Level 3 cache size 6 MB
made to remove bias from the comparison including Simulink configuration, similar
output variables, and similar subsystems retained. The results of those simulations
are shown in Table 4.1 in Section 4.2. Per discussion with the Stitched Model de-
velopers, the recommended integration method was MATLAB’s ode4 (Runge-Kutta)
with an integration time-step (dt) of 0.005 sec which serves as the baseline for com-
parison [60, 62]. Other integration methods are shown with the Stitched Model to
show the effect of integration order on operating speed. During the conversion process
the Euler-Forward integration method was adopted for simplicity, as shown in Equa-
tion 3.5 [63]. Ultimately, the Euler-Forward method provided the required operating
speed and accuracy.
yn+1 = yn + hf
′(xn, yn) (3.5)
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3.3.3 Converted Model Accuracy.
To validate the Stitched Model, Berger et al. compared the response of the sim-
ulation to actual Learjet 25 flight test data for a pitch doublet and a roll doublet as
shown in Figures A.2 and A.3 [47]. To validate the Converted Model, the Stitched
model was treated as the baseline and the two were compared using the same pitch
and roll doublets. The resulting plots for that comparison are presented in Appendix
A.2. Figure 3.4 is a sample of the Appendix A figures and shows the strong agreement
between the Stitched Model and Converted Model. There are a number of techniques
available to quantify the accuracy of two data sets, in this case the time history of
Stitched Model and Converted Model doublet responses. Following the example of
Vahle for his recent TPS TMP, this research used Theil’s Inequality Coefficient [59].
3.3.3.1 Theil’s Inequality Coefficient Analysis.
Using TIC as described in Section 2.6, Table 4.2 in Section 4.2 shows TIC values
for the Converted Model using various dt values. Pitch and roll doublets were used
to generate the time histories. In all cases the Stitched Model with a dt of 0.005 sec
was used as the “trusted model”. It can be seen that at dt ≤ 0.010 sec the Converted
Model has very strong agreement to the Stitched Model (TIC ≤ 0.3). With increasing
dt the TIC value increases and at dt = 0.015 sec the model fit is unacceptable. Based
on this information dt = 0.010 sec was used for the propagated trajectories discussed
in Section 3.5.1.
3.4 Identical Path Prediction and Execution Control Laws
Section 2.3 presented a number of different approaches to path prediction and
execution in both operational and research level systems. Some systems rely purely on
equations of motion for trajectory propagation while others, such as the NASA SUAV,
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Figure 3.4. Normal Load Factor Response to Pitch Doublet
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use flight test data [23]. In all cases, as of this writing, Auto-GCASs used dissimilar
control laws for prediction and execution. This research sought to apply a novel
approach by using the same control law to both predict and execute the trajectories.
The challenged was that for multi-path systems there are many predictions to perform
but only one to execute. The reasoning behind this approach was that by using the
same control law for prediction and execution, the accuracy of the maneuver would
be retained, reducing error and ultimately nuisance. A model which uses pre-planned
trajectories calculated from straight-and-level flight, on the other hand, may lose
significant accuracy if the aircraft is maneuvering. Such was the case with the F-16
Auto-GCAS. Swihart et al. state “determining how closely the TPA should match the
true recovery maneuver requires a balance between providing protection, eliminating
nuisance, and minimizing model complexity” [22]. The identical control law approach
sought to negate the need for a trade-off by using the same high fidelity model for
the prediction and control of the escape maneuvers.
Since the Euler-Forward integration method produced the desirable operating
speed and accuracy, as shown in Section 3.3.3, it was kept. The Converted Model
using, a dt of 0.005 sec, showed a reduction in simulation time of 93%. Clearly this
is a significant improvement in operating speed and met the needs of this research.
3.5 RSET System Description
The test item was the RSET system, which was designed to predict terrain collision
potential and to automatically command an appropriate ground avoidance maneuver.
As with F-16 Auto-GCAS and Have ESCAPE, the RSET system was designed with
three overarching design requirements in mind: Do No Harm, Do Not Impede Mission
Operations, and Avoid Ground Collisions. These algorithms, written in MATLAB
and Simulink, were adapted to be integrated with the Learjet VSS flight control
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system, which was able to be controlled externally via a laptop which sent commands
through a Simulink interface. The RSET system is a significant step forward in
Auto-GCAS development for performance limited aircraft and meets most of the
recommendations, outlined in Chapter I, from the works of Suplisson, Trombetta, and
Sorokowski. The improvements of RSET over the previously tested Have ESCAPE
system are summarized in Table 3.4.
The RSET system consisted of three major components: the trajectory prediction
algorithms (TPAs), the collision detector, and the maneuver autopilots. The RSET
system logic flow diagram is depicted in Figure 3.5 and the system block diagram is
shown in Figure 3.10.
3.5.1 Trajectory Prediction Algorithms.
The RSET system received time, space, position information (TSPI) and the
aircraft states from the VSS and, using this information as a starting point, used
trajectory prediction algorithms (TPAs) to predict the paths of the terrain avoidance
maneuvers. At the core of the path predictions was the Converted Model.
A design philosophy used in the development of these TPAs was the idea of a
“nervous yet aggressive copilot” (NACP). The Nervous-Aggressive Copilot (NACP)
was envisioned as a competent vigilant copilot who is constantly concerned with safely
avoiding terrain (nervous), but would not take control of the aircraft to do so until the
last possible moment (aggressive). In this manner, the NACP embodies the design
Table 3.2. Auto-GCAS Requirements in Order of Importance [22]
Priority Auto-GCAS Requirement
1 Do No Harm
2 Do Not Impede Mission Performance
3 Avoid Ground Collisions
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Figure 3.5. RSET System Logic Flow Diagram
criteria for RSET including continuous path analysis and minimizing nuisance via
maximizing performance. As discussed in Section 2.3.3.3, Suplisson uncovered the
importance of Min Control with and Aggressive Trigger as the appropriate optimal
control formulation for heavy aircraft. The Aggressive Trigger is necessary for the
Min Control formulation to be nuisance-free whereby the avoidance maneuver is not
performed until a control is at a maximum. This research applies this concept with
the modification that it be maximum performance instead of control, since the aircraft
need not be at the limit of a particular control to be at its maximum performance.
Using the NACP design concept, five TPAs were developed and are described as
follows:
• Forward Climb (Path 3)
- Roll to wings-level
- 2-g pull to 12o flight path angle (γ)
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- Advance throttle to Maximum Continuous Power (MCP)
• 60o Left (Path 1) and 60o Right (Path 5) Turns
- Roll to 60o right or left bank
- Pull 2 g
- Advance throttle to MCP
• 30o Climbing Left (Path 2) and 30o Climbing Right (Path 4) Turns
- Roll to 30o right or left bank
- Pull 2 g
- Advance throttle to MCP
All five TPAs used a speed-scaled flight path angle (gamma, γ) with an Nz limiter
control law as well as a coordinated turn control law. The control laws were developed
using control design techniques described by Stevens and Lewis, Nelson, and Ogata
[64–66] as well as with guidance provided by the Learjet 25D VSS operator Calspan
[62]. Basic block diagrams for the two control feedback loops used by the five TPAs
are shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.
Figure 3.6 depicts the control law used to execute the pull portions of the ma-
neuvers, which was a speed-scale flight path angle (gamma, γ) command with a load
factor (Nz) limiter. The control law was designed to primarily achieve the maximum
aircraft flight path angle at maximum continuous power (MCP). From simulator
testing and early checkout flights this was found to be 12o at 270 KCAS. For safety
purposes the lower airspeed limit was set at 200 KCAS, so the speed scaler was used
to adjust the target γ down as speed decreased during a climb. Due to the simple
nature of this design, at high speed from level flight the initial pull command was
aggressive enough to overshoot the target of approximately 2 g. For this reason, the
Nz limiter was added. Additionally there were instances during a maneuver where the
aircraft would unload to a low g condition, so a lower Nz limiter of 0.6g was added.
The coordinated turn control law loop is shown in Figure 3.7. This simple control
law design was effective at producing the desired bank angle with minimal sideslip.
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Figure 3.6. RSET Speed Scaled Gamma (γ) Command with Load Factor (Nz) Limiter
Control Diagram
Figure 3.7. RSET Coordinated Turn Control Diagram
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As discussed above, the bank angle command was changed depending on the path to
be performed.
The control law gains were tuned by running simulations at various initial condi-
tions and observing the behavior of the aircraft. Wherever possible the feedback loop
itself was tuned to ensure the aircraft operated at or near maximum performance
(i.e. aggressive) throughout the maneuver. Otherwise limits were put in place that
prevent the autopilot from over-controlling the aircraft beyond the Learjet 25D safety
limits given in Table 3.5. Since the Converted Model was of such a high fidelity the
majority of the autopilot design was accomplished via simulation. The simulation
derived gains were then adjusted during flight test.
To prevent altitude loss and asymmetric loading during the maneuver, additional
restrictions were place on the control laws as described in Table 3.3. The restric-
tions were used to allow for safe and effective path execution regardless of aircraft
maneuvering (e.g. calculating a 60o left turn when in a right turn).
3.5.1.1 Trajectory Propagation Length and Update Rate.
Based upon the analysis performed by Trombetta, and presented in Table 2.8, the
paths were each propogated for 30 seconds into the future. All five 30-second look-
aheads, known as the path prediction time, were computed at a planned rate of 12.5
Hz, 6.25 Hz, or 1.5625 Hz, known as the refresh rate. The TPAs were calculated based
on the throttle being advanced to maximum continuous power, which for testing was
manually activated by the test pilots as discussed in Section 1.4. Figure 3.8 shows a
visual representation of the five paths generated by the RSET system TPA logic in
simulation.
The TPAs used a fundamental time-step, dt, of 0.010 seconds which Tables 4.1
and 4.2 show provided an excellent balance of speed and accuracy. Once each TPA
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Table 3.3. RSET Bank Angles and Maneuver Restrictions
Path Bank Angle
Command
Maneuver Restrictions
1 -60o If flight path angle (γ) drops below 0, the bank angle
command goes to 0.
2 -30o If flight path angle (γ) drops below 0, the bank angle
command goes to 0. Delay gamma command loop until
bank angle is less than +5o
3 0o Delay gamma command loop until bank angle is between
-10o and +10o.
4 +30o If flight path angle (γ) drops below 0, the bank angle
command goes to 0. Delay gamma command loop until
bank angle is less than -5o
5 +60o If flight path angle (γ) drops below 0, the bank angle
command goes to 0.
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Figure 3.8. RSET Path Prediction Example with 12.5 Hz Refresh Rate (from simula-
tion)
calculated its respective predicted path, the vectors of aircraft position were passed
to the collision detector as shwon in Figure 3.5 and is discussed next.
3.5.2 Collision Detection.
As presented in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.8 there were a number of ways to compare
the predicted aircraft trajectory to the terrain elevation model and determine if a
conflict exists. To preserve speed this research opted to use interpolation to compare
the projected path to the terrain directly beneath each point.
At each sample time all five paths were evaluated for terrain collision. As long
as one of the five paths was available, the RSET system did not intervene with
the operation of the aircraft. Once all five paths predicted a collision along their
respective 30 second path, the path which was the last to predict a collision is chosen
as the escape route. This “Last Man Standing” approach to multi-path selection is
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the same as that used by Sorokowski et al. and Trombetta [15, 23]. Once the “Last
Man Standing” was identified, be it the Forward Climb or one of the turning paths,
the collision detector sent a flag1 to the controlling autopilots to execute the escape
maneuver.
The generated paths were compared to Level 1 DTED, available from the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency website, to find the distance between the flight path
and the terrain for each possible maneuver. The aircraft path was compared against
the interpolated DTED posts to determine the distance between the aircraft altitude
and the height of the terrain. Since Level 1 DTED had a spacing of approximately
295 ft between posts, interpolation was used to ensure that the aircraft did not simply
fly between posts and fail to identity a collision. The MATLAB interpolation method
used was called nearest, and referenced the closest DTED post to the TPA. This
interpolation method was chosen since it significantly reduced computational time
versus other interpolation methods, such as cubic or spline. Refer to Section 5.3 for
further discussion on this. If one or more maneuvers was predicted to maintain safe
separation from the terrain, the system did not take any action because it assumed
an aware pilot would be able to avoid the collision in a timely manner. This was
an important feature to avoid nuisance activations. When the system predicted that
every path intersected the GCB (evaluated at 200 feet), the system immediately took
control of the aircraft and commanded the maneuver which was last predicted to
violate the GCB. In this way, the algorithm waited for the last path to intersect
terrain allowing for pilot intervention up to the point where a collision would become
imminent. Safety buffers added to the terrain elevation accounted for TSPI and path
prediction errors as well as the time needed for the last available path to be selected
and executed. The GCB was simply a fixed height value added to each DTED post.
1Here a flag refers to a number between 1 and 5 which identified the autopilot to be engaged.
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Level 1 DTED was required to have a vertical error of less than 30 meters (98.4 ft)
from Performance Specification: Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) [MIL-PRF-
89020B] [67]. Level 1 DTED error was accounted for in the Terrain Safety Buffer
(TSB).
3.5.3 Maneuver Autopilots.
One of the elegant features of the newly developed RSET system was that the same
control logic used to determine the five escape paths was used to execute the actual
escape maneuver. Another feature of the RSET system was that at each sample time
all five paths are evaluated to see if a conflict exists and if there is a more aggressive,
i.e. less nuisance, path. In other words, once an avoidance path had been selected it
need not be flown for any predetermined amount of time. Depending on the terrain
being traversed the RSET system could switch between several trajectories to form
an overall more aggressive route than if just one path had been followed. This design
was motivated by Bellman’s Principle of Optimality as presented by Kirk [68]. The
optimal policy, as presented by R.E. Bellman and S.E. Dreyfus,
“...has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are,
the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to
the state resulting from the first decision” [69].
While this research does not assert that any of the generated paths were optimal, it
is accepted that they were optimal in a sense by nature of their aggressiveness.
When the collision detector identified the need to perform an avoidance maneuver,
a flag was sent to autopilot control laws which were capable of commanding the Learjet
VSS. The maneuver autopilots were identical in architecture and control law design
to the TPAs. This was important for ensuring the path flown by the aircraft matched
the path calculated by the RSET system as closely as possible. Once the system
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identified that the aircraft was no longer on a collision course with terrain based
on one or more paths opening, control was relinquished back to the pilot. Identical
to the TPAs, the maneuver autopilots included left and right 60o-bank turns, left
and right 30o-bank angle climbing turns limited to 2 g, and a wings-level climb.
All five maneuver autopilots also used a speed-scaled flight path angle control law
with a load factor (Nz) limiter. Simulator results indicated that forward climbing
escape maneuvers resulted in a steady-state flight path angle of approximately 8o.
The evaluation pilot (EP) had the ability to paddle off, or manually disconnect, the
maneuver autopilots and regain control of the Learjet VSS for safety or test efficiency.
Once the collision detector determined that one path was again available, a hand-back
autopilot was engaged. The hand-back autopilot rolled the aircraft to wings-level and
targeted zero flight path angle in preparation of handing the controls back to the EP.
Any time after the hand-back autopilot was engaged, the collision detector could
reengage if another collision event was detected. Figure 3.9 shows the results of a
simulation with the path color-coded to depict which autopilot was controlling the
aircraft (green means the pilot was in control).
3.5.4 Maneuver Termination and Control Hand-Back.
As discussed in the Collision Detector section, the RSET system took control
of the aircraft when all paths became unavailable, or closed, and executed the last
available path to avoid the terrain. During an RSET activation, if another path
became available, or open, then the system would hand back control to the pilot.
The hand-back sequence consisted of a roll to wings-level and targeting zero flight
path angle. The hand-back algorithm was fairly simple and immature, as is discussed
later in the test results. At the same time that the RSET system tests were being
conducted at TPS, at AFIT Carpenter was investigating various aspects of Auto-
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Figure 3.9. RSET Active Path History (from simulation)
GCAS improvement, including maneuver termination and hand-back. His thesis, title
“Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System for Performance Limited Aircraft”,
provides additional information on this topic [70].
3.6 RSET versus Have ESCAPE Differences Summary
Since Have ESCAPE served as a foundational work and motivation for the RSET
system, it is germane to provide a comparison between the two Auto-GCASs. Table
3.4 summarizes the primary differences between the RSET system and the Have
ESCAPE algorithm from the Have ESCAPE test report, and shows the contributions
of the RSET research [71].
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Table 3.4. Differences Between Have ESCAPE and RSET
Have ESCAPE RSET
Model
fidelity
3-DoF Augmented 6-DoF
Path
prediction
5 pre-calculated 3-DoF paths 5 autopilot calculated 6-DoF
paths
Full Flight
Envelope
Compatible?
No - only compatible with 1
airspeed and altitude and in
straight-and-level flight
Yes - able to adapt to changing
airspeed, altitude, and attitude.
DTED used Level 1 Level 1
Collision
detection
method
“bubble” around aircraft
touched DTED post
Aircraft position interpolated
against DTED
Maneuver
execution
Time series of g and bank
angle commands
Used same autopilots as path
prediction
Continuous
Path
Analysis?
No - Once triggered the
system flies out the full
duration of the maneuver
Yes - Continuously analyzes all
5 paths and hands back control
if conflict is resolved
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Figure 3.10. RSET System Block Diagram
3.7 Flight Test Objective Selection
There was extensive discussion among the Have MEDUSA test team and sup-
porting personnel regarding flight test objective selection. Presented here is a brief
explanation for the reasoning behind the objectives chosen.
1. Demonstrate the path prediction accuracy of the RSET system.
Since the RSET system utilized a more complex aerodynamic model and
used identical control laws for TPA calculation and maneuver execution,
it was important to determine how well a predicted path matched that
actual flown path.
2. Demonstrate the impact of changing the refresh rate on the RSET system’s
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ability to calculate an achievable escape path.
As has already been discussed, computational power and model fidelity are
design trade-offs. This objective was chosen to identify the threshold for
minimum path analysis speed (refresh rate).
3. Observe the RSET system tendency to nuisance activation.
The second overarching requirement for Auto-GCAS design is “Do Not
Impede Mission Performance”. As such, a successful design needs to be
as free of nuisance as possible. This objective was chosen to evaluate the
RSET system in several terrain environments for unwarranted activation.
4. Observe the control hand-back of the RSET system after maneuver termination.
As Auto-GCAS technology moves closer toward being a reality for per-
formance limited aircraft, the question of when and how the Auto-GCAS
should relinquish control back to the pilot will be a design challenge. The
test team realized that the Have MEDUSA test flights were a valuable op-
portunity to gather data and aircrew comments on hand-back conditions.
3.8 Test Equipment
3.8.1 Flight Sciences Simulator.
The USAF TPS FSS, described in Section 2.11.1, was used to check communica-
tion between the Test Laptop Computer and the Learjet VSS interface. The FSS was
also used to adjust the control law gains and prepare the EPs for the RSET system
taking control of the aircraft in flight. Due to manning and time constraints the FSS
was not used to gather any flight test objective data.
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3.8.2 Calspan Learjet 25D VSS.
The Calspan VSS-equipped Learjet LJ-25D (LJ-25D), displayed in Figure 3.11,
was employed as a platform to test the RSET system. The VSS was capable of inflight
simulation of different aircraft control laws and aircraft responses in four degrees of
freedom (pitch, roll, yaw, and thrust) using control surface and feel system2 actuators.
Since the aircraft model at the core of the RSET system was developed using the
baseline LJ-25D, the VSS was used in the baseline configuration for this test. The
cockpit accommodated a pilot and copilot crew. There was seating in the cabin for
a Test Conductor (TC) and one more occupant to include technical representatives
or incentive flyers. Minimum test aircrew included the two pilots and a TC. A TPS
student EP flew from the right seat control stick with VSS components. A Calspan
instructor pilot served as the pilot-in-command as well as the Safety Pilot (SP) from
the left seat. The left seat pilot controls were mechanically linked to the flight control
surfaces, and provide un-augmented flight control when the VSS was disengaged.
Under normal operation, the right seat EP controlled the VSS via an interface that
sent electrical signals from his controls to the hydraulic actuators connected to the
control surfaces.
In the VSS mode, engagement and safety trip logic existed which detected failure
conditions including aircraft states and loads, feel system, control surface parameters,
and hydraulic fluid level. If a failure condition or safety trip logic was satisfied, as
shown in Table 3.5, hydraulic pressure was removed from the control surface and
feel actuators, failures were annunciated in the cockpit, and the VSS was disengaged
as discussed in Learjet Flight Syllabus and Background Material for the US Air
Force/US Naval Test Pilot School Variable Stability Programs, TM-FRG-LJ1-0061-
R05 [72]. The VSS could also be manually disengaged by either pilot. Any VSS
2The feel system is part of the normal LJ-25D VSS an is meant to provide the sensation of a
reversible flight control system despite the VSS being “fly-by-wire”
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Figure 3.11. Calspan Variable Stability System Learjet LJ-25D with the Have
MEDUSA Test Team
disengagement automatically returned aircraft control to the SP. The Learjet-25D
was instrumented to collect aircraft performance and state data required to evaluate
test objectives at a rate of 200 Hz.
The RSET system interfaced with the VSS, which directly implemented the escape
maneuvers. During flight tests, the VSS operated using autopilots of the same design
as those used to generate the RSETs. The LJ-25D had a radar altimeter but did
not incorporate TAWS, GPWS, or any other altitude-dependent systems that would
interfere with the RSET system. When the RSET system commanded a maneuver to
the aircraft, it sent a flag to the maneuver autopilots to perform the ground avoidance
maneuver. These maneuvers were commanded until a clear of terrain flag was sent
at which time the system activate the hand-back autopilots and rolled the aircraft to
wings-level and targeted zero flight path angle in preparation of handing the controls
back to the EP. Then, the RSET system disengaged and control of the aircraft was
returned to the EP. The EP also had the option to manually terminate the automatic
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Table 3.5. LJ-25D VSS Safety Parameters [57]
Parametera Limitsb Automatic VSS Trip?
Airspeed (At or below 14K Ft) 306 KCAS Noc
Airspeed (Above 14K Ft) 325 KCAS / 0.79 M Noc
Normal Load Factor (nz) +0.25g to +2.8g Yes
Lateral Load Factor (ny) ±0.3g Yes
Angle of Attack (α) −5o to +12o Yes
Angle of Sideslip (β) 10o Yes
a This table presents just a small sample of the VSS safety trips. Several additional sensors (such
as load factor onset rate, control surface actuator pressure, etc.) are not discussed here.
b The safety trip logic for the above parameters was within the normal LJ-25D flight envelope.
c Airspeed was not monitored by VSS Trip Logic. The aircrew ensured limits were not exceeded.
maneuver by pressing a paddle-off button on the yoke. The TC had the ability to
monitor the activation and termination of the RSETs on the test laptop. Additionally,
the center console displayed the status of the five RSET paths during flight. Figure
3.12 shows the status of the Center Console System (CCS) during an RSET activation
with all five paths unavailable (highlighted white). The CCS did not give an indication
of which path, if any, was currently being flown. Rather, other than the motion of
the aircraft, the only way from the CCS to know which path was active was to see
which path was the last to remain open. The test laptop at the TC station, however,
gave a visual depiction of path closures as well as the current active path, as shown
in Figure 3.13. Note that the two circles shown were intended to be used as an
anticipatory and an execution notification for a path, but the anticipatory function
was not implemented. Instead both indicators were used to show whether a path was
open or closed. When the RSET system was controlling the aircraft, a stick shaker
on the right yoke (EP) activated to notify the pilots. The left seat yoke stick shaker
still only activated to indicate a stall.
One key aspect of this research was the use of the Learjet VSS as a stand-in for
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Figure 3.12. Learjet Center Console System RSET Path Status Page
Figure 3.13. Test Conductor Station Path Status Indication
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a performance-limited aircraft, such as a C-130 or C-17. The Learjet VSS was ex-
ceptional in this regard because it could be modified to behave as a heavy aircraft.
Due to time constraints (the Learjet VSS also serves regularly as a curriculum air-
craft at TPS), a “performance-limited” configuration was not developed. Rather, the
Learjet VSS maneuvers were restricted to the limits given in Table 3.5 which were
representative of larger mobility type aircraft. Roll rates were also limited to behave
accordingly.
3.8.3 Test Laptop Computer.
The RSET system was run via MATLAB and Simulink on a laptop computer
which interfaced with the VSS on the Learjet, referred to herein as the test laptop
computer. It was the physical hardware which both received the aircraft state infor-
mation as input to the RSET system and communicated the maneuver commands to
maneuver the aircraft. The test laptop computer specifications can be found in Table
3.6.
The laptop was equipped with a solid-state hard drive to minimize the proba-
bility of malfunctions caused by aircraft motion. During flight, the test laptop was
securely fastened to the TC workstation in the aircraft cabin. The view from the TCs
workstation is shown in Figure 3.14.
It is important to note that the results related to operating speed and refresh rate
are directly related to the performance of the host computer. As such, the pre-flight
test results should be compared to the research laptop computer and the flight test
results should be compared to the test laptop computer. The test laptop computer
was a more powerful and newer laptop than the research laptop computer and was
capable of running the RSET system faster.
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Table 3.6. Test Laptop Specifications
Model ASUS ROG G701VI
Operating System 64-Bit Windows 10 Pro
MATLAB Version R2015B
RAM 32 GB
Processor Intel Core I7-7820HK, 2.9 GHZ
Graphics NVIDIA GTX 1080
Microarchitecture Kaby Lake
Data width 64 bit
Number of cores 4
Number of threads 8
Level 1 cache size 256 KB
Level 2 cache size 1 MB
Level 3 cache size 8 MB
Figure 3.14. View from Test Conductor’s Workstation
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3.9 Test Methodology
The following sections discuss the flight test methodology as performed for the
USAF TPS Have Multi-Path Escape Decisions Using Sophisticated Algorithms (MEDUSA)
TMP.
3.9.1 Aircraft Ground Checkout.
The Learjet was equipped with a ground simulation mode that was used to verify
that the RSET system sent the proper commands to the VSS. This simulation was
used as a functionality check only, but it allowed a real-time determination that
the System Under Test (SUT), VSS, and flight controls were communicating and
operating correctly prior to flight. The goals of ground checkout were as follows:
• Verify integration of the RSET system by ensuring information exchange be-
tween the algorithm and the VSS computer.
• With the VSS in Simulator Mode, trigger every terrain avoidance maneuver and
verify proper control surface deflection.
• Verify the operation of the DTED coordinate and elevation slewing function.
• Verify that the VSS handed back control to the pilot after escape path maneuver
was complete.
The ground checkout found no major discrepancies.
3.9.2 Briefings.
Briefings were conducted prior to and immediately after each test sortie in accor-
dance with TPS standards. All crew members for the day’s test mission were required
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to attend the briefing. These briefings were similar to those used by the Have ES-
CAPE TMP [15]. The minimum crew consisted of a TPS student EP, a Calspan SP,
and a TC. The crew member annotated in parentheses was responsible for briefing
the associated items. The pre-flight brief consisted of:
Flight Safety (EP)
Weather and NOTAMs
Crew duties, responsibilities and Crew Resource Management (CRM)
Exchange of aircraft control and engaging VSS
Joker and bingo fuel
Emergency procedures
Departure and Recovery (EP)
Radio Frequencies
Airspace Management
Departure and recovery routing
Specific Mission Brief (TC)
Test Objectives
Software version
Test hazards and general minimizing procedures
Go/No-Go Criteria
Communication plan
Test card review
The post-flight brief consisted of:
Safety of Flight Concerns (EP)
Crew members bring up any issues encountered
Mission Recap (EP)
Brief review of test mission
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Test Card Review (TC)
Test Points Completed
Data Quality
Lessons Learned for next test mission
3.9.3 Execution.
3.9.3.1 RSET System Prediction Accuracy.
The prediction accuracy of the RSET system was demonstrated by comparing the
difference of the predicted flight path of the aircraft for a given collision avoidance
maneuver and the actual path of the aircraft while executing that maneuver. Path
Prediction Error (PPE) was defined as the distance between the two flights paths,
and was computed at each sampled time from maneuver activation until hand-back
of the aircraft. Refer to Appendix C for the details on how PPE was calculated.
The evaluation criteria for RSET prediction accuracy was expressed in terms of the
maximum value of PPE encountered during a 30-second maneuver. A maximum PPE
of less than 100 ft was classified as satisfactory, between 100 ft to 300 ft as acceptable
and above 300 ft as marginal.
The RSET system was flight tested at 15,000 ft pressure altitude (PA), 8,000 ft PA,
and 500 ft AGL, each at 220 and 270 KIAS. Entry conditions consisted of straight,
level, unaccelerated flight (SLUF)3, 45o left and right banked turns, 5o wings-level
climbs, and 5o wings-level dives. All 500 ft AGL SLUF entry test points were repeated
on separate flights. No diving entries were performed at 500 ft AGL. All five RSET
system escape paths were tested at each of the stipulated pressure altitude, airspeed
and entry conditions.
Prior to flight, the TC entered the number of passengers into the RSET system
3SLUF refers to a flight condition in which the aircraft is stable (i.e. trimmed) at a constant
altitude, heading, and airspeed.
89
via a laptop at the engineers station. This increased the accuracy of the weight and
balance measurement. At the established test point conditions, the TC entered the
current wind speed and direction derived from the onboard embedded GPS/INS (EGI)
and air data systems, and manually activated the RSET system escape path via the
laptop. Immediately upon indications of an RSET path activation, the pilot set the
throttle for maximum continuous power (MCP) (95 ± 2% RPM) in approximately 3
seconds to simulate auto throttle. The maneuver was completed after 30 seconds had
passed since the autopilot commanded the aircraft to fly the chosen RSET system
escape path, which allowed for comparison to the 30-sec path prediction.
Flights 1-3 were used to debug the RSET system, and only data from Flight 4-11
were used for data analysis. For the 30 test points collected during Flight 4 (SLUF
at 15,000 ft PA, 8,000 ft PA, and 500 ft AGL (only for the first set of data) at 220
and 270 KIAS), the RSET system did not consider any inputs on the number of
passengers, wind conditions, and had an allowable maximum flight path angle of up
to 20 degrees instead of 12 degrees for the chosen RSET system escape path. Flights
5-11 accounted for wind through TC entered parameters. Wind drift was identified
as a potential source of error as discussed later.
3.9.3.2 Refresh Rate Impact on Escape Path Calculation.
The second test objective was to gather terrain miss distance and forward look-
ahead time data to characterize a baseline performance model for the RSET solution.
The baseline performance of the RSET system was tested using one terrain feature
which included large mountain peaks located within the R-2508 complex as shown
in Figure 3.15. The terrain feature was located at 35o 31’ 42.0” N, 116o 18’ 31.2”
W. The base of the mountain was approximately at 0 ft MSL, and the peak was
approximately 6,200 ft MSL. The test included three altitudes (15k ft PA, 8k ft PA,
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and 500 ft AGL), two airspeeds (220 and 270 KIAS), and three initial conditions
(ICs). The three initial conditions were selected to present different headings which
provided varying terrain features to ensure all five paths were exercised. While the
real aircraft was flown at varying altitudes, the virtual altitude induced by the terrain
slewing tool, described in Section 3.2.3, was always set to 2,000 ft MSL. Three refresh
rates were tested at each of these conditions (12.5 Hz, 6.25 Hz, and 1.5625 Hz).
The terrain miss distance data were analyzed by calculating the difference of the
aircraft altitude to the height of the interpolated DTED surface directly below the
aircraft. The sign of this value was used to determine whether the aircraft was above
or below the virtual terrain. The actual distance to the virtual terrain was calculated
as the smallest distance from the aircraft’s location to a plane defined by the three
closest DTED posts. This calculation was repeated at every time step throughout
the path activation. The details of this calculation can be seen in Appendix C. The
minimum value for each test run was then recorded as the terrain miss distance, with
a negative value indicating terrain impact. Those miss distances were plotted against
refresh rate with markers identifying either the initial condition (starting point and
heading), test altitude, or test airspeed. This method was not the originally planned
analysis method. An alternate method for calculating terrain miss distance using a
root sum squared distance from the aircraft location to the nearest DTED posts of the
surrounding terrain was planned. However, this presented scenarios that displayed a
terrain impact when the aircraft was clear of the interpolated DTED terrain, since
only the DTED posts were used in this method.
The forward look-ahead time was analyzed by determining the first point along
the prediction path that impacted terrain, at the moment the last remaining path was
determined to be closed by the collision detector. This point was reported as a time
along the path, with the point closest to the aircraft at zero seconds, and the end of
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Figure 3.15. Location of “Heavy GCAS Mountain”
the path being 30 seconds (30 seconds was the length of each path prediction, known
as the path prediction time). All five paths were analyzed, and the highest of the five
times was used as the required forward look-ahead time. Figure 3.16 shows a graphical
representation of this analysis. These look-ahead times were plotted to compare the
impact of refresh rate on forward look-ahead time. The plots also included indications
of whether each activation impacted terrain or not. A terrain impact implied that
the current path prediction time was not adequate.
3.9.3.3 Nuisance Activation Tendency.
The third test objective was to observe the system’s tendency for nuisance acti-
vations. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) defined nuisance alerts as
inappropriate alerts, occurring during normal safe procedures, which are the result
of design performance limitations. The FAA defined nuisance alerts as alerts gen-
erated by a system that is functioning as designed but which are inappropriate or
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Figure 3.16. Forward Look-Ahead Time
unnecessary for the particular condition. For this evaluation, nuisance activations
were defined as RSET path closures that were perceived as unnecessary for terrain
avoidance.
To evaluate path performance, data were collected during manually activated
escape paths to compare predicted escape paths and actual aircraft flight paths. The
TC manually activated escape paths via a laptop at the engineer’s station. The laptop
communicated a value from 1-5 to the VSS, which then activated the corresponding
RSET path autopilot (1: 60o Left Turn, 2: 30o Climbing Left Turn, 3: Forward Climb,
4: 30o Climbing Right Turn, 5; 60o Right Turn). That autopilot then commanded the
aircraft to fly the chosen maneuver and data were collected to compare the predicted
and actual aircraft paths. The pilot set MCP for each maneuver within three seconds
of path activation. Maneuvers were considered complete once the RSET system
returned control of the aircraft to the pilot following the escape maneuver. The
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RSET system was designed to command escape maneuvers near the Learjet VSS
safety trip limits, specifically +2.2 g and 12o flight path angle when at the maximum
test speed of 270 KCAS. Flight test data were gathered to identify how well the RSET
system commanded maneuvers at or near its performance design targets.
To evaluate nuisance activations, each safety pilot performed multiple lateral
passes on the North portion of terrain identified in Figure 3.17. A 60o level banked
turn was first conducted at 2,000 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) to estimate turning
radius and verify RSET system disconnect. The EP then descended to 500 ft AGL
and made three passes abeam the terrain while the RSET ran in the background
evaluating the terrain. During each pass, the EP moved closer to the terrain until
subjectively inside his comfort level needed to execute a 60o escape maneuver. Figure
3.18 shows the view from the right side of the aircraft during these test points.
Lastly, for the operational nuisance evaluation, the EP flew multiple 60o level
banked turns at 2,000 ft AGL and clear of terrain to gain familiarity with the air-
craft’s turn radius at both 220 and 270 KIAS. The EP then descended to 500 ft
AGL and flew a low-level profile at what the EP determined to be an operationally
representative lateral offset from terrain to gather nuisance activation data at each
respective airspeed. The RSET’s ability to control the aircraft was severed to protect
against inadvertent activations, but it still accepted state parameters from the VSS
to determine if an escape maneuver was necessary. The TC informed the pilots any-
time a path closed and collected comments on whether the pilots thought the path
closure was necessary or not. Aircraft state parameters were recorded for all RSET
activations.
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Figure 3.17. Nuisance Terrain Route
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Figure 3.18. Lateral Offset from Terrain (view from TC station)
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3.9.3.4 Maneuver Termination Control Hand-Back.
Following any maneuver where the RSET system was activated, the EP qualita-
tively evaluated the control hand-back immediately following maneuver termination.
The test team produced an aircrew survey to guide EP commentary following control
hand-back. Before flight, the team familiarized themselves with the survey flow and
comments were given in accordance with survey criteria. A copy of the hand-back
survey can be found in Appendix J.
3.10 Data Analysis
The data analysis procedures used are described in Appendix C. The sources of
data were the Learjet VSS Data Acquisition System (DAS) and the test laptop com-
puter. The Learjet DAS sampled parameters at 200 Hz and saved those parameters
to a Microsoft Excel compatible file, which could be imported into MATLAB. The
tables and graphs depicted in Appendix C were used as a guide during data collection
and analysis to ensure the appropriate information was being presented. A review
of the data analysis methods is recommended to understand the results presented in
Chapter IV.
3.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the development and architecture of the RSET system.
The preliminary results of converting the Stitched Model into a usable form was
presented. Then the resources, test methodology, and analysis method for flight test
were outlined. The next chapter presents the results and analysis of the RSET system
flight test executed under USAF TPS TMP Have MEDUSA.
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Overview
This chapter outlines the data, results, and analysis of the model development
and test flights for the Have MEDUSA TMP. The flights were conducted from 5 to
18 September 2018. The Daily Flight Test Reports for each flight can be found in
Appendix B which outlines the crew, conditions of the flight, the test points flown,
and amplifying information related to the collection and quality of the data or the
performance of the system. As discussed in Section 3.7, the flight test objectives were:
1. Demonstrate the path prediction accuracy of the RSET system
2. Demonstrate the impact of changing the refresh rate on the RSET system’s
ability to calculate an achievable escape path
3. Observe the RSET system tendency to nuisance activation
4. Observe the control hand-back of the RSET system after maneuver termination.
The specific test points are detailed in Appendix D. A brief summary of the test
parameters is presented in Table 4.3. The “Manual Path Activation” test points were
used to gather data for the PPE and System Hand-back related objectives. The “Vir-
tual Terrain Activation” test points supported the Terrain Miss Distance, Forward
Look-Ahead Time, and System Hand-Back objectives. The “Low-Level Maneuver-
ing” test points were used to evaluate nuisance.
4.2 Model Development Results
The following sections present the results for the computational speed and model
accuracy of the Converted Model. These results were used to evaluate the utility of
the Converted Model for use in the RSET system.
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4.2.1 Converted Model Computational Speed.
Table 4.1 presents the results of the Converted Model operating speed analysis as
described in Section 3.3.2. As can be seen for the Converted Model with an integration
time-step (dt) of 0.01 sec, the value used for the RSET system, the computation time
needed was reduced by 97%, which provided the performance needed to progress to
flight test.
Table 4.1. Stitched and Converted Model Speed Comparison
Stitched Model Operating Speed
Integration
Method
Integration
Time-step (dt)
Real second
Simulated min
Improvement
vs Baseline
ode4 (Runge-Kutta) 0.005 sec 18.6 sec
min
Baseline
ode3 (Bagacki-Shampine) 0.005 sec 16.0 sec
min
-14%
ode2 (Heun) 0.005 sec 13.0 sec
min
-30%
ode1 (Euler) 0.005 sec 10.6 sec
min
-43%
Converted Model Operating Speed
Integration
Method
Integration
Time-step (dt)
Real second
Simulated min
Improvement
vs Baseline
ode1 (Euler) 0.005 sec 1.3 sec
min
-93%
ode1 (Euler) 0.010 sec 0.5 sec
min
-97%
ode1 (Euler) 0.015 sec 0.4 sec
min
-98%
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4.2.2 Converted Model Accuracy.
Table 4.2 presents the results of the TIC analysis as described in Section 3.3.3.
The Converted Model, which uses Euler-Forward integration, with a dt of 0.01 sec
achieved good model agreement with the Stitched Model while providing greatly
reduced computation times, as discussed in Section 4.2.1.
Table 4.2. TIC for Converted Model vs. Stitched Model (Stitched Model dt: 0.005s)
Pitch Doublet
State TIC Value
dt:0.005s dt:0.010s dt:0.015s
Pitch Rate (Q) 0.269 0.284 0.948
Pitch Attitude (θ) 0.008 0.0084 0.345
Normal Load Factor (nz) 4.27e-04 4.37e-04 0.024
Angle of Attack (α) 8.84e-04 8.64e-04 0.037
Average 0.070 0.073 0.338
Roll Doublet
State TIC Value
dt:0.005s dt:0.010s dt:0.015s
Roll Rate (P ) 0.025 0.053 0.052
Yaw Rate (R) 0.002 0.004 0.004
Lateral Load Factor (ny) 0.009 0.020 0.043
Angle of Side Slip (β) 0.005 0.015 0.037
Average 0.010 0.023 0.034
4.3 Flight Test Results
Overall, the RSET system performance successfully implemented in flight test a
methodology to use a multi-path collision avoidance system for performance limited
aircraft. Path prediction error (PPE) did not meet the specified criteria and was
larger than expected for the 30-second path predictions; however, at the maximum
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refresh rate of 12.5 Hz, the RSET system ensured terrain clearance in all cases tested.
Incorrect accounting for wind drift effects, the Learjet VSS auto-trim feature, and the
low-fidelity engine model were possible sources of PPE. The test team recommended
the main sources of PPE be determined prior to further testing. Despite the simple
design of the control logic, the RSET system was able to achieve and maintain target
load factor and flight path angle with momentary overshoots. The system showed no
tendency for nuisance activations for all cases tested. The RSET hand-back imple-
mentation utilized was immature and the Learjet VSS safety trips were repeatedly
triggered. Despite the unrefined hand-back, the response was deemed favorable in
most cases and could be utilized as a baseline for future Auto-GCAS implementations
and research. Overall, the RSET system was assessed to be MARGINAL. System
assessments were made according to the 412th Test Wing Rating Criteria shown in
Appendix H.
4.3.1 RSET System Prediction Accuracy.
The prediction accuracy of the RSET system was demonstrated by comparing the
difference of the predicted flight path of the aircraft for a given collision avoidance
maneuver and the actual path of the aircraft while executing that maneuver. Path
Prediction Error (PPE) was defined as the distance between the two flights paths,
and was computed at each sampled time from maneuver activation until handback
of the aircraft. Refer to Appendix C for the details on how PPE was calculated.
The evaluation criteria for RSET prediction accuracy was expressed in terms of the
maximum value of PPE encountered during a 30-second maneuver. A maximum PPE
of less than 100 ft was classified as satisfactory, between 100 ft to 300 ft as acceptable
and above 300 ft as marginal. The test objective was met and the prediction accuracy
of the RSET system was MARGINAL.
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Table 4.3. Test Parameters
Test Point Type Altitude Airspeed
Entry
Attitude
Refresh
Rate
Initial
Condition
Manual Path
Activation
15,000 ft PA
8,000 ft PA
500 ft AGL
220 KIAS
270KIAS
SLUF
climb
dive
turn N/A N/A
Virtual Terrain
Activation
15,000 ft PA
8,000 ft PA
500 ft AGL
220 KIAS
270KIAS SLUF
12.5 Hz
6.25 Hz
1.5625 Hz
IC 1
IC 2
IC 3
Low-Level
Maneuvering 500 ft AGL
220 KIAS
270KIAS
Dynamic
Flying 12.5 Hz N/A
Overall, the prediction accuracy of the RSET system was BORDERLINE. None of
the conditions tested had a maximum PPE of less than 100 ft, which was the threshold
for the satisfactory region. Only three of the conditions tested had a maximum PPE
of less than 300 ft, which was the threshold for the acceptable region. The remaining
117 test points had a maximum PPE above 300 ft, which was the threshold for the
marginal region. The summarized maximum PPE results across all altitudes are
presented in Figure 4.1 through Figure 4.4, and in Table 4.4 for the four different
entry condition: SLUF, level turn, climbing, and diving. The reader should again
note that the predecessor to RSET, Have ESCAPE, was only valid for SLUF entry.
The results for each test point are detailed in Appendix E.
Additionally, figures for every manual activation can be found in Appendix I. The
smallest maximum PPE of 172 ft was encountered during the following test condition:
500 ft AGL, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path 3 activation. The largest maximum PPE of
6568 ft was encountered during the following test condition: 15,000 ft PA, 270 KIAS,
diving entry, Path 1 activation.
Since the majority of test points represent a unique test condition that was only
tested once, there was no statistical significance in the error data. However, a few
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Figure 4.1. Maximum Path Prediction Error - SLUF Entry
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Figure 4.2. Maximum Path Prediction Error - Level Turn Entry
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Figure 4.3. Maximum Path Prediction Error - Climbing Entry
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Figure 4.4. Maximum Path Prediction Error - Diving Entry
106
trends were observed. In general, error tended to be higher for Path 1 and 5 acti-
vations, followed by Path 2 and 4 activations and lowest for Path 3 activations. In
addition, error tended to be higher for the diving entries, followed by level turn and
climbing entries, then SLUF entries.
Table 4.4. Average Maximum Path Prediction Error Based On Varied Entry Condition
Notice that these figures and tables mask dynamic pressure effects, as the effect
of altitude and airspeed on error is not apparent. Table 4.5 shows a summary table of
PPE results categorized by airspeed and altitude. In general, there was no observed
effect of airspeed on error, and error tended to increase with increasing altitude.
Table 4.5. Average Maximum Path Prediction Error Based On Varied Starting Air-
speed
The RSET system did not meet the evaluation criteria for the magnitude of the
PPE over a 30-second path activation, indicating that the TPAs are not adequately
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modeling the aircraft’s motion during the collision avoidance maneuvers. However,
one must look at the directionality of the error in addition to the magnitude in order
to fully assess whether RSET had utility as a ground collision avoidance system.
For instance, if the aircraft position was 1000 ft off from the predicted position, but
it resulted in the aircraft being farther away from terrain than predicted, then the
system was still successful in preventing a collision. It may have caused the aircraft
to command a collision avoidance maneuver sooner than necessary, which may be
considered a nuisance by the pilots, but that is a more desirable outcome than CFIT.
In order to characterize the directionality of the PPE for a given manual activation,
the actual path of the aircraft was compared with the predicted path in two aspects:
climb performance and turn performance. To compare the climb performance, the
actual and predicted paths were plotted and viewed from the side to determine if the
aircraft out-climbed the prediction. Figure 4.5 shows an example of a side view of
a Path 3 manual activation. The actual aircraft path, shown in blue, stayed below
the predicted path for the entire maneuver, which indicates that the aircraft had
worse climb performance than was predicted by the TPA and that the path error was
towards the terrain.
To compare the turn performance of the actual aircraft to the TPA, the paths
were plotted and viewed from above to determine if the aircraft had a smaller or
larger turn radius than what was predicted by the algorithm. Figure 4.6 shows an
example top-down view of a Path 5 manual activation. The actual aircraft path had
a larger turn radius than the predicted path, which indicates that the aircraft had
worse turn performance than was predicted and that the path error was towards the
terrain.
If both the climb and turn performance of the actual aircraft exceeded (i.e. out-
performed) the prediction, then it was concluded that the error was in a direction
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Figure 4.5. Side View of Forward Climb
Figure 4.6. Bird’s Eye View of 60o Right Turn
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“away from terrain”. Alternatively, if both the climb rate and turn radius of the
actual aircraft under-performed the prediction, then it was concluded that the error
was in a direction “toward terrain”, indicating a more dangerous situation. If the
actual aircraft out-performed the prediction in one aspect but under-performed in
the other aspect, then the direction of the error was deemed to be “inconclusive”,
because the safety of the maneuver would be dependent on the terrain feature. A
summary of the results for the directionality of the PPE is presented in Table 4.6.
Results for each test point are provided in Appendix E.
Table 4.6. Summary of PPE Directionality
Two general trends were observed in the PPE direction data. First, the direction
of the PPE was correlated to the airspeed flown. At the slower airspeed, 220 KIAS,
the actual path generally had a smaller turn radius than predicted, but worse climb
performance than predicted. This resulted in Paths 1 and 5 generally erring away
from terrain and Path 3 erring toward terrain. At the higher airspeed, 270 KIAS,
the actual path generally had a larger turn radius than predicted, but better climb
performance than predicted. This resulted in Paths 1 and 5 generally erring toward
terrain and Path 3 erring away from terrain. The second trend observed from the
PPE direction data was a correlation with the entry condition. For SLUF and climb-
ing entries, the aircraft generally out-performed the prediction and erred away from
terrain. For level turn and descending entries, the aircraft generally under-performed
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the prediction and erred toward terrain. This suggests that the current implemen-
tation of RSET performs best when the aircraft starts from straight-and-level flight
or from a slight climb. Thus far, the discussion has focused on trends in the PPE
magnitude and direction data with respect to the control variables (airspeed, altitude,
entry condition, and RSET path). However, there are several confounding variables
that could have had a significant effect on the PPE results. Possible sources of error
include (1) the auto-trim feature of the VSS, (2) incorrect accounting of wind speed
and direction in the TPAs, and (3) the low fidelity of the Learjet engine model used in
the TPAs. The first two error sources were investigated in post-flight analysis, but the
error due to engine model inaccuracies was not investigated. The engine model used
by the TPAs was a simplistic model, but its impact on overall model performance are
not fully understood. A separate study would need to be performed to understand
the accuracy of the model for various flight conditions.
One potential source of error was the auto-trim feature of the VSS. This function
was in place to reduce hinge loads on the horizontal stabilizer, and was a normal part
of the LJ-25D flight control system. Therefore, this feature could not be disabled
for flight safety, and was not accounted for due to the discovery of this feature only
after flight test began. The RSET system used the initial value for the horizontal
stabilizer deflection at activation, and did not account for auto-trim changes during
the maneuver. This error can be seen in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. At the time the
auto-trim functions activates, the RSS error begins to grow at a faster pace. While
this was not the only source of error, it did appear to be a contributing factor.
Another confounding variable that was investigated as a source of error was wind.
The wind data entered by the TC was derived from the onboard EGI and air data
systems. The TPAs compensated for the wind in its path predictions. The wind
speed and direction were assumed to be constant throughout the RSET maneuver.
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Figure 4.7. VSS Control Surface Positions (Auto-Trim at 7 Seconds)
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Figure 4.8. Bird’s Eye View of VSS vs TPA Paths: Flight 5 Record 14 (Auto-Trim at
7 Seconds)
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However, post-flight data analysis showed that the aircraft was consistently drifting
away from the predicted path in the direction of the wind during manually activated
RSET maneuvers. Figure 4.9 shows a bird’s eye view of the actual aircraft path
and the predicted path with the wind vectors overlaid for the following test point:
500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, level turn entry, Path 1 activation. The actual aircraft path
appears to be drifting away from the predicted path in roughly the same direction
that the wind is blowing. The same plot was generated for all 120 manual activation
test points, and Appendix E presents the wind speed for each point and whether
or not the wind direction appears to be contributing to the PPE. For 88% of the
test points, the actual aircraft path appears to be drifting away from the predicted
path in the same direction as the wind. These results suggest that the TPAs are not
accurately accounting for winds in their path predictions. Furthermore, this error due
to wind could explain some of the previous trends. For instance, since wind speed
generally increased with increasing altitude, the inability to fully account for winds
could explain why PPE increased with increasing altitude.
While the maximum PPE calculated during each 30-second maneuver was found
to be, on average, much higher than the amount deemed to be acceptable (300 ft), it
is believed that this metric is not a fair indicator of the overall utility of the RSET
system. Since the actual aircraft position drifted from the predicted path as time
progresses during an RSET maneuver, the calculated PPE is usually at a maximum
at the very end of the 30-second maneuver. As will be seen in the results for forward
look-ahead time, it typically takes significantly less than 30 seconds to clear a terrain
feature when a refresh rate of 12.5 Hz is used. Hypothetically, if it takes the aircraft
10 seconds to clear a terrain feature from the start of a commanded RSET maneuver,
then there is a chance that the PPE at the 10-second point is within the acceptable
amount; whereas the PPE at the 30-second point would have grown enough to be
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Figure 4.9. VSS vs TPA Paths: Flight 7 Record 14 with Wind: 227o at 12 knots
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outside the acceptable amount. Since the evaluation criteria for RSET prediction
accuracy did not take into account intermediate time steps within a manual activation
and the direction of the error (toward vs. away from terrain), little can be concluded
on the utility of RSET as a ground collision avoidance system with this metric alone.
Figure 4.10 shows a time history of the PPE during a manual maneuver of RSET
Path 3 at the following conditions: 15,000 ft PA, 270 KIAS, climbing entry. It can
be seen that while the maximum PPE, which occurs at 30 seconds after activation,
is 754 ft, the PPE stays under the acceptable value of 300 ft for the first 13 seconds
during the maneuver. If the terrain had been cleared within 13 seconds, then the
unacceptable PPE error for the remainder of the maneuver is irrelevant to the utility
of the RSET system.
Overall, the RSET system received a MARGINAL rating. Three test points were
acceptable with a maximum PPE between 100 ft to 300 ft, and the remaining 117
test points were marginal with maximum PPE above 300 ft. The smallest maximum
PPE was 172 ft and the largest maximum PPE was 6568 ft. It was observed that
maximum PPE tended to be higher for Path 1 and 5 activations, followed by Path 2
and 4 activations and lowest for Path 3 activations. Next, maximum PPE was higher
for diving entries compared to the other three entries. Lastly, it was concluded that
out of the 120 test points analyzed, 44 had PPE erring away from terrain, 54 had
PPE erring towards terrain and the remaining 22 test points were inconclusive. The
possible sources of error that could account for the marginal rating of the prediction
accuracy of the RSET system could be the auto-trim feature of the VSS, incorrect
accounting of wind speed and direction in the TPAs, and the low fidelity of the
Learjet engine model used in the TPAs. In particular, post-flight analysis suggested
that the TPAs were not properly accounting for winds. Recommendation 1 (R1):
Conduct further data analysis to determine the sources of error and their
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Figure 4.10. Time History of RSS Error (PPE) during a manual activation
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impact to PPE. Furthermore, the majority of test points were only tested once and
had no statistical significance in PPE. R2: Conduct repeat runs of specific test
conditions to increase statistical significance of PPE results.
4.3.2 Refresh Rate Impact on Escape Path Calculation.
An initial baseline was demonstrated for the RSET system. Slower refresh rates
appeared to have a negative impact on the ability of the system to safely avoid virtual
terrain. No significant correlation between, airspeed, altitude or initial condition and
terrain miss distance was found. Additionally, the necessary forward look-ahead time
increased as refresh rate decreased. At the lowest refresh rates, the 30 sec path
prediction time used did not appear to be adequate to ensure sufficient terrain miss
distance. The test objective was met.
4.3.2.1 Terrain Miss Distance.
The results showed that the highest refresh rate was required to ensure a successful
terrain avoidance maneuver. A 12.5 Hz refresh rate showed no virtual terrain impacts,
while at lower refresh rates terrain impacts did occur for the same test conditions.
Figure 4.11 shows the effect of the starting location and heading on miss distance.
Although it was beyond the scope of this test to exercise the RSET system against
numerous terrain types, the obstacle chosen, “Heavy GCAS Mountain”, presented
different terrain profiles from each of three starting points. These profiles included
slowly rising terrain, steeply rising terrain, and valleys.
The initial conditions did not appear to have a significant impact on terrain miss
distance at the highest refresh rate. At the lower refresh rates there appeared to be
slightly more variation in initial condition 3 which flew directly towards the mountain.
Initial conditions 1 and 2 placed the aircraft on more of a “glancing” angle with the
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Figure 4.11. Terrain Miss Distance with Initial Condition Variation
terrain, which meant that, in general, once the avoidance maneuver away from the
terrain was executed then the aircraft was clear of any other local co-altitude terrain.
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show a typical terrain miss distance profile. The low speed,
and therefore energy, was the primary cause of the flight path closely following the
terrain. However, at no time did the aircraft’s flight path intersect the digital terrain.
This was also the case for all the other runs at a 12.5 Hz refresh rate. The rest of the
data results can be found in Appendix I.
As can been seen from Figure 4.14, at the highest refresh rate there appeared
to be no significant change in performance with altitude variation. At the 6.25 Hz
refresh rate there was slightly more variation with higher altitude, but this was not
significantly observed at the other refresh rates.
As seen in Figure 4.15, airspeed also had no well-defined trend. The terrain miss
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Figure 4.12. Learjet VSS Flight Path versus DTED: Flight 7, Record 24, 220 KIAS,
500 ft AGL, IC 1
Figure 4.13. Distance to Terrain: Flight 7, Record 24, 220 KIAS, 500 ft AGL, IC 1
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Figure 4.14. Terrain Miss Distance with Altitude Variation
distance appeared to vary randomly across both airspeeds.
Based on these results, it appeared that a higher refresh rate near 12.5 Hz was
required to ensure terrain clearance with this implementation of the RSET system.
The other factors appeared to have no significant impact on terrain clearance. The
selection of an appropriate terrain buffer was also a critical parameter for system
performance. The 200 ft terrain buffer used in this implementation provided an initial
reference for the size of terrain buffers for future system implementations. Future
systems must also evaluate the mission set and aircraft performance ability when
determining a terrain buffer. Overall, these findings should provide a reference for
future multi-path systems on required system performance. R3: Using a refresh
rate of 12.5 Hz or faster, investigate the effect of varied operationally
representative terrain types and terrain buffers on miss distance.
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Figure 4.15. Terrain Miss Distance with Airspeed Variation
4.3.2.2 Forward Look-Ahead Time.
Figure 4.16 shows a trend of decreasing forward look-ahead time required with
increasing refresh rate. At the lowest refresh rate all 30 seconds or more were required
indicated by the number of virtual impacts seen, but at the highest refresh rate 16
seconds was the highest required forward look-ahead time with no virtual impacts
observed. No significant trend was seen based on initial condition, although it was
predicted that more look-ahead time would be required for more aggressive terrain.
This trend may not have been clearly seen during this test since all initial conditions
contained fairly aggressive terrain features.
As seen in Figure 4.17, no clear trend was seen across refresh rates for the effect
of altitude on forward look-ahead time. Model accuracy was expected to decrease
with deviation from 15,000 ft, the model’s validation altitude. However, this trend
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Figure 4.16. Forward Look-Ahead Time with Initial Condition Variation
was not seen consistently across refresh rates.
Figure 4.18 shows the variation of airspeed across each refresh rate. No significant
trend was observed from flight test. This behavior was expected since the paths were
a fixed time, e.g. a 30 sec prediction path at 270 KIAS was a longer distance than a
220 KIAS prediction path.
The data showed that an increased refresh rate yielded a shorter required forward
look-ahead time. Forward look-ahead time did not appear to be significantly affected
by other factors such as initial condition, airspeed, or altitude. The system refresh
rate will drive the forward look-ahead time, and the presented data should provide a
rough starting point for future multi-path collision avoidance systems. R4: Evaluate
the need for forward look-ahead times beyond 30 seconds.
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Figure 4.17. Forward Look-Ahead Time with Altitude Variation
4.3.3 Nuisance Activation Tendency.
The pilots’ perception of nuisance relies heavily on the system’s ability to operate
both timely and aggressively. Since the system already demonstrated its timeliness,
the test team looked to characterize its aggressiveness. That is, ability of the RSET to
command escape maneuvers at or near the VSS limits, as well as the aircraft’s ability
to perform at or near the RSET-commanded conditions, which was demonstrated in
Chapter III in simulation. The system’s aggressiveness was important to characterize
since the pilots would have considered a system that maneuvered less aggressively
than they would have as nuisance prone. The test objective was met.
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Figure 4.18. Forward Look-Ahead Time with Airspeed Variation
4.3.3.1 Path Performance.
The RSET system commanded maneuvers commensurate with available aircraft
performance. For all activations, MCP was set within three seconds of the escape ma-
neuver beginning. By design, the VSS commanded more aggressive escape maneuvers
during the 270 KIAS test points than it did during the 220 KIAS test points. That is,
the RSET commanded higher load factors and flight path angles (FPAs) when more
aircraft performance was available. As a result, airspeed and RSET commanded load
factor and FPA gradually decreased throughout the escape maneuver until reaching a
steady energy state. The aircraft generally achieved steady state, RSET-commanded
angle of bank (AoB) within five seconds of escape maneuver activation. With less
performance available during the 220 KIAS escape maneuvers, the aircraft initially
performed at reduced load factors and FPAs but gained energy as the throttles were
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advanced. As a result, airspeed and RSET commanded load factor and FPA gradu-
ally increased throughout the escape maneuvers until reaching a steady energy state.
These behaviors can be seen in Figure 4.19 through Figure 4.24. Path performance
of Paths 4 and 5 (right turning escape maneuvers) was representative of Paths 1 and
2 (left turning escape maneuvers).
Figure 4.19 shows a Path 3 escape maneuver initiated from straight and level flight,
at 220 KIAS and 500 ft AGL. Initially, performance available was low so the RSET
commanded a gradual increase in load factor and FPA. The available performance
increased as power reached MCP and the aircraft stabilized on the RSET-commanded
limit of approximately 8o FPA. Once on the RSET limit of FPA, the system no longer
commanded an increase in load factor.
Figure 4.20 shows a Path 3 escape maneuver initiated from a left 45 bank, at
270 KIAS and 500 ft AGL. Initially, performance available was high so the RSET
commanded the aircraft to simultaneously roll wings-level and increase load factor
to keep the FPA greater than or equal to zero. The aircraft reached the RSET-
commanded load factor limit when wings-level was achieved and the FPA began to
rapidly increase to the RSET limit. The RSET commanded the aircraft to maintain
the load factor limit until reaching the FPA limit. As a result of this binary-style
logic, the aircraft overshot the FPA limit by approximately 5o (42%). The FPA
gradually decreased until the RSET-commanded limit and the aircraft’s actual FPA
were in agreement. The airspeed never decreased below the test limit of 200 KIAS
during the FPA overshoot; however, the system should account for potential FPA
overshoots to preclude unsafe airspeeds during escape maneuvers. R5: Account
for FPA overshoots in the escape maneuver control laws for high aircraft
performance conditions.
Figure 4.21 shows a Path 4 escape maneuver initiated from a left 45o bank, at
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Figure 4.19. Path 3 Performance, 220 KIAS, 500 ft AGL, SLUF Entry
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Figure 4.20. Path 3 Performance, 270 KIAS, 500 ft AGL, 45o Left Turning Entry
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220 KIAS and 500 ft AGL. Initially, performance available was low so the RSET
commanded a gradual increase in load factor and FPA. The available performance
increased as power reached MCP and the aircraft stabilized on the RSET-commanded
limit of approximately 8o FPA. Once on the RSET limit of FPA, the system no longer
commanded an increase in load factor.
Figure 4.22 shows a Path 4 escape maneuver initiated from a left 45o bank, at
270 KIAS and 500 ft AGL. Initially, performance available was high so the RSET
commanded the aircraft to roll wings-level and, passing through 0o of bank, increase
load factor to keep FPA greater than or equal to zero. The aircraft reached the RSET-
commanded load factor limit and the FPA began to rapidly increase to the RSET
limit. The RSET commanded the aircraft to maintain the load factor limit until
reaching the FPA limit. As a result of the excess performance available, the aircraft
overshot the FPA limit by approximately 2o (17%). The FPA gradually decreased
until the RSET-commanded limit and the aircraft’s actual FPA were in agreement.
Figure 4.23 shows a Path 5 escape maneuver initiated from straight and level
flight, at 220 KIAS and 500 ft AGL. Initially, performance available was too low to
maintain the RSET-commanded 60o AOB without descending. The RSET control
logic prioritized maintaining greater than or equal to zero FPA over the escape ma-
neuver’s 60o AOB. As a result, the aircraft decreased AOB, raised the nose until
greater than or equal to zero FPA could be reestablished, and then continued its 60o
AOB. This “ratcheting” was undesirable, and could lead to confusion and incorrect
pilot actions. This behavior was not common during the 270 KIAS test points as
enough aircraft performance was available to keep greater than or equal to zero FPA
throughout the entire escape maneuver. Additional consideration of low aircraft per-
formance conditions in the control laws could alleviate this behavior. R6: Tailor
escape maneuver control laws for low aircraft performance conditions.
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Figure 4.21. Path 4 Performance, 220 KIAS, 500 ft AGL, 45o Left Turning Entry
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Figure 4.22. Path 4 Performance, 270 KIAS, 500 ft AGL, 45o Left Turning Entry
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Figure 4.23. Path 5 Performance, 220 KIAS, 500 ft AGL
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Figure 4.24 shows a Path 5 escape maneuver initiated from a left 45o bank, at
270 KIAS and 500 ft AGL. Initially, performance available was high so the RSET
commanded the aircraft to simultaneously roll into a right 60o bank and increase load
factor to increase FPA. The aircraft reached the RSET-commanded load factor limit
and the FPA began to rapidly increase to the RSET limit. The RSET commanded
the aircraft to maintain the load factor limit until reaching the FPA limit. As a
result of the excess performance available, the aircraft overshot the FPA limit by
approximately 2o (17%). After the FPA overshoot was rectified, the aircraft remained
on the RSET limit for load factor.
4.3.3.2 Nuisance Activations.
The aircraft did not exhibit nuisance activations during testing against lateral ter-
rain. For each pass flown, the RSET showed the level escape maneuver was available
and would avoid terrain, but the EP commented that he would not consider turning
in the direction of terrain if he were to manually fly a 60o level turn escape maneuver.
Figure 4.25 and Figure 4.26 depict the path of the aircraft in green and the RSET
60o right turn predictions of Path 5 in red. At no point did the RSET path nuisance
activate near lateral terrain.
4.3.3.3 Operational Nuisance Activations.
The RSET system did not exhibit nuisance activations during operationally rep-
resentative profiles against lateral terrain. Typically, the RSET showed the 60o bank
escape maneuver was available and would avoid terrain, but the EP commented that
they would not consider turning in the direction of terrain if they were to manually
fly a level turn escape maneuver. On each flight against operational terrain, the
team observed at least one to two instances when the turning escape path towards
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Figure 4.24. Path 5 Performance, 270 KIAS, 500 ft AGL
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Figure 4.25. Path of Aircraft During Lateral Offset Test Points
Figure 4.26. Path of Aircraft with 60o Right RSET Predictions during Lateral Offset
Test Points
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terrain would momentarily close. In all cases, the crew agreed that the closure was
appropriate. This data was also objectively confirmed via numerous team comments
during the operational terrain evaluation which stated surprise that the path towards
terrain was not closed off. In spite of the large path prediction error, the system still
demonstrated no tendency to nuisance for the operational profile flown.
4.3.4 Maneuver Termination Control Hand-Back.
Upon completion of any RSET path maneuvering, the aircraft autopilots com-
manded a roll to wings-level and pitch reduction to zero gamma as described in
Section 3.5.4. The test objective was met.
For low-speed test points, aircrew comments indicated a smooth, logical, and safe
hand-back. However, the test team found that at higher airspeeds, the hand-back
would trip the Learjet VSS safety logic, as was seen in Table 3.5, due to an under-g
condition (less than 0.25 g). Because of this, the team was unable to fully characterize
and evaluate every single hand-back scenario. During these maneuvers where the
VSS tripped, the aggressive unload from 2 g to 0.25 g repeatedly caused aircrew
motion sickness. This maneuver would likely have caused an aircraft limit exceedance
without the VSS safety logic. This behavior would need to be addressed prior to any
hand-back implementation in order to avoid airframe limit exceedance and aircrew
discomfort. Additionally, based on aircrew comments, airframe mission also needs to
be considered in future versions of the hand-back. This consideration would need to
account for tactics such as terrain masking where unnecessary maneuvering would be
detrimental to platform survivability.
The addition of the stick shaker during escape maneuver activation was well re-
ceived by the pilots. It provided tactile feedback that the RSET was handing back
control of the aircraft after the initial escape maneuver was complete. The stick
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shaker ceased concurrent with the completion of RSET hand-back. The stick shaker
was the only usable indication to the aircrew that the RSET was still in control of
the aircraft as the location of the CSS made it unusable to the pilots during “heads
up” flying. Aircrew comments were in favor of a display that could be incorporated
into a normal crosscheck for the low-level phase of flight. R7: System hand-back
should be less aggressive for aircrew comfort and PVI should be placed in
pilot’s line-of-sight.
Aircrew were in favor of the ability to “paddle off” the system and take control
any time the RSET was controlling the aircraft. Paddling off the system during the
hand-back was common when the pilots felt like the aircraft was in a safe condition
and they did not want to wait for the RSET to complete the entire hand-back process.
The aircrew strongly agreed the ability to paddle off the system was a requirement
rather than a desired feature. R8: Future implementation of the RSET should
require a means for aircrew to override the system and take control of the
aircraft.
Throughout the test period, all EPs provided their qualitative opinion of the hand-
back following RSET maneuver completion. An extensive listing of EP comments can
be found in Appendix K. A sampling of EP comments are displayed below:
“Felt smooth and safe. Adequate for system maturity.”
“Hand-back took a little too long in order to stay smooth. I would probably
pickle off and take command earlier to recover faster.”
“Higher airspeed hand-back was more aggressive vs lower energy state hand-
backs.”
“During low speed points, it’s hard to tell if the aircraft is in a hand-back
state or attempting a different path. Visual indication of system state would
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be useful.”
“In a non-combat environment this would be totally fine. It gets the aircraft
back to a place I feel comfortable taking control.”
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the results of the Have MEDUSA flight tests. Overall,
the results were positive and represented a significant advance from the Have ES-
CAPE tests, although there is still research to be done. Throughout this chapter
recommendations based on data analysis were presented for the flight test objectives.
The complete list of conclusions and recommendations, including those related to the
overall research objectives, are given in Chapter IV.
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V. Conclusions, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned
5.1 Overview
As presented in Chapter I, the goal of this research was to research, design, and
test an Auto-GCAS for performance limited aircraft. The motivation for this research
was to reduce the number of CFIT accidents across the Air Force inventory. This
research primarily used the works of Trombetta and Suplisson as a starting point for
system development [14, 15]. Their work demonstrated the advantage of a multi-
path system for performance limited aircraft, and identified the need for RSET. The
RSET system was developed through the adaptation of a flight tested Learjet 25D
aerodynamic model combined with 5 TPAs to project the aircraft’s position forward
in time. These forward projections were then compared to the surrounding DTED
posts to determine whether a collision risk was present and maneuver the aircraft in
an aggressive and timely manner when necessary. Once developed, this system was
flight tested under USAF TPS TMP Have MEDUSA. The following chapter presents
the conclusions and recommendations gleaned from the results presented in Chapter
IV. Additionally, lessons learned from this effort and guidance are given to aid future
research.
5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations
This section is divided into conclusions and associated recommendations based
on the flight test objectives and overall research objectives. Although several of
the research objectives were not explicit flight test objectives, they were evaluated
or observed during the development and execution of the flight test and are thus
recorded herein.
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5.2.1 Flight Test Objective Conclusions.
The flight test objectives from Section 1.3.2 are repeated below with their associ-
ated conclusions and specific recommendations for both future research and inclusion
in the requirements for a fielded system. The flight test objectives are presented first
since many of the research objectives where realized through pursuit of the flight test
objectives.
1. Demonstrate the prediction accuracy of the RSET system.
For path prediction accuracy, the RSET system was evaluated as MARGINAL
with 117 out of 120 test points having a maximum path prediction error
(PPE) above 300 ft. It was observed that maximum PPE tended to be
highest for Path 1 activation and lowest for Path 3 activation. Maximum
PPE was higher for diving entries compared to the other three entries.
Out of 120 test points analyzed, 44 had PPE erring away from terrain,
54 had PPE erring towards terrain, and the remaining 22 test points were
inconclusive. Possible sources of error could be the auto-trim feature of
the VSS, incorrect accounting of wind speed and direction in the TPAs,
and the low fidelity of the Learjet engine model used in the TPAs.
R1: Conduct further data analysis to determine the sources of
error and their impact to PPE.
Furthermore, the majority of test points were only tested once and had no
statistical significance in PPE.
R2: Conduct repeat runs of specific test conditions to increase
statistical significance of PPE results. Additionally, since TIC showed
that the Stitched and Converted models matched very closely the Stitched
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model should be investigated throughout the aircraft flight envelope to
verifying its applicability and accuracy.
2. Demonstrate the impact of changing the refresh rate on the RSET system’s
ability to calculate an achievable escape path
With respect to terrain miss distance, it appeared that a refresh rate near
12.5 Hz was required to ensure terrain clearance with this implementation
of the RSET system. The selection of an appropriate terrain buffer was
a critical parameter. Future systems should evaluate the mission and air-
craft performance ability when determining a terrain buffer.
R3: Using a refresh rate of 12 Hz or faster, investigate the effect
of varied operationally representative terrain types and terrain
buffers on miss distance.
Data showed that increasing refresh rate also required a shorter forward
look-ahead time. Forward look ahead time was evaluated at 30 seconds
only and did not appear to be significantly affected by other factors. Sys-
tem refresh rate drove forward look-ahead time, and the presented data
would provide a rough starting point for future multi-path collision avoid-
ance systems. Please see Carpenter’s research for supporting information
on varying forward look-ahead time [70].
R4: Evaluate the need for forward look-ahead times beyond 30
seconds.
For path performance, the aircraft generally achieved steady state, RSET-
commanded AOB within five seconds of escape maneuver activation. With
less performance available during the 220 KIAS escape maneuvers, the
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aircraft initially performed at reduced load factors and FPAs but gained
energy as the throttles were advanced. With more performance available
during the 270 KIAS escape maneuvers, the aircraft exhibited the ten-
dency to overshoot the RSET-commanded FPA by up to 5o (42%). The
FPA gradually decreased until the RSET-commanded limit and the air-
craft’s actual FPA agreed. The airspeed never decreased below the test
limit of 200 KIAS during FPA overshoots; however, the system should
account for FPA overshoots to preclude unsafe airspeeds during escape
maneuvers.
R5: The RSET system specification should include a requirement
to account for FPA overshoots in the escape maneuver control
laws for high aircraft performance conditions.
During 60o-AOB escape maneuvers at low performance states, the aircraft
was unable to maintain the RSET-commanded 60o-AOB without descend-
ing. The RSET control logic prioritized maintaining greater than or equal
to zero FPA over the escape maneuvers 60o-AOB. As a result, the aircraft
decreased AOB, raised the nose until greater than or equal to zero FPA,
and then continued its 60o AOB. This “ratcheting” was undesirable and
could lead to confusion or incorrect pilot actions. This behavior was not
common during the 270 KIAS test points as enough aircraft performance
was available to keep greater than or equal to zero FPA throughout the
entire escape maneuver. Additional consideration of low aircraft perfor-
mance conditions in the control laws could alleviate this behavior.
R6: The RSET system specification should tailor escape maneu-
ver control laws for low aircraft performance conditions.
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3. Observe the RSET system tendency to nuisance activation.
The aircraft did not exhibit nuisance activations during testing against
lateral terrain as well as for operationally representative profiles against
lateral terrain. Typically, the RSET showed the 60o AOB escape maneu-
ver was available, but the aircrew commented they would not consider
turning in the direction of terrain if they were to manually fly a 60o AOB
escape maneuver. As a result of these findings and the aggressive path
performance results, this RSET implementation was not nuisance prone.
R7: Continue to incorporate aggressive maneuvers to limit nui-
sance potential.
4. Observe the control hand-back of the RSET system after maneuver termination.
For low-speed test points, aircrew comments indicated a smooth, logical,
and safe hand-back. However, the test team found that at higher airspeeds,
the hand-back would trip the Learjet VSS safety logic due to an under-g
condition (≤ 0.25 g). During maneuvers where the VSS tripped, the ag-
gressive unload from 2 g to 0.25 g caused aircrew motion sickness. Based
on aircrew comments, airframe mission also needs to be considered in fu-
ture versions of the hand-back. Consideration should be given to tactics
such as terrain masking where unnecessary maneuvering would be detri-
mental to platform survivability.
The addition of the stick shaker during escape maneuver activation was
well received by the pilots. It provided tactile feedback that the RSET was
handing back control of the aircraft after the initial escape maneuver was
complete. The stick shaker ceased with the completion of RSET hand-
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back. The stick shaker was the only usable indication to the aircrew that
the RSET was still in control of the aircraft as the location of the CSS
made it unusable to the pilots during “heads up” flying. Aircrew com-
ments were in favor of a display that could be incorporated into a normal
crosscheck for the low-level phase of flight.
R8: The RSET system specification should require system hand
back to be less aggressive for aircrew comfort and relocate PVI
to pilots line-of-sight and include a positive indication (such as a
stick shaker) when active.
Aircrew were in favor of the ability to “paddle off” the system and take
control any time the RSET was controlling the aircraft. Paddling off the
system during the hand-back was common when the pilots felt like the
aircraft was in a safe condition and they did not want to wait for the
RSET to complete the entire hand-back process. The aircrew strongly
agreed the ability to paddle off the system was a requirement rather than
a desired feature.
R9: The RSET system specification should also include a means
for aircrew to override the system and take control of the aircraft.
5.2.2 Research Objective Conclusions.
The overall research objectives from Section 1.3.2 are repeated below with their
associated conclusions and recommendations.
1. Apply 6-DoF equations of motion for aircraft path prediction [14].
An augmented 6-DOF model was implemented for the RSET system. Al-
though the higher fidelity model did not provide the desired small PPE,
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it was nevertheless able to provide enough prediction accuracy to avoid
terrain. Furthermore it was an important step forward for multi-path
Auto-GCAS research to show that a more complicated flight dynamics
model could operate at a fast enough refresh rate.
R10: Continue to investigate the tradeoffs between model fidelity
and prediction accuracy. Based on this research, TIC and PPE appear
to be effective ways of calculating the quality of fidelty and accuracy re-
spectively.
2. Allow for a variable aircraft initial state [15].
A variable initial state was implemented for the RSET system. Since
adaptive control laws, described in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.3, were used for
both path prediction and execution, the aircraft was not constrained to
one starting condition. This was another step forward towards developing
an operationally relevant Auto-GCAS and shows that this RSET approach
is feasible.
R11: An RSET system specification should require the system
to be capable of operating within as much of the host aircraft
flight envelope as possible.
3. Determine necessary number of RSETs [15, 23].
While the research presented here cannot say conclusively how many RSETs
are necessary for a multi-path Auto-GCAS, flight testing did show that all
five paths were used based on terrain and aircraft energy state. Indeed
path selection and utility is entirely dependent on the design of the paths
themselves as well as aircraft performance and mission. The finding that a
five path solution may be necessary is contrary to the conclusion of Trom-
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betta [15].
R12: Continue to investigate other multi-path implementations,
to include more than five path options.
4. Integrate auto-throttle for maneuver execution [14].
Due to system constraints discussed in Section 1.4, the auto-throttle fea-
ture of the Learjet VSS was not used. Instead the EP served as the “human
auto-throttle”. The three EPs were adept at consistently setting MCP and
were not identified as a major source of error in the test results. Still, the
nature of performance limited aircraft will necessitate the use of a pilot-
free auto-throttle system for a fielded Auto-GCAS.
R13: An RSET system specification should incorporate auto-
throttle.
5. Perform continuous path analysis, even during maneuver [15].
As discussed, the adaptive control laws provided increased flexibility of the
RSET system compare to Have ESCAPE. The RSET system was able to
continually calculate TPAs and, if clear of offending terrain, automatically
hand control back to the EP.
R14: Continuous path analysis should be an RSET system re-
quirement.
6. Achieve ≥ 6 Hz operation with MATLAB implementation [14].
Using a laptop with the specifications provided in Section 3.8.3, the RSET
system was able to operate at 12.5 Hz, which was in agreement with fielded
systems such as F-16 Auto-GCAS (which operates at 12 Hz).
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R15: An RSET system should use 12 Hz as a baseline refresh
rate.
7. Include wind and density altitude effects [15, 23].
The Stitched Model which was at the core of the RSET system included
wind and density effects. As discussed in Section 4.3.1 it was determined
that wind effects were not properly accounted for in the flight tested sys-
tem. Indeed wind was identified to play an important role in error pro-
pogation.
R16: Future research efforts should ensure that wind effects are
appropriately accounted for in the RSET system and existing
autopilots.
8. Use of identical control laws for both path prediction and maneuver execution.
As has been discussed several times already, the approach of using identical
control laws for TPA calculation and maneuver execution was desirable.
R17: Recommend the use of similarly designed control laws for
path prediction and maneuver execution for future RSET sys-
tems.
9. Identify multi-path Auto-GCAS nuisance criteria.
This research used a simple and limited approach to evaluating nuisance
which was constrained by the safety requirements of the USAF TPS stu-
dent TMP process. Clearly, quantifying nuisance is important but it is
also challenging. It is especially challenging when evaluating against ter-
rain that is laterally offset from the aircraft and therefore does not have a
“time until impact” associated with it.
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R18: Continue to investigate appropriate metrics to quantify
multi-path nuisance.
10. Determine maneuver termination timeliness criteria.
There are an infinite number of maneuver termination criteria and hand-
back methods. This research simply identified when the projected paths
no longer predicted collision with terrain and then began a simple hand-
back to the pilot. As can be seen from the results in Chapter IV, this
implementation was generally favored.
R19: Investigate maneuver termination criteria and hand-back
state as appropriate for the aircraft customer and operational
environment.
5.3 Lessons Learned
While there were many technical and programmatic challenges, the overall percep-
tion of how the program went was excellent. At the 12.5 Hz refresh rate, the RSET
system met the three key design requirements: Do No Harm, Do Not Impede
Mission Performance, Avoid Ground Collision. Still, there were many lessons
learned that should be incorporated, or at least addressed, in follow-on and similar
programs.
Configuration Management Essential for Test Effectiveness and Efficiency
There were instances throughout the test program where the improper RSET
build was loaded onto the Learjet following code changes. This either resulted in early
termination of the sortie (when realized in flight) or data gathered in the incorrect
configuration. A list of configuration details and changes is shown in Appendix G.
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The opportunities to load the incorrect build were greater earlier in the test win-
dow when new RSET builds were commonplace. As the test window progressed, the
configuration was finalized and locked down, which resulted in fewer opportunities
to load the incorrect build. Follow-on programs should ensure tight configuration
management.
Test Conductor Communication Increased Pilot Situational Awareness
The pilots had minimal indications in the cockpit regarding the current state of
the RSET. The one display that did show RSET status was located on the center
console (between the pilots) and was not viewable during heads-up flying. As such,
the pilots relied heavily on the TCs to paint them a picture of what the RSET was
currently doing and what was going to be doing in the near future. This awareness
allowed pilots to anticipate what was next and keep an efficient airspace plan for sub-
sequent test points. This was primarily achieved with effective TC communication
over the aircraft intercom system. Follow-on programs should emphasize additional
means (that are readily available while flying, such as line-of-sight displays or haptic
feedback) to provide pilots awareness of RSET behavior.
Effect of Interpolation on DTED Terrain Interpretation
The interpolation method chosen has a direct impact on the Auto-GCAS terrain
miss distance. Using a nearest method, such as the one used for the RSET system,
is computationally efficient, but does not smoothly transition from one DTED post
to another as linear or cubic methods would. Conversely, the nearest method is the
only method that always uses truth data, whereas the other methods attempt to
calculate intermediate terrain heights between posts. Auto-GCAS developers should
further research into the pros and cons of the interpolation approach chosen. Note:
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the ability to use Level 2 DTED would reduce interpolation errors, but would require
more computational power to evaluate.
Terrain Safety Buffer Considerations
The terrain safety buffer method used during this test was a simple vertical offset
added to the DTED. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, this method provides a consistent
vertical buffer, but does not provide a consistent orthogonal or shortest distance, offset
from sloped terrain. In fact, in the case of sheer terrain such as a canyon wall, a verti-
cal offset terrain safety buffer provides no protection laterally. Consideration should
be given to other methods of adding a terrain safety buffer to prevent these variations.
Integration Issues
As a follow-on program to Have ESCAPE, there were no show-stopping integration
issues throughout the program. There were a myriad of instances, though, where the
test team expected data to flow from the VSS to the RSET in a certain manner only
to find out otherwise later on. Appendix G contains many of these instances. This
occurred well into the test window and resulted in lots of time sunk investigating
the issues. This also occurred with specific data parameters. For example, the test
team expected to receive certain parameters from the VSS only to find out during
integration they were not available or they were in a different format. Having the
equivalent of an Interface Control Document (ICD) would have been instrumental in
ensuring seamless integration and more effective flight testing. Follow-on programs
should ensure sufficient understanding of the system(s) their system under test will
interface with.
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Figure 5.1. Effect of Terrain Slope on Vertical Offset Terrain Safety Buffer
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5.4 Guidance for Future Research
This section provides guidance that the author felt was important for future Auto-
GCAS researchers and developers. This guidance is in addition to, and not in lieu of,
the recommendations and lessons learned already presented.
Standardized Terminology
As more and more individuals, institutions, and corporations add to the body of
knowledge for Auto-GCAS, the need for a common vernacular grows. Standardized
terminology is key to effectively share ideas, to compare performance, and to edu-
cate the operational community on Auto-GCAS. Terms such as Path Prediction Error
(PPE) used in this document establish a clear understanding of the performance met-
ric in question.
Adaptive Paths
Though outside the scope of this research, the author feels that adaptive path
analysis is a potential solution to the nuisance/operating performance trade-off. Ide-
ally if an Auto-GCAS has a large number of paths to chose from then it can delay
intervening longer, decreasing nuisance. A large number of paths comes at a steep
computational cost. Instead, for example, a five-path system could be used where
once a path becomes closed, that TPA could be reallocated to calculate an escape
along a different route. In this way, the computer is still only calculating five paths
at any given time, but is not wasting resources on a path that is not a viable option.
This thought process could also be applied to adapting the length of the look-ahead,
as has been researched by Carpenter [70].
Maneuver Data to Improve Aerodynamic Model
In addition to the data gathered to support the flight test objectives for the
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RSET system, a wealth of additional data was gathered during each ground avoidance
maneuver. This additional data could be highly useful in improving the prediction
aerodynamic model (Stitched Model) and, thus, greatly decreasing PPE. The author
advises consideration be given to using flight test to its fullest potential to not just
evaluate the Auto-GCAS under test, but to also improve it.
5.5 Contributions
As has been described throughout this chapter, the RSET system was successful
in achieving that majority of the objectives that were based on previous research.
The RSET system was demonstrated, in simulation and in flight test, that a complex
aerodynamic model can be computed quickly enough and used to generate a multi-
path Auto-GCAS solution that consistently avoids terrain. Clearly, technology and
the state of the art are ready for Auto-GCAS for performance limited aircraft.
5.6 Summary
Over the last five years Auto-GCAS, largely thanks to the success of the F-16
Auto-GCAS, has gained not only acceptance but respect within the aviation com-
munity. It is the author’s humble desire that the research presented here, and the
successes listed abovea will help bring this much needed technology to all aviators.
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Appendix A. Supporting Figures
A.1 Learjet Model Conversion
Figure A.1. Stitched Model Simulink Top Level [47]
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A.2 Stitched and Converted Model Comparison
Figure A.2. Stitched Model versus Flight Data Pitch Doublet Response (250 kts, 15,000
ft) [47]
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Figure A.3. Stitched Model versus Flight Data Roll Doublet Response (250 kts, 15,000
ft) [47]
Figure A.4. Pitch Doublet applied to Converted Model
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(a) Normal Load Factor (b) Angle of attack
Figure A.5. Converted Model Pitch Doublet Response for dt = 0.005 s
(a) Pitch rate (b) Pitch attitude
Figure A.6. Converted Model Pitch Doublet Response for dt = 0.005 s
Figure A.7. Roll Doublet Applied to Converted Model
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(a) Roll rate (b) Yaw rate
Figure A.8. Converted Model Roll Doublet Response for dt = 0.005 s
(a) Lateral load factor (b) Angle of side slip
Figure A.9. Converted Model Roll Doublet Response for dt = 0.005 s
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Appendix B. USAF TPS Daily Flight Test Reports
The following pages present the daily flight test reports (TPS Form 5314) for the
11 Have MEDUSA test flights conducted from 05 September 2018 to 18 September
2018. These reports were used to document data quality, anomalies encountered, and
aircrew comments for each test sortie.
The remainder of this page is intentionally blank
159
DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 1 5 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Crunch/Solo 5,600  
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Caddy/Hula 9916 SKC clm 24 deg 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
1225/1.1 001   2237’ PA Alt: 30.00 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
RSET Check out   
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Able to check RADAR altimeter on ground, showed approximately 5 ft. Should work up to 2500 ft.  
Recommend adding systems check to ground block card.  
Rest of taxi/takeoff was uneventful 
 
Crunch recommended having more rigid checklist steps… 
 
Worked Kohn to Cuddeback which was not bad, did require some extra turning.  Should be fine 
working cords/ black mtn.   
 
Some issues getting the FTE console and laptop set up, but after discussion with control (Jay/George) 
we were able to execute as planned.   
 
Conducted manual activations of each path at 15k, with no issues.  
Conducted flight against virtual terrain also with no major issues.  
 
Then went to 8k and was able to fly all manual activation points with no issue.   
 
Started experiancing aileron pressure differential VSS trips during handback.  Adjusting ailerons 
gains which helped some, but then led to elevator pressure differential trips.  Those trips occurred at 
path activation.  Gains seemed to work everywhere else, troublehooting required to understand what 
these trips are. Records 21-25 
All trips were seen at 8k, IC#1, also the airplance was experiencing moderate turbulence.   
 
GUI had no major issues once laptop IP issue was fixed.  
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Lockdown RSET rate limting and press to data collection.  Also recommend to complete low level 
fam on next sortie.  
 
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Carl Gotwald 
 
e-signed //cag// 5 Sep 18 
 TPS Form 5314 NOV 86 NOT REALLY AN OFFICIAL FORM, BUT THIS IS WHAT WILL BE USED AT TPS. 
 
 
DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 2 7 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Crunch/COBE 5,600 998TMP0004 
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
HEX/Hula 9916 SKC clm 18°C 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
0733/1.9 002   2200’ PA Alt: 30.04 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
RSET Validation flight and low level fam to satisfy safety package for 500’ AGL data points.  
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implemented new RSET ground checkout using mode 802 on CSS (ground sim w/o hydro). Initially 
failed the test until surface servos were turned off. Recommend adding this step (and reactivation of 
switches) to next ground block checklist. 
 
NSTR through climbout/system checks. Left seat instruments showed 3kts slower and 100ft higher 
than right seat instruments. 
 
Worked Cords road which was satisfactory. This area did require some planning regarding which 
maneuver to fly next especially for virtual terrain activations. Planned mission frequency did not 
work for Sport which required some radio dancing when we needed to call back to CALSPAN DE. 
 
Conducted manual activations of each path at 15k, with no issues.  
Conducted virtual activations at 15k. IC 1&2 performed as expected. Following IC #2, MATLAB 
froze which required calling back to control for reset instructions. Following this reset, RSET would 
not activate against virtual terrain. It was determined that initial parameters in MATLAB (latitude, 
longitude, altitude) were populating incorrectly. Following these corrections, virtual activations 
occurred as expected, but RSET would not “handback” control following the handback maneuver for 
the remainder of the flight. 
 
Manual activations at 8k’ were then performed. Initial path 3 at 270kts had VSS trip due to elevator 
pressure differential. Rate limit adjusted from 50 to 35 with no further issues. Paths ¾ at 8k’ and 
270kts showed approximately 5-10° of gamma hunting in the climb. Due to time constraints, paths 
1/5 were not tested and we dropped down to perform low level fam near Harpers lake area to include 
60° banked turns. 
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Lockdown RSET to learjet wind model and press to data collection.  Also recommend to complete 
low level manual activations on next sortie.  
 
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Mark Hammond 
 
e-signed //mah// 10 Sep 18 
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DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 3 10 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Crunch/Smoked 5,600 998TMP0004 
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Caddy/Hula 9916 Winds 220/11, SKC, >5500ft 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
1104L/1.0 002 2339’ PA Alt: 29.89 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
Highest priority points were the manual activations with varied entry conditions starting at 15k ft and 
working down to 500 ft AGL. Lowest priority points were the different refresh rates for virtual terrain 
activations. 
 
 
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NSTR through climbout/system checks. Left seat instruments showed 6kts faster and 40ft higher than 
right seat instruments. Worked Cords road in the block 7-20k ft.  
 
Manual activations of all five paths were accomplished from the starting conditions of 270 KIAS, level 
flight, and 45° left bank. Power was routinely set between 94-96% rpm within 3 seconds of manual 
activations. The majority of the escape maneuvers appeared to be flown as the team expected. The first 
time we activated path 4, the aircraft rolled right and buried the nose below the horizon. EP and SP 
intervention was required to disconnect the system and recover to level flight. This appeared to be an 
anomaly as subsequent activations of path 4 performed in the correct sense (climbing right turns). One 
VSS trip (aileron pressure differential) occurred during these activations. 
 
In general, the nose of the aircraft “hunted” longitudinally between ~13-15° flight path angle (FPA) 
during the escape maneuvers. The RSET would not “handback” control following the handback 
maneuver for the majority of the flight and the EP had to paddle the system off to take control. 
 
Manual activation of path 3 was accomplished from the starting condition of 270 KIAS, wings level, 
5° FPA and resulted in a VSS trip (aileron pressure differential). The TC paused testing and 
investigated the output parameter list to troubleshoot the recurring issue. The TC discovered that the 
elevator (h_stab) deflection was being fed in to the ailerons within the OFP. We called back to control 
and discussed with the Calspan DE a way forward. It was determined the OFP was incorrect and the 
mix-up was due to a copy/paste error in the code. The TC stopped test and the pilots proceeded to spiral 
down to 500 ft AGL over Harper’s Lake to accomplish low-level fam for the EP. The EP built his site 
picture and cross check down at 500 ft AGL and then accomplished left and right 60 ° AOB turns for 
familiarity. 
 
RTB was routine. 
 
 
 
  
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Analyze flight data for the path 4 activation that descended. Troubleshoot gamma hunting during activations. Fix OFP 
issues, perform ground check-out, and lock down the code for the remainder of the flight test window. 
 
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Mike Bakun 
 
e-signed //mab// 11 Sep 18 
 TPS Form 5314 NOV 86 NOT REALLY AN OFFICIAL FORM, BUT THIS IS WHAT WILL BE USED AT TPS. 
DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 4 12 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Hineline/Hammond 5,600 998TMP0004 
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Gahan 9916 SKC 210/8 17°C 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
0749/2.0 003   2200’ PA Alt: 30.04 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
RSET Validation flight with updated configuration. 
MANUAL ACTIVATIONS – 15K’ PA 
VIRTUAL TERRAIN ACTIVATIONS – 15K’ PA 
MANUAL ACTIVATIONS – 8K’ PA 
VIRTUAL TERRAIN ACTIVATIONS – 8K’ PA (priority 2) 
MANUAL ACTIVATIONS 500 AGL 
 
 
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NSTR for ground Ops through climbout. Left seat instruments showed 3kts slower and 100ft higher 
than right seat instruments. 
 
Manual Activations (15k’ PA)-Initial climbing activations had a Gamma command for 20° nose high. 
This resulted in airspeed dropping below 200kts (point termination) before wings level. Gamma 
command was reduced to 15° resulting in min speed of 203kts. Final command was set at 12° with 
new min airspeed of 210kts. Test proceeded with new Gamma command set. 
 
Virtual Activations (15k’ PA)-Aircraft maneuvered as predicted in the sim with no Gamma hunting 
as experienced in prior RSET config. Did experience VSS trips due to under G on handback 
theorized to be a result of multiple paths rapidly changing to handback conditions. These trips 
shouldn’t affect testing as it stands. Also noted that winds displayed by the aircraft during dynamic 
maneuvering were higher than when flying straight and level. 
 
Manual Activations (8k’ PA)-All paths were flown with NSTR. 
 
Virtual Activations (8k’ PA)-Accomplished 220 kts all 3 IC’s at max refresh rate. NSTR. 
 
Manual Activations (500’ AGL)-Points were flown towards top of databand to increase safety 
margin. All paths showed at least a 2000’ climb with high engine performance capability. For path #5 
activation at 220kts, the aircraft accelerated out to 270kts and tripped VSS for elevator pressure 
differential at handback. Only point not accomplished was path 1 at 270kts due to fuel limitations. 
 
NSTR for RTB 
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Press with test. No further RSET config changes needed.  
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Mark Hammond 
 
e-signed //mah// 12 Sep 18 
 TPS Form 5314 NOV 86 NOT REALLY AN OFFICIAL FORM, BUT THIS IS WHAT WILL BE USED AT TPS. 
DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 5 13 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Hineline/Bakun 5,600 998TMP0004 
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Mak/Carpenter 9916 SKC 190/4 17°C 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
0758/1.9 003   2320’ PA Alt: 29.93 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
Manual Activations – 15K’ PA, 270 KIAS, varied entry conditions (15 pts) 
Virtual Activations – 15K’ PA, 220/270 KIAS, 6.25Hz (6 pts) 
Manual Activations – 8K’ PA, 270 KIAS, varied entry conditions (15 pts) 
Virtual Activations – 8K’ PA, 220/270 KIAS, 12.5Hz (3 pts) 
Virtual Activations – 8K’ PA, 220/270 KIAS, 6.25Hz (6 pts) 
Manual Activations – 500’ AGL, 270 KIAS, SLUG (1 pt) 
Manual Activations – 500’ AGL, 270 KIAS, varied entry conditions (10 pts) 
 
 
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NSTR for ground Ops through climbout. Left seat instruments showed 4kts faster and 100ft higher than right seat 
instruments. We read winds from straight and level flight in the databand before each test point so the TC could manual 
enter the values into the laptop. The system activated escape maneuvers in the correct sense the crew was expecting for the 
most part. A few of the virtual activations resulted in different escape paths than we expected from the sim results. 
 
Manual Activations (15k’ PA) – VSS trip (under g) on path 1 activation from left 45° turn entry condition. 
 
Virtual Activations (15k’ PA) – VSS trip (under g) on test point 5 during the handback. 
 
Manual Activations (8k’ PA) – Immediate VSS trip (elevator pressure delta) on path 3 activation from left 45° turn entry 
condition. VSS trip (under g) on path 1 activation from left 45° turn entry condition. VSS trip (under g) on path 5 activation 
from -5° FPA entry condition. 
 
Virtual Activations (8k’ PA) – 12.5Hz refresh rate VSS trip (under g) on test points 1, 2, and 3 during the handback. 6.25Hz 
refresh rate at 220 KIAS VSS trip (under g) on test point 1 during the handback. Did not complete test points 2-6 with 
6.25Hz refresh rate due to fuel limitations. 
 
Manual Activations (500’ AGL) – Not accomplished due to fuel limitations. 
 
NSTR for RTB 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Acquire data.  
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
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DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 6 13 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Crunch/Solo 5,600  
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Suplisson/Hex 9916 SKC clm 27 deg 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
1202/2.1 001   2283’ PA Alt: 29.95 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
Manual/Virtual activations at 15k and 8k.  Manual activations at 220 KIAS, virtual activations at 1.5625 Hz.    
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxi/takeoff was uneventful 
 
All points were completed successfully.  This sortie included entering in winds before each test point.  
 
5 VSS trips, all during handback on virtual activations at 270 KIAS, for low g as seen previously.  
 
Some turblence seen near the end of the sortie on the 8k points.   
 
A number of very slow handbacks which required the EP to terminate for airspace.   
 
One point still showed some gamma hunting, but it was pretty benign.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Continue testing, finish manual/virtual activations and start nuisance testing.     
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Carl Gotwald 
 
e-signed //cag// 13 Sep 18 
 TPS Form 5314 NOV 86 NOT REALLY AN OFFICIAL FORM, BUT THIS IS WHAT WILL BE USED AT TPS. 
 
 
DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 7 14 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Hineline/Hammond 5,600  
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Mak 9916 SKC clm 16 deg 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
0946/1.7 003   2292’ PA Alt: 29.94 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
Virtual activations at 8k for 6.25 Hz.  Manual/virtual (12.5Hz) activations at 500’ AGL, all airspeeds and 
attitudes.  Lateral offset to actual terrain 500’AGL. 
 
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxi/takeoff was uneventful 
 
All points were completed successfully.  This sortie included entering in winds before each test point. 
Wind interface inputs were changed after the previous sortie and went unnoticed for the first 3 virtual 
activations. This led to unexpected path activation for each IC. After the change was found, all points 
were reflown successfully.   
 
5 VSS trips, all during handback on virtual activations at 270 KIAS, for low g as seen previously.   
 
A number of very slow handbacks which required the EP to terminate for airspace.   
 
The terrain chosen for the lateral offset was the southern ridgeline between Koen and Cuddeback 
lakes. This terrain was moderately sloping which limited the ability to “walk in” lateral distance for 
evaluation. Recommend flying the northern portion of the ridge which is steeper and should give 
more opportunity to decrease offset proportionally. For all points flown near the ridgeline, EP would 
not have felt comfortable executing a level 60° banked turn. In all cases the RSET never determined 
path closure which shows promise regarding lack of nuisance alerts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Refly lateral offset on north side of ridgeline.     
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Mark Hammond 
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DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 8 14 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Hineline/Gotwald 5,600 998TMP00 
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Kolesar/Gahan 9916 >5500 Winds 070/04 Temp 28 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
1231/1.8 001 2320’ PA Alt: 29.91 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
Flew manual activations and virtual activations at 500’ AGL.  Also flew lateral offset to actual terrain at 500’ AGL north 
of Koehn Lake.    
 
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxi/takeoff was uneventful. 
 
Manual activation were flown at 500’ AGL and 200 KIAS.  One g trip was seen during a path 1 handback.   
 
Virtual activations were flown at 500’ AGL and both 6.25 Hz and 1.5625 Hz. G trips were seen during every handback at 
6.25 Hz. One g trip was seen at 270 KIAS. 
 
Lateral offsets were flown, and no nuisance was noted.  A path 1 closure was seen by flying very close to terrain, well 
inside both pilots comfort level.  Pilots also commented that there were times that they did not think a path 1/5 could be 
executed but the system did.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Finish low level nuisance testing.      
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Carl Gotwald e-signed //cag// 14 Sep 18 
 TPS Form 5314 NOV 86 NOT REALLY AN OFFICIAL FORM, BUT THIS IS WHAT WILL BE USED AT TPS. 
 
 
DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 9 17 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Hineline/Bakun 5,600 998TMP00 
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Mak/Gotwald 9916 >5500 Winds 210/8 Temp 17C 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
0946/1.7 003 2283’ PA Alt: 29.95 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
Lateral offset to actual terrain 500’AGL south of Koehn to Cudde airspace. Operational low-level nuisance eval on 
Sidewinder from points C-E for both pilots. Manual activations at 220/270 KIAS and 500’ AGL. 
 
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxi/takeoff was uneventful. 
 
Lateral offset to terrain 500’AGL: The terrain chosen for the lateral offset was the southern ridgeline between Koehn and 
Cuddeback lakes. We completed several 360 degree turns at 60 degrees AOB well above the terrain using ground references 
for lateral offset estimation. Once comfortable with the turn radius, we stepped down to 500’ AGL at the offset where I felt 
comfortable performing a level 60 degree turn. Path 1 remained open in agreement with our expectations. I decreased lateral 
spacing to the terrain until I felt I could no longer perform a 60 degree turn without striking terrain. Path 1 again remained 
open. I was able to get close enough to terrain to see Path 1 close for an extended period of time and Path 2 close 
intermittently.  
 
Operational low-level nuisance eval: Both pilots flew the Sidewinder from points C-E at 500’ AGL. Winds were light and 
no turbulence was noted. There were a few test points between points D-E where the system indicated we could perform a 
level right turn and avoid terrain; however, the entire crew unanimously disagreed. Recommend thorough analysis of these 
test points to determine the truth.  
 
Manual activations at 220/270 KIAS and 500’ AGL: I hopped back in the seat for these test points. We accomplished all 
five manual activations from straight and level at 220 KIAS and a path 3 activation from 270 KIAS. The paths activated in 
the sense that we expected. Engine performance was strong down low with slightly cooler temps. Path 5 activation 
accelerated to 292 KIAS and achieved 2.4g in the pull. NSTR for the remaining test points and RTB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Press     
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Mike Bakun e-signed //mab// 17 Sep 18 
 TPS Form 5314 NOV 86 NOT REALLY AN OFFICIAL FORM, BUT THIS IS WHAT WILL BE USED AT TPS. 
 
 
DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 10 18 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Hineline/Hammond/Abel 5,600 998TMP00 
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Kolesar 9916 >5500 clm Temp 12C 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
0804/1.9 003 2329’ PA Alt: 29.90 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
Lateral offset to actual terrain 500’AGL south of Koehn to Cudde airspace. Operational low-level nuisance eval on 
Sidewinder from points C-E for both pilots. Manual activations at 270 KIAS and 500’ AGL and virtual at 270KIAS. 
 
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxi/takeoff was uneventful. 
 
Lateral offset to terrain 500’AGL: The terrain chosen for the lateral offset was the southern ridgeline between Koehn and 
Cuddeback lakes to mimic previous sorties with other project pilots. We completed several 360 degree turns at 60 degrees 
AOB well above the terrain using ground references for lateral offset estimation. Once comfortable with the turn radius, 
we stepped down to 500’ AGL at the offset where I felt comfortable performing a level 60 degree turn. Path 1 remained 
open in agreement with our expectations. I decreased lateral spacing to the terrain until I felt I could no longer perform a 
60 degree turn without striking terrain. At my comfort level, the RSET never indicated path closure for an extended period 
of time  
 
Operational low-level nuisance eval: Both pilots flew the Sidewinder from points C-E at 500’ AGL. Winds were light and 
no turbulence was noted. There were a few test points between points D-E where the system indicated we could perform a 
level right turn and avoid terrain; however, the entire crew unanimously disagreed.  
 
During manual/virtual activations at 500’AGL, SPORT called traffic in our vicinity that did not have approval to be there. 
We took some time getting eyes on them which resulted in some repeat test points lost. LtCol Abel flew all these points 
with no significant differences noted from previous flights. VSS tripped on both path 1 and 5 handbacks per usual. 
 
RTB NSTR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Press     
   
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Mark Hammond  e-signed //mah// 18 Sep 18 
 TPS Form 5314 NOV 86 NOT REALLY AN OFFICIAL FORM, BUT THIS IS WHAT WILL BE USED AT TPS. 
 
 
DAILY/INITIAL FLIGHT TEST REPORT 1. AIRCRAFT TYPE LJ-25 
2. SERIAL NUMBER 
N203VS 
3.                                                                                                               CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO TEST 
A.  PROJECT / MISSION NO B.  FLIGHT NO / DATA POINT C. DATE 
HAVE MEDUSA 11 18 Sep 18 
D. FRONT COCKPIT E. FUEL LOAD F. JON 
Hineline/Bakun 5,600 998TMP0004 
G. REAR COCKPIT  H. No Fuel Weight I. WEATHER 
Gahan/Suplisson 9916 SKC 200/6 17°C 
J. TO TIME / SORTIE TIME K. CONFIGURATION / LOADING L. SURFACE CONDITIONS 
1207/1.9    2320’ PA Alt: 29.95 
M. CHASE ACFT / SERIAL NO N. CHASE CREW O. CHASE TO TIME / SORTIE TIME 
N/A N/A    N/A 
4. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT / TEST POINTS 
 
 
 
 
Operational low-level nuisance eval on Sidewinder from points C-E for both pilots. Manual activations at both airspeeds, 
5°FPA, 45° bank at 500’ AGL and virtual activations at 12.5 Hz for both airspeeds. 
 
5. RESULTS OF TESTS (Continue on reverse if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxi/takeoff was uneventful. 
 
Operational low-level nuisance eval: I flew the Sidewinder from points C-E at 500’ AGL. Winds were light and no 
turbulence was noted. There were a few test points between points D-E where the system indicated we could perform a 
level right turn and avoid terrain; however, the entire crew unanimously disagreed. Only during one point along the route 
did path 2 momentarily close when in proximity to a small mound rising ahead of the mountain terrain. Crew agreed that 
this closure was appropriate. 
 
VSS tripped on both path 1 and 5 handbacks per usual during slow speed activations. 
 
RTB NSTR 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Complete Report  
COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE DATE 
Capt Mike Bakun e-signed //mab// 18 Sep 18 
 TPS Form 5314 NOV 86 NOT REALLY AN OFFICIAL FORM, BUT THIS IS WHAT WILL BE USED AT TPS. 
 
 
Appendix C. Data Analysis Procedures
The following pages describe the data analysis procedures used in the Have MEDUSA
test project in order to produce the required final data products. The primary data
source for analysis was the Learjet VSS Data Acquisition System. This system sam-
pled parameters at 200 Hz, and saved these parameters to a Microsoft Excel compat-
ible file, which was imported into MATLAB.
The remainder of this page is intentionally blank
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Objective  1 – Demonstrate the Prediction Accuracy of the RSET System 
MOP 1.1 – Path Prediction Error  
Required Data Parameters 
Description Name Units Source 
Time gps_time Seconds DAS 
True Latitude gps_lat Degrees North DAS 
True Longitude gps_lon Degrees East DAS 
True Altitude gps_alt Feet DAS 
Indicated Airspeed Vc Knots DAS 
Flight Path Angle gamma_cf Degrees DAS 
Bank Angle phi Degrees DAS 
Heading  Degrees DAS 
Wind Speed  Knots DAS 
Wind Direction  Degrees DAS 
Predicted Latitude  Degrees North RSET Algorithm 
Predicted Longitude  Degrees East RSET Algorithm 
Predicted Altitude  Feet RSET Algorithm 
Qualitative Data Required 
Description Source 
Pilot Comments Handheld Data, noted by FTE on flight cards 
Data Quality 
Maneuver Quality Determination 
Pilot & FTE (real time) 
FTE (post-flight) 
Data gathering effectiveness and 
procedure if data are unusable 
Determine if effective real-time. 
If unusable or unsure, repeat test point. 
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Repeats None planned, but approved, fuel allowing. 
Analysis 
Procedure 
1. For the entire duration of the RSET commanded autopilot maneuver, latitude (φ), 
longitude (λ), and altitude (h) was obtained from the aircraft TSPI data (considered the 
truth source). Also, at the time of RSET activation, the lat, long, and altitude for each 
time step along the 30 second RSET predicted path was obtained. 
2. Both sets of coordinates were converted into Cartesian earth-centered, earth-fixed 
(ECEF) coordinates (u, v, w) using the equations below. 


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where 
 
3. The distance vector (Δu, Δv, Δw) between the two paths was then calculated at each 
sampled time throughout the maneuver. The aircraft’s data acquisition had a different 
sampling rate (200 Hz) than the RSET path prediction (100 Hz), so the two data sets 
needed to be matched up in time. 
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4. The Path Prediction Error (PPE) was calculated at each sampled time 
𝑃𝑃𝐸 =  √∆𝑢2 + ∆𝑣2 + ∆𝑤2  
5. The maximum PPE during the RSET commanded maneuver was identified. 
6. The actual aircraft path and the RSET predicted path were plotted on the same axes in 
order to determine whether the direction of the error was towards terrain or away from 
terrain in both the vertical (climb) and horizontal (turn) directions. 
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Data 
Products 
The maximum PPE data was summarized in a table as shown below in Table A1. 
Table A1 – Summary Table of Max PPE Results 
Fligh
t # 
R
e
co
rd
 # 
A
lt 
A
/S 
En
try 
P
ath
 
Wind 
Speed 
(kts) 
Wind in 
Direction 
of Error? 
Prediction 
Error (ft) 
Out-climb 
prediction? 
Tighter turn 
radius than 
prediction? 
Error Away 
from 
Terrain? 
# # ft KIAS # # kts Yes/No ft Yes/No Yes/No 
Yes/No/ 
Inconclusive 
 
For each manually activated RSET maneuver, the PPE was plotted as a function of 
time.  Also, the aircraft’s actual position and the RSET predicted path was plotted in 
three dimensions on the same axes in order to show a visualization of the paths.  Later, 
wind vectors were also plotted on the same chart in order to show the effect of wind. 
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Objective  
2 – Demonstrate the impact of changing refresh 
rate on the RSET system’s ability to calculate an 
achievable escape path. 
MOP 2.1 – Terrain Miss Distance  
Required Data Parameters 
Description Name Units Source 
Time gps_time Seconds DAS 
True Latitude gps_lat Degrees North DAS 
True Longitude gps_lon Degrees East DAS 
True Altitude gps_alt Feet DAS 
Indicated Airspeed Vc Knots DAS 
DTED Point Latitude  Degrees North DTED Matrix 
DTED Point Longitude  Degrees East DTED Matrix 
DTED Point Altitude  Feet DTED Matrix 
Refresh Rate  Hertz RSET Algorithm 
Qualitative Data Required 
Description Source 
Pilot Comments Handheld Data, noted by FTE on flight cards 
Data Quality 
Maneuver Quality Determination 
Pilot & FTE (real time) 
FTE (post-flight) 
Data gathering effectiveness and 
procedure if data are unusable 
Determine if effective real-time. 
If unusable or unsure, repeat test point. 
Repeats None planned, but approved, fuel allowing. 
Analysis 
Procedure 
1. For the entire run against virtual terrain, the aircraft’s TSPI data (latitude, longitude, 
and altitude) were obtained. 
2. At each time sample, the distance from the aircraft’s position to the interpolated 
DTED elevation at the point directly below the aircraft (same latitude and longitude) 
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was calculated.  This value was used to determine if the aircraft impacted the virtual 
terrain or not (negative or positive value).  The RSS distance to the terrain was 
calculated by defining a plane with the three DTED posts that were closest to the 
aircraft.  These DTED posts formed the base of a tetrahedron with the aircraft position 
at the apex of the tetrahedron.  The smallest difference from the aircraft to terrain was 
calculated by calculating the height of the tetrahedron (see equations below).  This 
was repeated for every time step during the system activation.  
 
The distances from the aircraft to each of the three closest DTED posts were defined 
as (a, b, c) using the same Cartesian earth-centered, earth-fixed (ECEF) coordinates 
(u, v, w) from MOP 1.1.  The distances between each of the DTED posts were defined 
as (x, y, z).  Then, the closest distance, h, was calculated using the following equations 
and defined the magnitude of the terrain miss distance.   
𝑋 =  𝑏2 + 𝑐2 − 𝑧2 
𝑌 =  𝑎2 + 𝑐2 − 𝑦2 
𝑍 =  𝑎2 + 𝑏2 − 𝑥2  
 
𝑉 =  
√4𝑎𝑏𝑐 − 𝑎2𝑋2 − 𝑏2𝑌2 − 𝑐2𝑍2 + 𝑋𝑌𝑍
12
 
 
ℎ =
3𝑉
1
2
(𝑥𝑦)
 
3. The minimum terrain miss distance for each run was identified. 
Data Products 
Summary charts of the minimum terrain miss distance for each test condition were 
generated. In addition, for each run against virtual terrain, the following plots were 
generated: 
1. The aircraft’s actual path and the DTED matrix plotted together in a three-
dimensional chart. 
2. Terrain miss distance as a function of time throughout the entire run. 
3. Active RSET path, aircraft virtual altitude and virtual terrain elevation as a 
function of time throughout the entire run. 
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Objective  
2 – Demonstrate the impact of changing 
refresh rate on RSET system ability to 
calculate an achievable escape path 
MOP 2.2 – Forward look ahead time 
Required Data Parameters 
Description Name Units Source 
Time gps_time Seconds DAS 
True Latitude gps_lat Degrees North DAS 
True Longitude gps_lon Degrees East DAS 
True Altitude gps_alt Feet DAS 
Ground Speed gps_Vg Feet per Second DAS 
Indicated Airspeed Vc Knots DAS 
Pitch Attitude theta Degrees DAS 
Bank Angle phi Degrees DAS 
Heading  Degrees DAS 
Wind Speed  Knots DAS 
Wind Direction  Degrees DAS 
Predicted Latitude  Degrees North RSET Algorithm 
Predicted Longitude  Degrees East RSET Algorithm 
Predicted Altitude  Feet RSET Algorithm 
DTED Point Latitude  Degrees North DTED Matrix 
DTED Point Longitude  Degrees East DTED Matrix 
DTED Point Altitude  Feet DTED Matrix 
Terrain Safety Buffer  Feet RSET Algorithm 
Qualitative Data Required 
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Description Source 
Pilot Comments Handheld Data, noted by FTE on flight cards 
Data Quality 
Maneuver Quality 
Determination 
Pilot & FTE (real time) 
FTE (post-flight) 
Data gathering effectiveness 
and procedure if data are 
unusable 
Determine if effective real-time. 
If unusable or unsure, repeat test point. 
Repeats None planned, but approved, fuel allowing. 
Analysis 
Procedure 
1. For the entire run against virtual terrain, the aircraft’s TSPI data (latitude, 
longitude, and altitude) was obtained. 
2. The moments at which RSET triggered an escape maneuver were 
identified. 
3. At each of these moments, the forward look-ahead time was determined by 
finding the time along each of the 5 path predictions at which the 
algorithm predicted a collision and taking the highest of the five times. 
Data Products 
The forward look-ahead times were plotted in a summary chart to compare the 
impact of refresh rate on forward look-ahead time.  The plots also included 
indications of whether each activation impacted terrain or not. 
  
178
Objective  3 – Observe RSET system tendency to nuisance activation. 
MOP 3.1 – Path Performance 
Required Data Parameters 
Description Name Units Source 
Time gps_time Seconds DAS 
Indicated Airspeed Vc Knots DAS 
Flight Path Angle gamma Degrees DAS 
Bank Angle phi Degrees DAS 
Normal Load Factor nz g DAS 
Qualitative Data Required 
Description Source 
Pilot Comments 
Handheld Data, noted by FTE on flight 
cards 
Data Quality 
Maneuver Quality 
Determination 
Pilot & FTE (real time) 
FTE (post-flight) 
Data gathering effectiveness 
and procedure if data are 
unusable 
Determine if effective real-time. 
If unusable or unsure, repeat test point. 
Repeats None planned, but approved, fuel allowing. 
Analysis 
Procedure 
1. For each manually activated RSET maneuver, the normal acceleration, 
airspeed, flight path angle, and bank angle from the aircraft VSS data 
were collected for the entire 30 second maneuver. 
2. For each time step along the RSET maneuver, the algorithm’s g limit 
was calculated using the equation below. 
𝑛𝑍𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 = −
1
2
(−3
𝑉𝑐 − 200
270 − 200
− 1) 
3. For each time step along the RSET maneuver, the algorithm’s target 
flight path angle was calculated using the equation below. 
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𝛾𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 12 (
𝑉𝐶 − 200
270 − 200
) 
Data Products 
Three plots were generated for each manually activated RSET maneuver: 
1. Aircraft normal acceleration (nZ), RSET g limit (nZlimit), and the VSS 
g limit (2.8) as a function of time. 
2. Aircraft bank angle (φ) and RSET target bank angle (φtarget) as a 
function of time. 
3. Aircraft flight path angle (γ) and RSET target flight path angle 
(γtarget) as a function of time. 
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Objective  3 – Observe RSET system tendency to nuisance activation 
MOP 3.2 – Nuisance Activations 
Required Data Parameters 
Description Name Units Source 
Time gps_time Seconds DAS 
True Latitude gps_lat Degrees North DAS 
True Longitude gps_lon Degrees East DAS 
True Altitude gps_alt Feet DAS 
Indicated Airspeed Vc Knots DAS 
Flight Path Angle gamma_cf Degrees DAS 
Bank Angle phi Degrees DAS 
Heading  Degrees  
Wind Speed  Knots  
Wind Direction  Degrees  
Predicted Latitude  Degrees North RSET Algorithm 
Predicted Longitude  Degrees East RSET Algorithm 
Predicted Altitude  Feet RSET Algorithm 
DTED Point Latitude  Degrees North DTED Matrix 
DTED Point Longitude  Degrees East DTED Matrix 
DTED Point Altitude  Feet DTED Matrix 
Terrain Safety Buffer  Feet RSET Algorithm 
Qualitative Data Required 
Description Source 
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Pilot Comments Handheld Data, noted by FTE on flight 
cards 
Data Quality 
Maneuver Quality 
Determination 
Pilot & FTE (real time) 
FTE (post-flight) 
Data gathering effectiveness 
and procedure if data are 
unusable 
Determine if effective real-time. 
If unusable or unsure, repeat test point. 
Repeats None planned, but approved, fuel allowing. 
Analysis 
Procedure 
1. The aircraft’s states and TSPI data (latitude, longitude, and altitude) and 
the surrounding DTED data were obtained for each run against terrain. 
2. The RSET data was examined to see if the 60° banked turn TPA towards 
terrain was closed off (collision detected) at any point along the run. 
3. The RSET data was combined with pilot comments to determine 
nuisance. 
Data Products 
Each test run was re-constructed by plotting the position of the aircraft in 
three dimensions relative to the DTED matrix.  The RSET predicted path of 
the 60° turn towards the terrain was overlaid on the plot at regular intervals 
along the aircraft path to show whether or not RSET predicted a path closure.  
Also, the pilot’s comments for each run were presented to show whether or 
not the pilot felt that such a turn into terrain was possible. 
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Objective  3 – Observe RSET system tendency to nuisance activation 
MOP 3.3 – Aircrew Comments 
Required Data Parameters 
Time gps_time Seconds DAS 
True Latitude gps_lat Degrees North DAS 
True Longitude gps_lon Degrees East DAS 
True Altitude gps_alt Feet DAS 
Indicated Airspeed Vc Knots DAS 
Flight Path Angle gamma_cf Degrees DAS 
Bank Angle phi Degrees DAS 
Heading  Degrees  
Wind Speed  Knots  
Wind Direction  Degrees  
Predicted Latitude  Degrees North RSET Algorithm 
Predicted Longitude  Degrees East RSET Algorithm 
Predicted Altitude  Feet RSET Algorithm 
DTED Point Latitude  Degrees North DTED Matrix 
DTED Point 
Longitude  Degrees East DTED Matrix 
DTED Point Altitude  Feet DTED Matrix 
Terrain Safety Buffer  Feet RSET Algorithm 
Qualitative Data Required 
Description Source 
Pilot Comments Handheld Data, noted by FTE on flight cards 
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Data Quality 
Maneuver Quality 
Determination 
Pilot & FTE (real time) 
FTE (post-flight) 
Data gathering effectiveness 
and procedure if data are 
unusable 
Determine if effective real-time. 
If unusable or unsure, repeat test point. 
Repeats None planned, but approved, fuel allowing. 
Analysis 
Procedure 
1. The aircraft’s states and TSPI data (latitude, longitude, and altitude) and 
the surrounding DTED data were obtained for each operationally 
representative low-level profile. 
2. At any point during the profile when RSET predicted that an escape path 
activation was necessary, pilot comments were gathered along with the 
TSPI data to determine whether nuisance occurred. 
Data Products 
Aircrew comments were summarized and presented. 
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Appendix D. Test Points
The following pages present a record of the test points gathered during the 11
Have MEDUSA test sorties from 05 September 2018 to 18 September 2018.
The remainder of this page is intentionally blank
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Learjet  
Flight # 
Flight # 
Record 
# Point Description 
2111 1 1 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2111 1 2 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2111 1 3 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2111 1 4 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2111 1 5 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2111 1 6 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2111 1 7 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2111 1 8 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2111 1 9 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2111 1 10 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2111 1 11 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2111 1 12 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2111 1 13 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2111 1 14 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2111 1 15 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2111 1 16 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2111 1 17 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2111 1 18 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2111 1 19 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2111 1 20 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2111 1 21 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2111 1 22 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2111 1 23 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2111 1 24 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2111 1 25 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2113 2 1 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2113 2 2 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2113 2 3 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2113 2 4 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2113 2 5 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2113 2 6 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2113 2 7 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2113 2 8 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2113 2 9 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 10 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 11 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 12 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 13 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 14 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 15 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 16 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
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2113 2 17 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 18 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2113 2 19 N/A 
2113 2 20 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2113 2 21 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2113 2 22 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2113 2 23 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2113 2 24 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2113 2 25 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2113 2 26 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2113 2 27 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2113 2 28 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2113 2 29 Low Level Fam 
2113 2 30 Low Level Fam 
2113 2 31 Low Level Fam 
2114 3 1 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, ϕ = 45° entry, Path #3 
2114 3 2 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, ϕ = 45° entry, Path #2 
2114 3 3,4,6,7 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, ϕ = 45° entry, Path #4 
2114 3 8 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, ϕ = 45° entry, Path #1 
2114 3 9 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, ϕ = 45° entry, Path #5 
2114 3 10 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, γ = 5° entry, Path #3 
2115 4 1 N/A 
2115 4 2 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2115 4 3 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2115 4 4 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2115 4 5 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2115 4 6 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2115 4 7 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2115 4 8 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2115 4 9 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2115 4 10 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2115 4 11 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2115 4 12 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2115 4 13 Manual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2115 4 14 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2115 4 15 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2115 4 16 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2115 4 17 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2115 4 18 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2115 4 19 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2115 4 20 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
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2115 4 21 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2115 4 22 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2115 4 23 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2115 4 24 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2115 4 25 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2115 4 26 N/A 
2115 4 27 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2115 4 28 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2115 4 29 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2115 4 30 Manual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2115 4 31 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2115 4 32 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2115 4 33 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2115 4 34 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2115 4 35 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2115 4 36 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2115 4 37 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2115 4 38 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2115 4 39 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2115 4 40 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2115 4 41 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2115 4 42 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2116 5 1 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #3 
2116 5 2 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #2 
2116 5 3 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #4 
2116 5 4 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #1 
2116 5 5 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #5 
2116 5 6 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #3 
2116 5 7 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #2 
2116 5 8 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #4 
2116 5 9 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #1 
2116 5 10 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #5 
2116 5 11 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #3 
2116 5 12 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #2 
2116 5 13 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #4 
2116 5 14 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #1 
2116 5 15 Manual, 15K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #5 
2116 5 16 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #1 
2116 5 17 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #2 
2116 5 18 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #3 
2116 5 19 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #1 
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2116 5 20 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #2 
2116 5 21 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #3 
2116 5 22&23 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #3 
2116 5 24 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #2 
2116 5 25 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #4 
2116 5 26 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #1 
2116 5 27 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #5 
2116 5 28 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #3 
2116 5 29 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #2 
2116 5 30 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #4 
2116 5 31 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #1 
2116 5 32 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #5 
2116 5 33 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #3 
2116 5 34 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #2 
2116 5 35 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #4 
2116 5 36 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #1 
2116 5 37 Manual, 8K ft, 270 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #5 
2116 5 38 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2116 5 39 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2116 5 40 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2116 5 41 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #1 
2117 6 1 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #3 
2117 6 2 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #2 
2117 6 3 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #4 
2117 6 4 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #1 
2117 6 5 Manual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #5 
2117 6 6 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #3 
2117 6 7 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #2 
2117 6 8 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #4 
2117 6 9 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #1 
2117 6 10 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #5 
2117 6 11 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #3 
2117 6 12 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #2 
2117 6 13 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #4 
2117 6 14 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #1 
2117 6 15 Manual, 15K ft, 220 KIAS, -5⁰ entry, Path #5 
2117 6 16 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2117 6 17 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #2 
2117 6 18 Virtual, 15k ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #3 
2117 6 19 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2117 6 20 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #2 
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2117 6 21 Virtual, 15k ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #3 
2117 6 22 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #3 
2117 6 23 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #2 
2117 6 24 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #4 
2117 6 25 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #1 
2117 6 26 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #5 
2117 6 27 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #3 
2117 6 28 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #2 
2117 6 29 N/A 
2117 6 30 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #4 
2117 6 31 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, -5° entry, Path #3 
2117 6 32 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, -5° entry, Path #2 
2117 6 33 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, -5° entry, Path #4 
2117 6 34 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, -5° entry, Path #1 
2117 6 35 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #1 
2117 6 36 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #5 
2117 6 37 Manual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, -5° entry, Path #5 
2117 6 38 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2117 6 39 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #2 
2117 6 40 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #3 
2117 6 41 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2117 6 42 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #2 
2117 6 43 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #3 
2118 7 5 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #3 
2118 7 6 Virtual, 8k ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #2 
2118 7 7 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #1 
2118 7 8 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #2 
2118 7 9 Virtual, 8k ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #2 
2118 7 10 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2118 7 11 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #3 
2118 7 12 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #2 
2118 7 13 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #4 
2118 7 14 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #1 
2118 7 15 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 45⁰ entry, Path #5 
2118 7 16 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #3 
2118 7 17 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #2 
2118 7 18 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #4 
2118 7 19 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #1 
2118 7 20 Manual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 5⁰ entry, Path #5 
2118 7 21 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2118 7 22 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
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2118 7 23 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2118 7 24 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2118 7 25 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2118 7 26 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2118 7 27 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2118 7 28 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2118 7 29 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2119 8 1 N/A 
2119 8 2 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #3 
2119 8 3 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #2 
2119 8 4 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #1 
2119 8 5 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #5 
2119 8 6 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #4 
2119 8 7 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #3 
2119 8 8 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #2 
2119 8 9 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #1 
2119 8 10 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #5 
2119 8 11 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 5° entry, Path #4 
2119 8 12 Virtual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #1 
2119 8 13 Virtual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #2 
2119 8 14 Virtual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #3 
2119 8 15 Virtual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #1 
2119 8 16 Virtual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #2 
2119 8 17 Virtual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 6.25 Hz, IC #3 
2119 8 18 Virtual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2119 8 19 N/A 
2119 8 20 Virtual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #2 
2119 8 21 Virtual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #3 
2119 8 22 Virtual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2119 8 23 Virtual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #1 
2119 8 24 Virtual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #2 
2119 8 25 Virtual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #3 
2119 8 26 Virtual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 1.5625 Hz, IC #3 
2119 8 27 N/A 
2119 8 28 RSET disconnect check 
2119 8 29 Practicing level turn above 2,000 ft AGL 
2119 8 30 Descending to 500 ft AGL 
2119 8 31 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2119 8 32 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2119 8 33 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2120 9 1 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
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2120 9 2 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2120 9 3 Low Level Flight 
2120 9 4 Low Level Flight 
2120 9 5 Low Level Flight 
2120 9 6 Low Level Flight 
2120 9 7 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2120 9 7 to 8 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2120 9 9 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2120 9 10 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2120 9 11 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2120 9 12 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #3 
2121 10 1 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2121 10 2 Lateral Offset to Actual Terrain 
2121 10 3 Low Level Flight 
2121 10 4 Low Level Flight 
2121 10 5 Low Level Flight 
2121 10 6 Low Level Flight 
2121 10 7 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #2 
2121 10 8 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #4 
2121 10 9 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #1 
2121 10 10 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, SLUF entry, Path #5 
2121 10 11 Virtual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2121 10 12 Virtual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2122 11 1 Low Level Flight 
2122 11 2 Low Level Flight 
2122 11 3 Low Level Flight 
2122 11 4 Low Level Flight 
2122 11 5 Low Level Flight 
2122 11 6 Low Level Flight 
2122 11 7 Low Level Flight 
2122 11 8 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2122 11 9 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2122 11 10 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 220 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2122 11 11 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #1 
2122 11 12 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #2 
2122 11 13 Virtual, 500 ft AGL, 270 KIAS, 12.5 Hz, IC #3 
2122 11 14 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #3 
2122 11 15 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #4 
2122 11 16 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #2 
2122 11 17 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #1 
2122 11 18 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #1 
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2122 11 19 Manual, 500 ft, 270 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #5 
2122 11 20 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #3 
2122 11 21 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #2 
2122 11 22 Manual, 500 ft, 220 KIAS, 45° entry, Path #4 
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Appendix E. Path Prediction Error Results
The following pages present the results of the Path Prediction Error (PPE) anal-
ysis.
The remainder of this page is intentionally blank
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Alt A/S Entry Path 
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Out-climb 
prediction? 
Tighter than prediction? 
Error Away 
from Terrain? 
4 2 15000 220 1 3 31 Yes 1672 No N/A No 
4 3 15000 220 1 2 34 Yes 1719 No No No 
4 4 15000 220 1 4 33 Yes 1654 Yes Yes Yes 
4 5 15000 220 1 1 32 Yes 1651 Yes Yes Yes 
4 6 15000 220 1 5 37 Yes 1636 Yes No Inconclusive 
4 9 15000 270 1 3 33 No 1399 Yes N/A Yes 
4 10 15000 270 1 4 37 Yes 1024 Yes No Inconclusive 
4 11 15000 270 1 2 30 Yes 1671 Yes Yes Yes 
4 12 15000 270 1 5 31 Yes 1816 Yes Yes Yes 
4 13 15000 270 1 1 37 Yes 1524 No No No 
4 20 8000 220 1 3 24 Yes 1191 Yes N/A Yes 
4 21 8000 220 1 4 28 No 1256 No Yes Inconclusive 
4 22 8000 220 1 2 28 Yes 1272 Yes No Inconclusive 
4 23 8000 220 1 5 25 Yes 962 Yes No Inconclusive 
4 24 8000 220 1 1 27 Yes 773 Yes No Inconclusive 
4 25 8000 270 1 3 25 Yes 2505 Yes N/A Yes 
4 27 8000 270 1 2 26 Yes 1602 No No No 
4 28 8000 270 1 4 28 Yes 1365 No No No 
4 29 8000 270 1 1 26 Yes 1445 No No No 
4 30 8000 270 1 5 28 Yes 514 Yes Yes Yes 
4 34 500 220 1 3 17 No 172 No N/A No 
4 35 500 220 1 2 12 Yes 659 Yes Yes Yes 
4 36 500 220 1 4 14 Yes 918 No No No 
4 37 500 220 1 1 13 No 1408 Yes No Inconclusive 
4 38 500 220 1 5 13 No 2332 Yes No Inconclusive 
4 39 500 270 1 3 13 Yes 481 Yes N/A Yes 
4 40 500 270 1 2 16 Yes 728 No No No 
4 41 500 270 1 4 17 Yes 350 Yes Yes Yes 
4 42 500 270 1 5 18 Yes 864 No Yes Inconclusive 
5 1 15000 270 2 3 34 Yes 1922 No N/A No 
5 2 15000 270 2 2 37 Yes 2862 No No No 
5 3 15000 270 2 4 31 Yes 947 Yes No Inconclusive 
5 4 15000 270 2 1 32 Yes 1821 Yes Yes Yes 
5 5 15000 270 2 5 35 Yes 1843 No No No 
5 6 15000 270 3 3 28 Yes 754 Yes N/A Yes 
5 7 15000 270 3 2 30 Yes 1687 Yes Yes Yes 
5 8 15000 270 3 4 32 Yes 1524 Yes Yes Yes 
5 9 15000 270 3 1 43 Yes 4447 No No No 
5 10 15000 270 3 5 43 Yes 1201 No Yes Inconclusive 
5 11 15000 270 4 3 34 No 1404 No N/A No 
5 12 15000 270 4 2 37 Yes 1290 Yes No Inconclusive 
5 13 15000 270 4 4 36 Yes 1571 No No No 
5 14 15000 270 4 1 42 Yes 6568 No No No 
5 15 15000 270 4 5 41 Yes 4914 No No No 
5 24 8000 270 2 2 45 Yes 2061 No No No 
5 25 8000 270 2 4 45 No 2392 No Yes No 
5 26 8000 270 2 1 30 Yes 748 No No No 
5 27 8000 270 2 5 25 Yes 1733 No Yes No 
5 28 8000 270 3 3 33 Yes 1553 Yes N/A Yes 
5 29 8000 270 3 2 28 Yes 1936 Yes Yes Yes 
5 30 8000 270 3 4 21 Yes 1337 Yes Yes Yes 
5 31 8000 270 3 1 29 Yes 2588 No No No 
5 32 8000 270 3 5 26 Yes 2430 Yes Yes Yes 
5 33 8000 270 4 3 27 Yes 1140 No N/A No 
5 34 8000 270 4 2 33 No 1935 No No No 
5 35 8000 270 4 4 35 Yes 1632 No No No 
5 36 8000 270 4 1 38 Yes 2864 No No No 
5 37 8000 270 4 5 30 Yes 2411 Yes Yes Yes 
5 23 8000 270 2 3 28 Yes 2007 No N/A No 
6 1 15000 220 2 3 36 Yes 1914 No N/A No 
6 2 15000 220 2 2 33 Yes 1702 No No No 
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6 3 15000 220 2 4 34 Yes 2285 No No No 
6 4 15000 220 2 1 32 Yes 1786 No No No 
6 5 15000 220 2 5 23 Yes 1353 Yes No No 
6 6 15000 220 3 3 30 Yes 1601 Yes N/A Yes 
6 7 15000 220 3 2 27 Yes 2057 Yes Yes Yes 
6 8 15000 220 3 4 25 Yes 1176 Yes Yes Yes 
6 9 15000 220 3 1 31 Yes 3422 Yes Yes Yes 
6 10 15000 220 3 5 34 Yes 2612 Yes No Inconclusive 
6 11 15000 220 4 3 31 Yes 1256 Yes N/A Yes 
6 12 15000 220 4 2 35 Yes 1964 Yes Yes Yes 
6 13 15000 220 4 4 29 Yes 660 Yes Yes Yes 
6 14 15000 220 4 1 36 Yes 3685 No No No 
6 15 15000 220 4 5 38 Yes 2803 No No No 
6 22 8000 220 2 3 30 No 1768 No N/A No 
6 23 8000 220 2 2 24 Yes 2019 Yes Yes Yes 
6 24 8000 220 2 4 27 Yes 1258 Yes No Inconclusive 
6 25 8000 220 2 1 25 Yes 2632 Yes Yes Yes 
6 26 8000 220 2 5 32 Yes 2369 No No No 
6 27 8000 220 3 3 27 Yes 771 Yes N/A Yes 
6 28 8000 220 3 2 19 Yes 1383 Yes Yes Yes 
6 30 8000 220 3 4 11 Yes 721 Yes Yes Yes 
6 31 8000 220 4 3 28 Yes 732 No N/A No 
6 32 8000 220 4 2 33 Yes 3184 No No No 
6 33 8000 220 4 4 32 Yes 1641 No No No 
6 34 8000 220 4 1 34 Yes 5192 No No No 
6 35 8000 220 3 1 28 Yes 2727 Yes Yes Yes 
6 36 8000 220 3 5 28 Yes 2482 Yes No Inconclusive 
6 37 8000 220 4 5 30 Yes 1294 Yes Yes Yes 
7 10 500 270 1 1 5 Yes 383 Yes Yes Yes 
7 11 500 270 2 3 16 Yes 913 No N/A No 
7 12 500 270 2 2 6 Yes 915 Yes Yes Yes 
7 13 500 270 2 4 7 Yes 291 Yes No Inconclusive 
7 14 500 270 2 1 12 Yes 2036 No No No 
7 15 500 270 2 5 10 Yes 751 No No No 
7 16 500 270 3 3 6 Yes 346 Yes N/A Yes 
7 17 500 270 3 2 8 Yes 739 No No No 
7 18 500 270 3 4 8 Yes 652 Yes Yes Yes 
7 19 500 270 3 1 10 Yes 687 No No No 
7 20 500 270 3 5 14 Yes 516 No Yes Inconclusive 
8 2 500 220 2 3 2 No 806 No N/A No 
8 3 500 220 2 2 9 Yes 853 Yes Yes Yes 
8 4 500 220 2 1 8 No 967 Yes Yes Yes 
8 5 500 220 2 5 8 Yes 3640 Yes No Inconclusive 
8 6 500 220 2 4 11 Yes 592 No Yes Inconclusive 
8 7 500 220 3 3 5 Yes 409 No N/A No 
8 8 500 220 3 2 10 No 880 No No No 
8 9 500 220 3 1 12 Yes 4464 No No No 
8 10 500 220 3 5 10 No 1742 Yes No Inconclusive 
8 11 500 220 3 4 11 No 232 No Yes Inconclusive 
9 7 500 220 1 3 19 No 565 No N/A No 
9 8 500 220 1 2 9 Yes 301 No No No 
9 9 500 220 1 4 1 Yes 1191 Yes Yes Yes 
9 10 500 220 1 1 14 Yes 4114 Yes Yes Yes 
9 11 500 220 1 5 12 Yes 1064 Yes No Inconclusive 
9 12 500 270 1 3 16 Yes 603 Yes N/A Yes 
10 7 500 270 1 2 13 Yes 1471 No No No 
10 8 500 270 1 4 14 Yes 1090 Yes Yes Yes 
10 9 500 270 1 1 20 Yes 2486 No No No 
10 10 500 270 1 5 17 Yes 973 No No No 
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Appendix F. Virtual Terrain Activation Results
The following page presents the results of the virtual terrain activation analysis.
The remainder of this page is intentionally blank
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Test 
Flight Rec # 
Alt 
(ft) 
MSL 
AGL 
Airspeed 
(KIAS) IC 
Refresh 
Rate (Hz) 
Set 
Buffer 
Forward 
Look-Ahead 
Time (sec) 
RSS 
Dist. 
(ft) HaT (ft) 
5 16 15000 MSL 270 1 6.25 100 3 -13 -220 
5 17 15000 MSL 270 2 6.25 100 5 16 23 
5 18 15000 MSL 270 3 6.25 100 21 -9 -422 
5 19 15000 MSL 220 1 6.25 100 8 191 226 
5 20 15000 MSL 220 2 6.25 100 11 337 342 
5 21 15000 MSL 220 3 6.25 100 20 547 576 
5 38 8000 MSL 270 1 12.5 100 3 37 109 
5 39 8000 MSL 270 2 12.5 100 1 211 212 
5 40 8000 MSL 270 3 12.5 100 5 110 133 
5 41 8000 MSL 270 1 6.25 100 15 135 151 
6 16 15000 MSL 220 1 1.5625 100 15 121 154 
6 17 15000 MSL 220 2 1.5625 100 6 -11 -45 
6 18 15000 MSL 220 3 1.5625 100 28 -9 -294 
6 19 15000 MSL 270 1 1.5625 100 15 145 153 
6 20 15000 MSL 270 2 1.5625 100 5 15 44 
6 21 15000 MSL 270 3 1.5625 100 30 105 106 
6 38 8000 MSL 220 1 1.5625 100 10 -20 -33 
6 39 8000 MSL 220 2 1.5625 100 7 173 184 
6 40 8000 MSL 220 3 1.5625 100 8 50 75 
6 41 8000 MSL 270 1 1.5625 100 3 95 101 
6 42 8000 MSL 270 2 1.5625 100 3 105 137 
6 43 8000 MSL 270 3 1.5625 100 6 -32 -24 
7 5 8000 MSL 270 3 6.25 100 17 47 74 
7 6 8000 MSL 270 2 6.25 100 4 15 71 
7 7 8000 MSL 220 1 6.25 100 10 100 132 
7 8 8000 MSL 220 2 6.25 100 11 239 242 
7 9 8000 MSL 220 3 6.25 100 10 94 102 
7 21 8000 MSL 270 1 6.25 100 15 90 190 
7 22 500 AGL 270 2 12.5 100 4 119 123 
7 23 500 AGL 270 3 12.5 100 5 108 125 
7 24 500 AGL 220 1 12.5 100 11 136 169 
7 25 500 AGL 220 2 12.5 100 7 157 179 
8 12 500 AGL 220 1 6.25 100 14 46 48 
8 13 500 AGL 220 2 6.25 100 8 87 141 
8 14 500 AGL 220 3 6.25 100 7 149 157 
8 15 500 AGL 270 1 6.25 100 19 45 137 
8 16 500 AGL 270 2 6.25 100 3 79 82 
8 17 500 AGL 270 3 6.25 100 6 4 141 
8 18 500 AGL 220 1 1.5625 100 8 70 86 
8 20 500 AGL 220 2 1.5625 100 5 139 172 
8 21 500 AGL 220 3 1.5625 100 17 -11 -124 
8 24 500 AGL 270 2 1.5625 100 2 138 143 
8 26 500 AGL 270 3 1.5625 100 2 715 720 
10 11 500 AGL 220 1 12.5 200 3 102 174 
10 12 500 AGL 220 2 12.5 200 6 34 99 
11 8 500 AGL 220 1 12.5 200 16 184 221 
11 9 500 AGL 220 2 12.5 200 1 175 203 
11 10 500 AGL 220 3 12.5 200 11 251 270 
11 11 500 AGL 270 1 12.5 200 5 128 151 
11 12 500 AGL 270 2 12.5 200 4 187 214 
11 13 500 AGL 270 3 12.5 200 4 95 151 
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Appendix G. RSET Configuration Tracker
The following pages present a record of the configuration changes made during
the Have MEDUSA test program.
The remainder of this page is intentionally blank
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Flight # EP(s) TC(s) 
Changes Made  
Before Flight 
Issues Discovered  
During or After Flight 
1 Gotwald 
Gahan 
Mak Jian Ming 
*Baseline configuration 
resulting from simulator 
and ground tests. 
*Actual control surface rate limits 
significantly different than the 
requested rate limits (persistent 
variables issue), causing numerous VSS 
trips. 
*Wind data from Learjet was not being 
passed to RSET - variable names too 
long (discovered post flight 2). 
*Initial horizontal stab position was 
incorrectly being passed to RSET as the 
aileron position (discovered flight 3). 
*Learjet sending unreliable heading 
value (Psi) to RSET instead of INS 
ground track value (discovered post 
flight 3). 
*C.G. offset set to a fixed value instead 
of changing based on current fuel 
balance (discovered post flight 3). 
2 Hammond 
Kolesar 
Gahan 
*Issue with rate limit 
variables resolved. 
*Wind data from Learjet was not being 
passed to RSET - variable names too 
long. 
*Initial horizontal stab position was 
incorrectly being passed to RSET as the 
aileron position (discovered flight 3). 
*Learjet sending unreliable heading 
value (Psi) to RSET instead of INS 
ground track value (discovered post 
flight 3). 
*C.G. offset set to a fixed value instead 
of changing based on current fuel 
balance (discovered post flight 3). 
*MATLAB froze mid-flight and required 
a lot of troubleshooting to get all 
settings set up. 
3 Bakun 
Mak Jian Ming 
Gahan 
*Wind variable names 
changed so they are 
properly passed to RSET 
*Extensive list of VSS 
parameters added to 
recording list 
*Initial horizontal stab position was 
incorrectly being passed to RSET as the 
aileron position. 
*Learjet sending unreliable heading 
value (Psi) to RSET instead of INS 
ground track value. 
*C.G. offset set to a fixed value instead 
of changing based on current fuel 
balance. 
*Learjet sending unreliable wind speed 
data to RSET (~80 kts) 
*Learjet reported incorrect causes for 
valid VSS trips 
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Flight # EP(s) TC(s) 
Changes Made  
Before Flight 
Issues Discovered  
During or After Flight 
4 Hammond Gahan 
*Initial aileron position 
issue fixed. 
*Aircraft heading 
parameter changed from 
"psi" to "ins_track_true" 
*Updated Lear 3 mass 
property calculation in 
order to pass correct c.g. 
offset to RSET 
*Wind set to zero 
*Autopilot updated to 
improve smoothness 
(removed Nz feedback; 
added lower Nz bound) 
*Max gamma changed to 12 deg 
during flight to prevent excessive 
airspeed loss. 
*Under-g VSS trips during hand-back 
after multiple automatic activations. 
5 Bakun Mak Jian Ming 
*Drop-down menu for 
number of back seat 
passengers added to GUI in 
order to increase accuracy 
of weight & balance 
measurement 
*Fields added to GUI for 
entering wind speed and 
direction before each test 
point. Wind 
speed/direction will be 
considered constant 
throughout each test 
point. 
  
6 Gotwald Kolesar 
None   
7 Hammond Mak Jian Ming 
*Drop-down field for DTED 
region added to GUI 
  
8 Gotwald Gahan 
None   
9 
Bakun 
Gotwald 
Mak Jian Ming 
None   
10 
Hammond 
Lt Col Abel 
Kolesar 
None   
11 Bakun Gahan 
None   
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Appendix H. 412th Test Wing Rating Criteria
Figure H.1 presents the test objective rating criteria used by the 412th Test Wing
as of the September 2018 Have MEDUSA TMP.
Figure H.1. 412th Test Wing Rating Criteria
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Appendix I. Digital Appendix
Raw flight test data, additional figures, and MATLAB code used to reduce the
flight test data are available by contacting the Air Force Institute of Technology Point
of Contact:
Dr. Richard Cobb
AFIT/ENY
2950 Hobson Way, Bldg 640
Room 345
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433
937-255-3636
Please see Section 3.8.3 for recommended minimum system specifications for run-
ning the RSET system. The files are held in four folders. Their structure is listed
below.
0. RSET System MATLAB Code
a. All files needed to run the RSET System
b. Primary file is “HaveMEDUSA.slx”
1. Raw Data
a. All flight test data gathered from flights 4 - 11
b. Data is separated as data gathered from the RSET algorithm and that
gathered from the Learjet sensors.
c. RSET data: “Flight XX MEDUSA data”
d. Learjet data: “Flight XXX VSS data”
2. Data Reduction Scripts
a. For calculating PPE: “Manual path prediction error v6.m”
b. For calculating RSS distance from terrain: “closest point approach v9.m”
3. Figures and Plots
a. Contains manual and virtual terrain activation figures
b. Manual figures: “Flight XX Man Act”
c. Virtual figures: “Flight XX Virtual Figures”
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Appendix J. Hand-Back Survey
204
Appendix K. Aircrew Comments
“Felt smooth and safe. Adequate for system maturity.”
“Hand-back took a little too long in order to stay smooth. I would probably
pickle off and take command earlier to recover faster.”
“Higher airspeed hand-back was more aggressive vs lower energy state hand-
backs, but not undesirable.”
“During low speed points, its hard to tell if the aircraft is in a hand-back state or
attempting a different path. Visual indication of system state would be useful.”
“In a non-combat environment this would be totally fine. It gets the aircraft
back to a place I feel comfortable taking control.”
“The hand-back may be problematic for spec ops terrain masking missions as
the RSET doesnt account for these mission-specific requirements.”
“Mission must be accounted for in the hand-back design”
“The stick shaker was a nice way to identify the RSET was controlling the
aircraft. Termination of stick shaker made it unambiguous that the hand-back
was complete.”
“While slightly too aggressive at times, a hand-back sequence needs to be in-
corporated.”
“Low speed was very smooth.”
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and an 18 DoF Stitched aerodynamic model to create terrain avoidance paths based on the aircraft’s state and location.
The system then triggered when all paths predicted collision with the DTED and automatically activated the path which
had the longest time until impact. A buffer of 200 ft added to the DTED to allowed for processing and execution of the
maneuver. Path prediction error (PPE) was larger than expected for the 30-second path predictions. At 12.5 Hz the
RSET system avoided terrain in all cases tested and was able to achieve and maintain target load factor and flight path
angle with momentary overshoots, and showed no tendency for nuisance activations. Hand-back was favorable.
multi-path, Auto-GCAS, controlled flight into terrain, safety, Test Pilot School, Calspan Learjet VSS, MATLAB,
Simulink, rapidly selectable escape trajector, RSET, Have MEDUSA, stitched model, DTED, Thesis
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